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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
White Fight: Papers on Racial Context and Political Behavior
by
Tyler Thomas Reny
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020
Professor Matthew Alejandro Barreto, Chair
The four papers in this dissertation examine the relationship between demographic context
and mass and elite political behaviors. The first paper leverages a demographic shock—the
movement of massive numbers of African Americans from the American south to California
during the “Second Great Migration” in the early 20th century—to assess the impact of
proximity to demographic change on voting for a racial ballot proposition in 1964. The
second paper argues that racial threat can also operate prospectively before demographic
shifts occur, what I call “potential outgroup entry.” To study this, I examine how a vote
for a bond funding the expansion of the BART train in the Bay Area in 1962 was partially
shaped by the fear of the potential outgroup entry of a sizable number of black riders from
the East Bay into San Francisco. In the third paper I apply theories of demographic change
and racial threat to contemporary voting by looking at how both symbolic attitudes and
contexts were correlated with vote-switching toward and away from Donald Trump in 2016.
Finally, in the fourth paper, I examine the role that context plays in shaping elite behavior.
More specifically, I examine how both stable and changing demographics in a state shape
electoral incentives and thus the content of campaign appeals by U.S. Senatorial candidates
in 2010, 2012, and 2014.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The change in the demographic composition of the United States is arguably one of the most
important shifts of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The changes have been rapid and
the social, economic, and political implications continue to be profound and understudied.
This dissertation explores a central question: what is the impact of local demographic change
on the political behaviors of the mass public and elites?
Across four chapters of this dissertation, I address this question in different ways, each
of which makes a unique contribution to the literature. Theoretically, this dissertation helps
clarify some of the boundaries of contextual effects on mass behavior, highlighting the ways
in which demographic change is a unique political phenomena with political effects that
are distinct from those correlated with demographic composition. This dissertation also
steps back in time to understand how large demographic shifts shaped politics historically,
many of which continue to affect politics today. In addition, the third chapter generates
a new set of theoretical concepts that I think are ripe for future investigation—namely
the idea of “potential outgroup entry,” the idea that the anticipated demographic changes
wrought by changes in infrastructure or transportation can shape support or opposition
to those changes, helping to perpetuate and reinforce spatial segregation in urban spaces.
Finally, the last empirical chapter takes theories about demographic change and its effects
on mass behavior and suggests that it also shapes the electoral incentives of elected officials
running for office. Together the findings in this dissertation help us better understand how
demographic changes across the United States will continue to shape mass and elite politics
well into the 21st century.
The papers in this dissertation also make empirical contributions to the literature on
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contextual effect. The first two papers, in particular, leverage historical moments where I
can measure political behavior of native residents of communities in response to demographic
changes or prospective demographic changes before large-scale sorting occurred. In addition
to shedding light on two interesting historical periods—the second great migration of black
southerns into California and the roll-out of the BART train in the Bay Area—the design
of these two studies helps me to ameliorate the specter of selection bias, getting me closer
to causal estimates of context on behavior.
While each paper in this dissertation stands alone, I will use the rest of this introduc-
tion to briefly highlight how rapidly demographic shifts are changing the racial and ethnic
composition of communities around the country, lay out the state of the literature on con-
textual effects in political science and related social sciences, and outline how the chapters
in this dissertation help us narrow some of those gaps.
1.1 How Changing Demographics Shape Local Politics
To understand just how rapidly and profoundly demographic changes are shaping our society
and politics, we can zoom in on Hazleton, Pennsylvania, a small town in the coal region of
northeastern Pennsylvania. Hazleton has been, for most of its recent history, an exclusively
white community, home to descendants of European immigrants who worked the coal local
mines. It is a town that took pride in its working-class history and civic spirit, its various
European-origin groups united “by mining work, the labor movement, high levels of military
service, and the community’s churches and fraternal organizations.”1
By the mid-1990s, the town of about 25,000 residents was less than 1% Hispanic, the
1990 Census recording 249 Hispanic residents within its borders. But everything would
change rapidly in late 2001. The September 11th attack on the World Trade Centers in New
York City catalyzed the out-migration of significant numbers of Hispanic—predominantly
Dominican—immigrants from the Washington Heights neighborhood in Manhattan. Do-
1See: https://www.city-journal.org/html/chain-migration-comes-hazleton-15832.html
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minican immigrants were drawn to small communities like Hazleton, PA, for their lower
crime rates, affordable housing, and stronger public schools. By 2007, Hazleton Area School
District was 28% Hispanic. As of 2014, it was 45% Hispanic, with nearly 20% of its student
body needing English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction.2
Like many small predominantly white communities experiencing large influxes of im-
migrants, Hazleton passed into law one of the first local-level immigration enforcement legis-
lation that fined employers and landlords for hiring or renting apartments to undocumented
immigrants. While the law was eventually deemed unconstitutional and struck down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in 2014, other communities across the nation followed suit. Estimates
by researchers at the Migration Policy Institute suggest that between 2000 and 2010, 107
U.S. towns, cities, and counties approved local immigration enforcement ordinances.3
These sorts of legislative activities undertaken or supported by residents of a commu-
nity undergoing demographic change and aimed at stemming or reversing that demographic
change are what I call “white fight.” This cycle of demographic shift and dominant-group
resistance is one that has shaped local and national politics throughout time and across the
United States in various ways—most notably through the spatial distribution of people and
resources.
Not every community in the United States has changed as rapidly or reacted the way
Hazelton did, but the vast majority of communities in the United States have experienced
changing demographics, with the growth of the non-white population being a core feature of
these changes. In Figure 1.1, I plot the histogram of percent change in non-white and white
populations in U.S. counties between 2000 and 2018. The differences are stark. Fully 89%
of U.S. counties saw an increase in their non-white populations (an average change of 66%)
compared to just 39% that saw an increase in their white populations (an average change of
0%).
2https://www.city-journal.org/html/chain-migration-comes-hazleton-15832.html
3https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hazleton-immigration-ordinance-began-bang-goes-out-
whimper
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Figure 1.1: Percent Change Demographics in Counties (2000-2018)
Note: Histogram of percent change in non-white and white population (pop2018−pop2000)/(pop2000 at county
level across all U.S. counties between 2000 and 2018. Data from 2000 U.S. Census and 2018 American
Community Survey.
This is perhaps an unfair comparison, though, given that baseline levels of non-white
populations were much smaller to begin with. We can also look at the change in percent
of the population that is non-white in U.S. counties, which I do in Figure 1.2. The finding
are more or less the same. 94% of counties saw a positive increase in percentage of their
populations that were non-white which means conversely that 94% of counties saw a drop
in the percentage of their populations that were white. Today 14% of U.S. counties are over
50% non-white, an incredible statistic.
We can also look at data at lower levels of aggregation to see if changes are concentrated,
perhaps, in urban areas within counties. If that is the case, we would expect to see fewer
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Figure 1.2: Change in Percent White/Non-White in Counties (2000-2018)
Note: Histogram of percent change in non-white and white population (popnonwhite2018 − totalpop2018) −
(popnonwhite2000 − totalpop2000) at county level across all U.S. counties between 2000 and 2018. Data from
2000 U.S. Census and 2018 American Community Survey.
census tracts, a smaller unit of aggregation (average population of n = 4, 385), experiencing
demographic shifts. This isn’t the case. If I repeat the analysis above I find that 79% of
census tracts saw a percentage increase in their nonwhite populations where only 33% saw
the same with their white populations. Looking at it a bit differently, 82% of tracts saw an
increase in their percentage of population that was non-white whereas just 18% of tracts saw
the same increase in the percentage of their populations that were white.
In sum, demographic change is not something that is just happening in a handful of
large and mid-size metropolitan areas in a few immigrant receiving states like California,
Texas, Florida, Illinois and New York. It is also happening in medium and small cities,
suburbs, towns, and rural areas in the Midwest, the South, and the Northeast. This change
has already or is in early stages of transforming the demographic profile of almost every com-
munity in the United States and it behooves scholars to understand how these demographic
shifts shape politics so that we better understand how we got where we are today but also
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where we might be going in the near future.
1.2 Conflicting Findings in Extant Literature
While I suggest that studying cycles of demographic change and political response is crucial
to understanding national, state, and local politics, it’s important to recognize that the study
of contextual effects is exceedingly difficult. While the challenges are numerous, chief among
them is what Robert Sampson called the specter of selection bias (Sampson 2008). The
reality is that Americans are quite mobile and some move quite frequently. According to
the 2019 U.S. Census Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement,
9.4% of Americans moved last year. 62% of those moved within the same county, 22% within
the same state but different county, and 15% to a different state. While overall residential
mobility is dropping over time, this are still over 30 million people choosing a new apartment
or home in potentially a new neighborhood each year.
The issue, though, is that these 30 million Americans do not move randomly. There
are a number of factors that go into choosing neighborhoods including trade-offs between
individual-level constraints and desired neighborhood qualities (Martin and Webster 2017).
These qualities might include overall levels of crime, quality of schools, commuting times,
and density (Mummolo and Nall 2017). It might also include preferences for different racial
compositions, likely a function of people’s underlying racial predispositions (Tam Cho et al.
2013). There is a long history in the United States of white American fleeing diverse or
diversifying spaces partly as a function of their racial attitudes (Kruse 2013). Newer work
shows that liberals prefer to live in more dense and diverse spaces, also partly as a function
of their baseline tolerance for diversity (Maxwell 2017). As such, it is exceptionally difficult
to tease out whether observed attitudes and behaviors are shaped by contexts or whether
those underlying attitudes influenced the move into that context in the first place.
A second issue is that variation in observed outcomes could be driven by variation in the
contextual or areal unit chosen for analysis (Yule and Kendall 1950; Openshaw and Taylor
1979). The relationship between racial composition and behavior, for example, has been
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examined at the state level (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Hero and Preuhs 2007), county level
(Giles and Buckner 1993; Gaines et al. 2004; Key 1949), zip code (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999;
Hopkins 2010a), census tract (Oliver and Wong 2003; Putnam 2007), and census block group
(Gay 2006), among others. Individuals are nested within a number of different administrative
geographic boundaries and the covariation of an outcome of interest with some contextual
variable of interest can vary drastically depending on the choice of administrative geographic
boundary. In fact, Oliver (2010) finds that high levels of racial diversity at the zip code level
is correlated with low levels of prejudice among white residents of that “neighborhood,”
while high levels of racial diversity at the county level generally correlates with higher level
of prejudice.
As a result of these and other issues, there are drastically diverging findings in extant
research on contextual effects. Some scholars find that proximity to outgroups fuels racially
threatened attitudes and behaviors (Enos 2017; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Giles and Hertz
1994), others that it has no effect (Voss 1996; Cain et al. 2000; Campbell et al. 2006), and still
others that it reduces threat (Fetzer 2000; Fox 2004; Welch et al. 2001; Carsey 1995; Oliver
and Wong 2003; Voss 1996).4 For some, this has cast doubt on the research on contextual
effects all together. Michael Tesler and David Sears (Tesler and Sears 2010), two of the
leading scholars of race in politics in America, dismiss the approach all together in their
book (Tesler and Sears 2010), noting that observed effects, whenever they are observed, are
likely spurious or driven by sorting. The approach, they argue, is “rejected as outdated”
(pg 170). Needless to say, there remains considerable space for researchers to improve on
existing work on contextual effects, particularly those of racial context, in political science.
1.3 Paths Forward
Ideally, as researchers, we would be able to randomize contexts and measure outcomes as
a function of random assignment to treatment. Aside from a handful of small or extremely
4See Enos 2016 and Oliver 2010 for additional excellent reviews of the literature.
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expensive experiments (Enos 2014a; Sampson 2008), however, this is unfeasible. Other ap-
proaches have involved controlling for neighborhood racial preference (Oliver and Wong
2003), using instrumental variables (Acharya et al. 2016), using survey experiments (Glaser
2003), or, more recently, taking advantage of large and rapid shifts of populations in geo-
graphic space to capture behaviors before the native population could sort as a function of
those demographic shifts (Enos 2016; Hopkins 2012; Reny and Newman 2018; Hangartner
et al. 2018).
The first two papers of this dissertation take advantage of the latter situation. In the
first paper, titled “Protecting the Right to Discriminate: The Second Great Migration and
Racial Threat in the American West,” I leverage a vote for a racialized ballot proposition
that promptly followed the rapid and large-scale movement of black Americans from the
South to California. Taking advantage of this unique historical event, coupled with a bevy
of robustness checks, allows me to increase my confidence that I’m estimating a racial threat
effect before sorting could commence. In the second paper, titled “Racial Threat as Potential
Outgroup Entry: Historical Evidence Using New Mass Transit,” I identify a unique case
where residents of San Francisco voted on a bond measure to fund the construction of public
transit that would facilitate the easy entry of mass numbers of non-white East Bay residents
into their largely white enclaves. As such I can estimate the effect of “potential outgroup
entry” before the demographic change had even occurred, again bypassing the selection issue
that plagues so much of this research.
In the last two papers of this dissertation I move away from methodological contri-
butions and historical cases to instead explore the impact of demographic change on con-
temporary mass and elite behavior. The first explores how both symbolic and contextual
factors were associated with vote switching either toward or away from Donald Trump in
2016. The second looks at how the interplay of demographic change and overall demographic
composition incentivize elite strategy with regards to immigration appeals in U.S. Senate
elections.
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1.4 Future Work
While this dissertation doesn’t propose or test a broad theory of demographic shifts and
“White Fight,” it raises several questions or ideas that merit further investigation.
1. The first relates to the lack of clear definitions in the study of “contextual effects.” It
is clear that treating all “snapshots” (e.g. looking at cross-sectional data, for example)
of geographic contexts as identical is a mistake. Demographic contexts are the result
of current and past political, social, and economic push and pull forces. Some commu-
nities have stable population dynamics. In the South, for example, there are counties
that have roughly maintained the same proportion of white and black residents for
decades. There are institutions in place in these areas that are the results of political
power dynamics in the past and present. Political behavior and attitudes in these areas
are a partly a function of both this history and these institutions and are very different
from the political dynamics that might follow rapid demographic shifts. Yet if scholars
continue to examine snapshot cross-sections of contexts without paying attention to
the specifics of that context, the field will continue to arrive at vastly divergent results.
2. Second, building on the theme above, there is room for a big study of how communities
respond to demographic shifts and the conditions under which “White Fight” occurs.
My works in this dissertation and elsewhere examines cases where it did occur, but
this isn’t always the case. At least anecdotally, many small towns across the United
States have welcomed immigrants. These “New Americans” bring economic renewal to
many areas suffering from population decline, economic stagnation, and drug addiction,
among others.5
3. Third, there is ample space to expand on the idea of “racial threat as prospective
outgroup entry.” The study of racial contextual effects has, to my knowledge, focused
almost exclusively on demographic changes that have already occurred or are in the
5For example, see: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/02/opinion/sunday/the-mexican-revival-of-small-
town-america.html
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process of occurring. Yet in urban communities across the country officials are mak-
ing development decisions daily that have demographic consequences. Zoning, public
transportation, highway construction, and housing development (among others) all
have potential implications for different groups: their spacial segregation, their access
to scarce resources, their housing values, their exposure to pollution, their quality of
life. One important factor in these development decisions is often, whether spoken or
unspoken, the impact that they will have on the racial makeup of communities. Will
public transit allow for the easy access of non-white city residents into predominantly
segregated white communities? Will allowing the construction of three story apartment
buildings in single-family home neighborhoods change the demographic character of
these spaces? Racial threat can exist and influence behaviors and attitudes before the
demographic shifts even take place and I suspect that this happens quite frequently in
urban spaces.
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CHAPTER 2
Protecting the Right to Discriminate: The Second
Great Migration and Racial Threat in the American
West
A substantial body of research in American politics explores the impact of ”racial threat”
(Key 1949) on White Americans’ political attitudes and behavior. As summarized in prior
scholarship (Enos 2016; Oliver 2010; Cho and Baer 2011a)1, this literature is beset with
conflicting findings, with one of the primary contributing factors being the problem of se-
lection bias. Indeed, this research typically analyzes the impact of the size of geographically
proximate racial minority populations on whites using observational data, limiting causal
inference due to concerns over the non-random nature of minority settlement patterns and
residential selection among whites (Clark 1992). Researchers have attempted to assuage
these concerns by controlling for self-reported neighborhood racial preferences (Oliver and
Wong 2003), performing endogeneity tests (Rocha and Espino 2010), demonstrating that
racial orientations are not predictive of respondents’ racial context (Branton and Jones
2005a), and using instrumental variables (Acharya et al. 2016). Additionally, scholarship
has attempted to bypass this issue altogether by using survey and field experiments (Glaser
2003; Enos 2014a).
A promising direction taken in recent research is the identification of events where
large changes in minority populations occurred and characteristics of the event facilitate
causal inference, typically by mitigating concerns about selection bias. Examples include
the influx of African American evacuees from New Orleans into neighboring cities following
1see Appendix A for an expanded review
11
Hurricane Katrina (Hopkins 2012) and the exodus of African American residents from whites’
neighborhoods following the demolition of public housing in Chicago (Enos 2016).
In this chapter, I identify a previously overlooked event in American history that pro-
vides useful features for gaining insight on the effect of racial context on white voter behavior.
Following the First Great Migration (1910-1930) of African Americans out of the American
South to Northeastern cities (Gregory 2005), a second and larger exodus of African Amer-
icans out of the South (1941-1970) resulted in a massive and unprecedented migration to
the American West—most notably to the state of California (Wilkinson 2011). Dubbed the
Second Great Migration (SGM), this event provides a useful test of racial threat, as African
Americans previously constituted an almost non-existent share of the California popula-
tion. Residential choice among Anglo-Californians prior to the SGM occurred largely in
the absence of black residents, distinguishing this event from the vast majority of existing
studies of racial threat where the whites under study had long-standing contact with African
Americans and residential decisions were made with regard to racial demographics (Freund
2007).
I leverage this historical event to evaluate the impact of proximity to areas undergoing
rapid demographic change on white voting for Proposition 14, a California ballot proposition
in the 1964 election that sought to exempt the real estate industry and homeowners from anti-
discrimination laws (HoSang 2010). Applying theories of racial threat, I expect proximity to
rapidly diversifying cities to be associated with greater levels of racial threat and therefore
stronger support among white voters for Proposition 14. Because many Anglo-Californians
in the early 1960s made housing decisions before this demographic shock took place, I have
increased confidence that the SGM provides a rare test of racial threat that at least partially
ameliorates concern over selection bias.
2.1 The Second Great Migration and Proposition 14
Throughout the early 20th century, the African American population in California was small
and, due to both de jure and de facto segregation, concentrated in a handful of census tracts
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designated specifically for non-whites. The 1940 decennial census, conducted immediately
before the start of the SGM, indicates that African Americans comprised less than 2% of
the state population and less than 3% of the population in urban counties that would come
to house the largest black populations. Holding aside the black population, the non-black
minority population in California in 1940 was only 2.7%, leaving the state nearly 96% white.2
The SGM drastically changed this, and represents one of the largest demographic
shocks to white society in contemporary American history. By 1960, California’s black
population grew by over 600% to approximately 885,000. In a number of cities, the black
population exploded: Berkeley, Emeryville, Richmond, and Vallejo all saw their black pop-
ulations expand by 10 percentage points or more. In Compton, the black population grew
from zero to nearly 40 percent by 1960. Figure 5.1 displays the cities with the highest black
population growth. This population growth strained housing in the few black neighborhoods
throughout the state, increasing demand for housing in neighboring communities (HoSang
2010). As the black community grew, political elites and homeowners sought to protect
white communities from what they saw as a threat to home values and neighborhood iden-
tity (Lipsitz 1996). Together, these actors maintained racial exclusion through a variety of
official and unofficial policies, leading to some of the most entrenched segregation in the
nation (HoSang 2010).
The election of state legislator William Rumford (D) in 1949 and Governor Pat Brown
(D) in 1958 aided in the passage of several anti-discrimination measures, precipitating the
white backlash that culminated in Proposition 14. Real estate interests, politicians, and
evangelical church leaders coordinated to collect signatures for a proposition to amend the
2The Mexican/Latina/o and Asian populations in the state at this point were still quite small, though
it’s difficult to discern the true size of each given that the U.S. Census was not collecting or reporting data
on smaller racial or ethnic categories at this time. The city of Los Angeles, however, has reported data. In
1930, Los Angeles was 7.8% Latino and 2% Asian or “other” race. By 1960, the groups had not grown as
a proportion of the total population, in fact they had shrunk, to 6.4% and 1.8% respectively. While this is
just one city in the state, there is little evidence that either of these racial or ethnic minority groups were
rapidly growing. In fact the Latino population really didn’t start growing in Southern California until the
passage of the 1965 immigration reform bill. By 1970, Los Angeles was 18.4% Latino and by 1980 27.5%.
This lack of growth of other minority populations during this time period reduces my concern that other
growing minority populations are serving as confounders with the growing black population in the state.
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Figure 2.1: Map of Rapidly Growing Black Cities 1940-1960
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Note: City-level African American population growth 1940-1960 in Southern (panel A) and
Northern (panel B) California. 98th percentile growth cities include Compton, Emeryville,
Richmond, Vallejo, and Berkeley and additional 95th percentile growth cities of Pasadena,
Elsinore, Menlo Park, Pittsburg. A map of the central valley, including 95th percentile growth
cities of Bakersfield, Fowler, and Madera, is presented in Figure 2.9.
state constitution, protecting what white residents believed was their right to discriminate.
The measure, Proposition 14, passed 65 to 35 percent with overwhelming support from white
Californians who, according to the CA Field Poll surveys, supported the measure by 3 to
1 (HoSang 2010). Less than one year after the passage of Proposition 14, the Watts Riot
broke out in Los Angeles, which was one of the most destructive urban race riots in American
history (Queally 2015).
In sum, 1940 to 1965 represents a pronounced period of racial change and conflict in the
American West, and key features of the SGM afford a unique opportunity to assess the causal
effect of racial threat on white voting behavior. First, the residential decisions of the study
group (whites) were largely made in the absence of the treatment group (African Americans).
The interpretation of findings from prior observational studies of racial threat are often
marred by concerns over selection bias; however, in the case of the SGM, residential decisions
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by whites were made largely without consideration of the black composition of their own or
neighboring communities. Second, the migration of African Americans into California was
rapid and concentrated in a few cities, increasing my confidence that the 1964 vote preceded
much of the White flight that occurred between mid-1960 to 1980 following the Watts Riots,
the overturning of Proposition 14 by the Supreme Court, and school desegregation (Schneider
2007). In short, I treat the rapid increase in California’s black population as a racially
threatening “shock” to white society and a potentially important source of white support
for Proposition 14.
2.2 Empirical Strategy and Data
As the SGM involved the drastic growth of black populations in key areas throughout the
state of California, my empirical strategy centers upon analyzing the effect of spatial prox-
imity to black growth cities on white support for Proposition 14. Theories of racial threat
are rooted in Key’s (1949) proposition that white political behavior in the American south
was partly a consequence of the presence of African Americans in their communities. More
recent work, however, argues that it is the in-migration and growth of an out-group that
serves as a motivating shock to white political behavior (Green et al. 1998; Hopkins 2009a;
Newman 2013a). Following this work, and that by Enos (2016), I conceptualize racial threat
as the motivating effect on white political behavior of drastic changes in a spatially prox-
imate black population. Given that theories of racial threat argue that the psychological
salience of a group is a function of its size and spatial proximity (Enos 2016), I conceptualize
my “treatment” as the proximity of white voters to epicenters of black population growth.
I constructed a dataset from historical administrative data from the U.S. Census Bureau
and the Office of the Secretary of State. The data is provided at the Census place (i.e., city)
level, the finest level of aggregation I could acquire from historical sources. In total, my full
dataset includes voting results for 392 cities in California. Because I are primarily interested
in white voting behavior, I subset the data for my analyses to cities that were 9% or greater
white (n=340) in 1960. My dependent variable is city-level vote for Proposition 14 (mean =
15
65.7%, sd=10.6%) as reported by the 1964 California Secretary of State Supplement to the
Statement of the Vote.
My key independent variable is city proximity to its nearest black growth city. To
calculate this measure, I used city-level demographic estimates from the 1940 and 1960 U.S.
Census files to calculate percentage point change in the black population (mean=1.17%,
s.d.=3.97%). I identified black growth cities as those in the 98th percentile of black pop-
ulation growth, capturing cities that experienced black population growth between 10 and
40 percentage points over the 20-year span, constructed a matrix of orthodromic distances
between the centroids of all California cities, and defined proximity as the distance in miles
from the nearest black growth city (mean = -69.8, sd = 64). For ease of interpretation, I
divide this variable by 100 and multiplied by -1, so that a unit increase indicates a 100 mile
increase in proximity. By using a continuous treatment indicator on non-nested data, I by-
pass the concern in the racial threat literature over the sensitivity of results using multilevel
data to the choice of administrative boundary (Cho and Baer 2011b; Voss 1996).3
I gathered a number of additional control variables at the census tract level and merged
them with my dataset via a weighted spatial join. I obtained 1964 voter registration figures
for cities from the Berkeley School of Law Center for Research and control for city-level
percent Democrat (of registered) to rule out partisanship as a confounder. Measures of pop-
ulation density control for variation in geographic and population size of each city. As poorer
and more racially conservative whites might be more likely to live adjacent to high black
growth cities, I include controls for median income, home ownership, and unemployment
(descriptive statistics are included in Table 2.3).
While the majority of the residents, and certainly voters, in the state of California were
still white at this time, I restrict all of my samples to 90% or greater white, unless otherwise
noted. This move, which drops 18 observations from the dataset, increases my confidence
that aggregate estimates of voting at the city level are picking up almost exclusively white
voter behavior.
3For more discussion see Appendix B.
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2.3 Results
I begin by estimating the bivariate relationship between proximity and city-level vote for
Proposition 14 for cities with 90% or greater white population, the results of which are
presented in column 1 of Table 5.1. The results indicate that proximity to cities with rapidly
growing black populations is associated with higher levels of white support for Proposition 14.
The benefit of this analysis is that it maximizes statistical power, as the analyses including
control variables have a reduced sample size due to the limited coverage of smaller cities in
the 1960 decennial census.
As the relationship in column 1 could be driven by confounders, column 2 presents
the results from a model including city-level control variables. As shown in column 2, the
relationship between proximity to nearest black growth city and support for Proposition 14
holds. To assess the robustness of these results when accounting for possible nonlinearity
in the relationship between proximity and city-level voting for Proposition 14, I estimate a
model including a squared and cubed proximity term (column 3) and logged proximity (col-
umn 4). While these results indicate a non-linear relationship between these two variables,
it is difficult to compare the average impact of proximity across models. To do so I estimate
predicted values and first-differences.
I plot predicted city-level Proposition 14 vote in Figure 5.2 for models 2 (panel 1), 3
(panel 2), and 4 (panel 3) from Table 2.1. In panel 1, holding all other variables at their
means, I find that a city located adjacent to a black growth city is estimated to support
Proposition 14 at 72.4% (95% CI: [70.5%, 74.3%]), whereas estimated support in a city 200
miles away (mean – 2 s.d.) is 60.6% (95% CI: [56.1%, 65.1%]), a difference of 11.8 percentage
points (95% CI: [6%, 17.2%]). Looking at panel 2, I find that the effect of proximity seems to
be most pronounced in the first 75 miles. The effect of moving from a city 75 miles away to
one adjacent to a black growth city is 11.5 percentage points (95% CI: [5.4%, 18.1%]). The
difference across the full range of proximities is only a slightly larger 12.7% (95% CI: [4.3%,
20.6%]). In panel 3, using logged proximity, I find an almost identical first difference of 12.6%
(95% CI: [6.4%, 18.9%]). This is strong initial evidence for the racial threat hypothesis.
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Table 2.1: The Effect of Proximity to Black Growth Areas on Support for Proposition 14
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Proximity 5.94∗∗∗ 5.88∗∗ 36.06∗∗
(0.87) (1.77) (11.62)
Proximity Sq 35.14∗
(14.99)
Proximity Cubed 10.22∗
(5.11)
Log(Proximity) 10.85∗∗∗
(2.97)
Median Income −0.72 −1.07 −0.83
(0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
Unemployment −6.53 −10.31 −5.62
(30.60) (30.27) (30.29)
Homeownership −7.14 −4.89 −7.00
(6.31) (6.27) (6.26)
Pct Dem 1.49 −3.79 0.33
(6.01) (6.23) (6.00)
Pop Density 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 70.69∗∗∗ 81.06∗∗∗ 89.64∗∗∗ 83.21∗∗∗
(0.77) (6.70) (7.36) (6.78)
R2 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.09
Adj. R2 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.06
Num. obs. 337 181 181 181
RMSE 9.50 9.74 9.59 9.68
Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. 90% and greater White
cities. Columns 1 and 2 assume linear relationship between proximity and city-level Proposition 14 vote.
Columns 3 and 4 allow for non-linearity.∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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Figure 2.2: Effect of Proximity to Black Growth Areas on Support for Proposition 14
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Note: Lines indicate predicted city-level Proposition 14 vote and 95% confidence interval
moving from 200 (2 s.d. below mean) to zero miles from black growth cities for models 2, 3,
and 4 from Table 2.1. All other variables are set to their means.
Because the effect of proximity is similar in all models, for ease of interpretation I will
use the linear specification for the remaining models in the paper.
2.4 Robustness Checks
I demonstrate in the appendix that my results hold when using beta regression (Table 2.4)
and when including county-level fixed effects (Table 2.5). Given my interest in the behavior
of white voters, I demonstrate that my results hold when further restricting the analysis to
cities that were 95% or greater white in 1960 (Table 2.6). Alternatively, my results hold
when lifting the percent white sample restrictions (Table 2.6).
Another concern might be that it is inappropriate to infer individual level behavior
from aggregate election results, even with sample restrictions based on race of city residents.
As such, I show that results hold when employing an ecological inference model to estimate
support for Proposition 14 among white voters (Table 2.7).
Other concerns might be my choice of how to define a “treatment city.” I show that
regardless of how I define treatment cities, my results are robust (Table 2.8). Additionally,
readers might be concerned that orthodromic distance is not the most theoretically appro-
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priate measure of proximity given the geography and topography of California—it could be
the case that two given people live close to one another but are separated by a mountain
range that is not easily passable, reducing threat. I show in Table 2.9 that my results are
robust when using alternate measures of proximity including driving distances and times.
To account for possible post-treatment bias, I demonstrate that my results hold when
replacing my 1960 control variables with pretreatment (i.e., before the SGM) variables de-
rived from the 1940 Census (Table 2.10). While column 1 of Table 2.1 demonstrates that my
results hold when analyzing all predominantly white California cities, to further ensure that
my results are not driven by the mid-to-large cities covered by the 1940 and 1960 Censuses,
I demonstrate that the effect of proximity holds when analyzing the n=187 smaller-sized
cities not covered by these censuses (Table 2.6).
Next, readers might be concerned that a control for partisanship is not adequately
proxying for ideology, which was not as highly correlated with partisanship in the 1960s as it
is today. One way to address this is to show that there is no relationship between proximity
and ideologically clear placebo outcomes. I demonstrate that the positive effect of proximity
to black growth cities is restricted to Proposition 14 and not observed when analyzing two
race neutral propositions dealing with economic (investing pensions in the stock market) and
cultural issues (a ban on obscene materials) (Table 2.11). Lastly, I uncover complementary
results to those presented in Table 2.1 when analyzing individual-level survey data estimating
white support for Proposition 14 as a function of black population growth in respondents’
counties of residence (Table 2.12).
We might also be concerned about additional unobserved confounders in the model. A
sensitivity analysis (Figure 2.7) suggests that confounding would have to explain 16 times the
residual variation in the treatment and outcome as compared to median income in order to
account for the effect. Knowing the importance of income when it comes to where someone
lives (cities versus rural areas) and voting for housing rights, it is difficult to think of a
confounder that is as bad as this, much less 5, 10, or 16 times as bad. I show similar
results comparing instead to partisanship, another plausible variable, in the second panel of
Figure 2.7.
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While the SGM and the 1964 election offer a case where selection bias is substantially
reduced, such concern is not entirely removed. Black residents did not settle at random in
California cities. Further, while “white flight” from California cities was most pronounced
between mid-1960 to 1980 (Schneider 2008), it is possible that substantial residential sorting
occurred between 1940 to 1964. One method for addressing this possibility is to re-analyze
my model among targeted subsamples of the data.
First, I explore whether my results hold when looking at white cities with higher levels
of white residential tenure. The 1960 decennial census includes data on when individuals
moved into their residence. Using this data, I can restrict my analysis to white cities where
a higher rate of residents reported having moved in before 1940 (i.e., before the start of the
SGM). The first row of results in Figure 2.3 (full results available in Table 2.13) demonstrates
that the effect of proximity to black growth cities holds (p<.01) when looking at above-
median tenure cities. This result is critical, as it indicates that when conducting a test
reducing white residential selection bias, the estimated effect of proximity remains positive
and statistically significant.
Second, I can assess whether my results hold when looking at majority-white cities with
lower levels of white population growth between 1940-1960. Racially conservative whites re-
siding in cities experiencing black in-migration may have fled to adjacent all-white cities,
taking their racially threatened attitudes with them and changing aggregate levels in sur-
rounding cities. Such a process could have induced the findings I observe, suggesting they
are less due to the activation of racial threat among whites residing in proximity to black
growth cities and due instead to the migration of racially threatened whites to neighboring
cities. While I find suggestive evidence that white populations contracted the most in cities
within five miles of black growth cities, I find no evidence that white population growth
disproportionately occurred within neighboring cities five or more miles away from black
growth cities (see Figure 2.8). Moreover, the results presented in Figure 2.3 belie this con-
cern: rather than being endemic or more pronounced in white cities experiencing high white
population growth, I find the effect of proximity to black growth cities is stronger in white
cities with below median white growth (range: [-17.2, -0.003], mean= -2.2).
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Figure 2.3: Reanalysis by Residential Tenure, White Growth, and Housing Markets
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
Acquired Before 1940 − Above Median
Acquired Before 1940 − Below Median
White Growth − Above Median
White Growth − Below Median
Control − Inflating Home Values
Control − Contracting Housing
Proximity Coefficient
Note: OLS regression coefficients and heteroskedastic robust standard errors of proximity to
black growth cities. 90% or greater white cities. The first panel splits the sample at median
percent of city residents who moved into their residence prior to 1940, the second splits the
sample at median white growth (1940-1960), and the final controls for proximity to cities
with the largest drop in housing availability or increase in home values. Full model results
available in Appendix Table 2.13.
It is also possible that “redlining” (Rothstein 2017) forced African Americans to settle
in neighborhoods deemed less desirable, which may have contained poorer and more racially
conservative whites. Such possibility could explain the relationship I observe between prox-
imity to black growth cities and white support for Proposition 14. This possibility is not
suggested by the data, as proximity to black growth cities is not strongly correlated with
pretreatment indicators of 1940 socioeconomic standing, such as median home values (r =
.10), homeownership rates (r = .15), or unemployment rates (r = .01). Another concern
is that my results are due to housing competition. It is possible that proximity to black
growth cities is capturing the effect of proximity to areas experiencing increased competition
for housing. The bottom panel of Figure 2.3 displays the coefficient for proximity to black
growth cities when adding a control variable for proximity to cities with the most drastic
(95th percentile) contraction in available housing units (i.e., vacant units for sale or rent) be-
tween 1940-1960, or the most drastic increases in home values between 1940-1960. I find the
effect of proximity holds in both models (p<.001), indicating that proximity to black growth
cities remains positive and significant when holding constant proximity to areas manifesting
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symptoms of housing competition.
2.5 Conclusion
Exploiting a large demographic shift during the SGM, I sidestep some of the concerns of exist-
ing observational research on racial threat and find evidence that white residential proximity
to growing black populations in California was positively associated with voting for Propo-
sition 14 in the 1964 election. As such, my study makes a novel and compelling contribution
to the existing scholarship on the role of racial threat in shaping white political behavior.
Remarkably, demographic change remains a politicized and salient issue fifty years after the
referendum I study. As the nation continues to diversify, understanding the impact of these
demographic shifts on the attitudes and behaviors of native-born residents is increasingly
crucial to understanding national political trends writ large.
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2.6 Supplemental Appendix
2.6.1 A: Expanded Literature Review
Existing work on racial threat has long been beset by conflicting findings. Some scholars find
that proximity to outgroups fuels racially threatened attitudes and behaviors (Enos 2017;
Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Giles and Hertz 1994), others that it has no effect (Voss 1996;
Cain et al. 2000; Campbell et al. 2006), and still others that it reduces threat (Fetzer 2000;
Fox 2004; Welch et al. 2001; Carsey 1995; Oliver and Wong 2003; Voss 1996).4
A number of reasons have been offered for these conflicting findings, including variation
in the groups being studied (Oliver and Wong 2003), socio-economic conditions (Oliver and
Mendelberg 2000; Cho and Baer 2011b), the levels of segregation of the given contexts (Enos
2017; Rocha and Espino 2010), and the operationalization of threat as standing population
versus change in population (Newman 2013a; Green et al. 1998; Hopkins 2010a; Newman
and Velez 2014a). While all of these are important factors, two dominant explanations have
been offered for conflicting results: residential self-selection and the modifiable areal unit
problem (MAUP).
First, contexts aren’t randomly assigned (Sampson 2008; Clark 1992). There are a
number of reasons we might choose to live in a given community, including our attitudes
towards racial and ethnic outgroups (Tam Cho et al. 2013; Oliver 2010).5. The non-random
nature of residential self-selection makes it difficult to tease out the causal effect of context
on attitudes and behaviors using observational data.
Prior scholarship has attempted to address concerns over residential self-selection by
controlling for self-reported neighborhood preferences (Oliver and Wong 2003) or preferences
together with the ability to relocate (Enos and Gidron 2016), performing endogeneity tests
(Rocha and Espino 2010), demonstrating that racial orientations are not predictive of respon-
dents’ racial and ethnic context (Branton and Jones 2005b), using instrumental variables
4See Enos 2016 and Oliver 2010 for additional excellent reviews of the literature.
5though see Mummolo and Nall (2017)
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(Acharya et al. 2016), using field experiments (Enos 2014a), and recently, by identifying
events where large changes in minority populations have occurred and where characteristics
of the event facilitate causal inference, typically by mitigating concerns about selection bias
(Hopkins 2012; Enos 2016).
Second, variation in outcomes could be driven by variation in the contextual or areal
unit chosen for analysis (Yule and Kendall 1950; Openshaw and Taylor 1979). The relation-
ship between racial composition and behavior, for example, has been examined at the state
level (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Hero and Preuhs 2007), county level (Giles and Buckner
1993; Gaines et al. 2004; Key 1949), zip code (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Hopkins 2010a),
census tract (Oliver and Wong 2003; Putnam 2007), and census block group (Gay 2006),
among others. Individuals are nested within a number of different administrative geographic
boundaries and the covariation of an outcome of interest with some contextual variable of
interest can vary drastically depending on the choice of administrative geographic bound-
ary. In fact, Oliver (2010) finds that high levels of racial diversity at the zip code level is
correlated with low levels of prejudice among white residents of that “neighborhood,” while
high levels of racial diversity at the county level is generally correlated with higher level of
prejudice.
This issue has frequently been cited as a contributor to the conflicting findings in the
extant literature (Tam Cho and Baer 2011; Enos 2016; Oliver 2010; Voss 1996). Researchers
generally attempt to bypass issues of MAUP by attempting to theoretically justify their
choice of areal unit of analysis and conducting various robustness checks (Oliver 2010).
More recently, researchers have attempted to avoid this problem all together by examining
a continuous measure of spatial proximity to some “treatment” as their operationalization
of threat (Enos 2016). For a greater discussion of the MAUP and how I address it, see
Appendix M.
In sum, while a number of factors have been singled out as culprits in the literature’s
conflicting findings, residential self-selection and the MAUP are most frequently cited as the
chief culprits. Studies of racial threat need to carefully assess how both of these issues may
affect the findings and thus the conclusion of the study.
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2.6.2 B: Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP)
Two potential issues arise with regards to choice of areal unit of analysis (in my case, city),
both of which fall under the rubric of the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) (Yule and
Kendall 1950; Openshaw and Taylor 1979). For a discussion of the MAUP in the racial
threat literature, see Appendix A.
The first issue, which is most relevant to the vast majority of studies on contextual
effects (see Enos 2016; Oliver 2010; Tam Cho and Baer 2011), is that individuals are nested
within a number of different administrative geographic boundaries. This first concern is one
that my analysis avoids, as I am not using multilevel data and are not making a choice over
a contextual unit to embed my units of analysis (i.e., cities) within. In other words, I am not
examining the behavior of my unit of analysis as a function of the demographic composition or
change of some researcher-chosen overarching areal unit; rather, like Enos (2016), I examine
the behavior of my unit of analysis as a function of its proximity to a “treatment” stimulus,
which in my case is cities where the black population grew dramatically between 1940 to
1960. Proximity is a continuous measure and is limited not by administrative boundaries
but only by the maximum range of spatial distance between cities in California.
The second issue has to do with the use of aggregate data. Here, the applicable
MAUP concerns whether or not the positive and statistically significant relationship I observe
between proximity to black growth cities and support for Proposition 14 would change if I
used data aggregated at different levels (e.g., MSA, zip code, census tract, etc.). My analysis
uses aggregations of voters at the city-level, and it is possible that an individual on the
eastern-most boundary of a city lives in a different micro-context (e.g., further / closer to
a black growth treatment city) than an individual on the western-most boundary of a city.
Without geo-coded survey responses or aggregate data at finer levels of geography, I do not
have the ability to assess greater levels of detail. However, there are several reasons why I
believe these types of concerns do not overly threaten the inferences I draw from my city-level
findings.
First, by measuring proximity between centroids of cities, I average across all of the
26
proximities for individuals residing at opposite ends of a given city. Thus, even if I were to
entertain the possibility of the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in white voter behavior
within cities as a function of within-city variation in racial micro-context, the use of city
centroids to measure distance between predominately white cities and black growth cities
averages across all of the proximities for white voters residing in varying within-city micro-
contexts.
Perhaps more convincingly, variation in the actual geographic scale of the cities in
my data makes it possible to assess whether my main findings hold when focusing on cities
with smaller total land area, as such cities essentially represent smaller aggregations of
white voters across space. Indeed, city land areas in my dataset range between 0.3 and 455
miles (mean=8.15, median=3.4), indicating that my analysis combines cities the size of the
average contemporary census tract (in LA county today, 1.73 square miles) and zip code
(37 square miles, based upon estimates from the 2016 American Community Survey) with
cities approximating the size of the average county in states such as Ohio, Tennessee, and
Maryland (450 square miles). When restricting the analysis to 90% white or greater cities
with below median total land area, I find that my results hold. I present the results from
this analysis in Table 2.2. Within the confines of the available data, this analysis essentially
illustrates that my results hold when using smaller levels of geographic aggregation, as the
land area of this below median subsample of cities is close to the size of an average 2010
census tract in LA county (1.73 square miles).
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Table 2.2: Sample Restrictions by Land Area
Model 1 Model 2
Proximity 4.62∗∗∗ 7.97∗∗∗
(1.14) (1.89)
Intercept 68.94∗∗∗ 71.79∗∗∗
(1.27) (1.16)
R2 0.10 0.11
Adj. R2 0.09 0.10
Num. obs. 149 148
RMSE 8.91 9.87
Note: OLS coefficients and heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample restricted to cities
that are 90% and greater White and are below median land area (column 1) and above median land area
(column 2). ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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2.6.3 C. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation
Percent Democrat (1964) 57% 14%
Population Density 30,329 80,695
Owner Occupied Units 61% 15%
Income 6,694.84 1,570.34
Unemployment 6% 3%
Note: Cells display mean and standard deviation of control variables. For the analysis, I rescale population
density and income to 1000s.
Figure 2.4: Distributions of Votes for Proposition 14
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Note: Bars indicate distribution of city-level vote for Proposition 14 for 90% or greater white cities.
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Figure 2.5: Distributions of Proximity to Black Growth Cities
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Note: Bars indicate distribution of city proximity to nearest Black growth city in miles.
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2.6.4 D. Alternate Modeling Specifications
Table 2.4: Effect of Proximity to Black Growth Cities on Support for Proposition 14
Model 1
Proximity 0.28∗∗∗
(0.08)
Median Income −0.02
(0.03)
Unemployment −0.16
(1.35)
Homeownership −0.40
(0.29)
Partisan Composition (%D) 0.07
(0.27)
Population Density 0.00
(0.00)
Phi 23.33∗∗∗
(2.41)
Intercept 1.31∗∗∗
(0.30)
Pseudo R2 0.10
Log Likelihood 175.89
Num. obs. 181
Note: Beta regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Sample restricted to 90% and greater
White cities. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
31
Table 2.5: Reanalysis with County Fixed-Effects
Model 1
Proximity 5.36∗
(2.33)
Median Income −0.58
(0.38)
Unemployment −39.28
(20.75)
Homeownership 4.42
(4.22)
Partisan Composition (%D) −3.16
(4.04)
Population Density 0.00
(0.01)
Intercept 74.27∗∗∗
(5.20)
Fixed Effects ✓
R2 0.69
Adj. R2 0.65
Num. obs. 181
RMSE 5.91
Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample restricted to
90% and greater White cities. Model includes county fixed effects. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
(two-tailed)
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2.6.5 E. Sample Size: Restrictions and Controls
In this section I assess the robustness of the effect of proximity to black growth cities given
differing sample sizes due to (1) the introduction of controls with missing values and (2)
restricting my sample to 90% and 95% or greater white cities.
The most straight forward way of determining whether my results are influenced by
the sample restrictions is to assess the robustness of the proximity coefficient as I restrict
the sample in a variety of ways. First, I assess the bivariate relationship between proximity
and city-level vote for Proposition 14 in the full dataset, thus including all n=386 cities for
which I have proximity measures and for which data is reported in the Supplement to the
Statement of the Vote (column 1), then for the remaining cities that are included in the
sample if I were to include controls (column 2), and finally for those cities that were dropped
from the regression for missing covariates (column 3). I then look at the coefficient when
I include the full set of controls for all cities (column 4), for 90% or greater white cities
(column 5) and for 95% or greater white cities (column 6).
Across all sample restrictions, we see a retention of a positive and statistically significant
effect of proximity to black growth cities on support for Proposition 14, which increases my
confidence that the results are not being driven by the exclusion of cities either from sample
restrictions or missing data on control variables.
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Table 2.6: Effect of Sample Restrictions on Relationship Between Proximity and City Vote
for Proposition 14
Full Full Control Full Excl Full 90 Control 95 Control
Proximity 5.69∗∗∗ 3.99∗ 4.47∗∗∗ 4.89∗∗ 5.88∗∗ 6.18∗∗
(0.79) (1.64) (0.98) (1.79) (1.77) (2.32)
Median Income −0.88 −0.72 −0.81
(0.60) (0.57) (0.61)
Unemployment −11.43 −6.53 −4.12
(31.33) (30.60) (33.73)
Homeownership 0.25 −7.14 −5.22
(6.34) (6.31) (7.02)
Partisan Composition (%D) −3.04 1.49 1.29
(6.17) (6.01) (6.72)
Population Density −0.00∗ 0.01 0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 69.67∗∗∗ 70.44∗∗∗ 66.89∗∗∗ 79.49∗∗∗ 81.06∗∗∗ 80.35∗∗∗
(0.75) (1.01) (1.18) (6.98) (6.70) (7.44)
R2 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.09
Adj. R2 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.05
Num. obs. 386 199 187 199 181 161
RMSE 9.94 10.51 9.01 10.45 9.74 10.08
OLS coefficients and heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 1 displays bivariate
relationship between proximity and Proposition 14 vote for the full sample. In Column 2 we show the
bivariate relationship for just the cities that remain once we introduce controls. In Column 3 we show the
bivariate relationship for those cities that are excluded when controls are introduced. Columns 4, 5, and 6
show results of the relationship with controls in the full sample, in 90% or greater White cities, and 95% or
greater White cities. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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Figure 2.6: Proximity and Vote of Excluded Cities Under Sample Restrictions
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Note: bivariate relationship between proximity and city-level vote for Proposition 14 for cities
excluded when I restrict the sample to 90% (panel 1) and 95% white (panel 2).
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2.6.6 F. Ecological Inference
In an effort to address ecological inference issues when using aggregate data, I run an ecolog-
ical inference (EI) analysis to obtain more precise estimates of white and nonwhite behavior
across all cities. I use King’s (1997) EI package to infer the proportion of white and non-
white voters who supported Proposition 14 within each city given vectors of (1) support
for Proposition 14, (2) the white and non-white population within cities, and (3) the total
population within cities. I find that the results closely correspond to Field Poll estimates
from the 1960s (as cited in HoSang 2010) with an average white support of 68% and black
support of only 10%. I then re-estimated my main model (Table 2.7) substituting out the
official tally of city-level vote for Proposition 14 with my EI estimated white support for
Proposition 14. I find that the proximity coefficient remains essentially unchanged by this
substitution, increasing my confidence that my method of sample restriction is appropriate.
Table 2.7: Effect of Proximity on Estimated (EI) White Prop 14 Vote
Model 1
Proximity 4.83∗∗∗
(1.51)
Median Income −0.76
(0.90)
Unemployment 0.27
(31.27)
Homeownership −6.70
(6.49)
Partisan Composition (%D) 0.53
(5.66)
Population Density 0.001∗∗
(0.001)
Intercept 82.35∗∗∗
(7.84)
R2 0.06
Adj. R2 0.03
Num. obs. 199
Note: OLS coefficients and heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is EI-estimated
city-level White vote for Proposition 14. Data is not restricted to 90% or greater White cities. ∗∗∗p < 0.001,
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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2.6.7 G. Proximity Measures
In this section I assess the robustness of the effect of proximity to black growth cities to
different operationalizations of proximity both with regards to (1) my choice of treatment
cities and (2) the choice of orthodromic distance between city centroids as my measure of
proximity.
2.6.7.1 Choice of ‘Treatment Cities’
I conduct robustness checks using additional cut points to define black growth cities, includ-
ing 95th, 90th, and 85th percentiles. I choose the 98th percentile for my models but assess
the robustness of my choice in the Table 2.8. I find that the relationship is similar, and
indeed strengthens, regardless of how I define a black growth city.
2.6.7.2 Choice of Orthodromic Distance
The earliest available city shapefiles were from the 1980 decennial census. While it is true
that California cities likely annexed unincorporated territory in the sixteen years following
the 1964 election, the centroids of the cities do not change dramatically over time.
In order to address the robustness of this choice, I conducted three additional anal-
yses. First, following Nall, Schneer, and Carpenter (Nall et al. 2018), I estimate driving
distance between cities in the United States using an OpenStreetMap protocol API, an open
source mapping software. Second, I used the same software to calculate drive times, us-
ing current driving conditions (not adjusting for traffic). Third, because I was concerned
that contemporary driving distances and times may not be good proxies for driving times
and distances in the 1960s, given the different infrastructure landscape at the time, I ac-
quired a copy of Rand McNally’s Standard Highway Mileage Guide from 1966 (which is
the legal standard for driving distances under 28 U.S.C. 1821 for driving mile reimburse-
ment, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/28/21.5.) The guide includes driving distances
between 31 different cities in California (for a total of 961 unique distance pairs). These
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Table 2.8: Alternative Choices of Treatment Cities
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Proximity 98 5.88∗∗
(1.77)
Proximity 95 5.45
(3.20)
Proximity 90 8.93∗
(4.17)
Proximity 85 12.19∗∗
(4.64)
Median Income −0.72 −0.52 −0.39 −0.37
(0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.57)
Unemployment −6.53 −34.75 −37.90 −39.71
(30.60) (30.14) (30.05) (29.88)
Homeownership −7.14 −7.41 −8.26 −8.56
(6.31) (6.58) (6.57) (6.49)
Partisan Composition 1.49 3.44 4.66 5.26
(6.01) (6.13) (6.13) (6.11)
Pop Density 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 81.06∗∗∗ 78.91∗∗∗ 78.28∗∗∗ 78.39∗∗∗
(6.70) (6.90) (6.73) (6.66)
R2 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.06
Adj. R2 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03
Num. obs. 181 181 181 181
RMSE 9.74 9.97 9.92 9.86
Note: OLS coefficients and heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is restricted to
90% or greater White cities. Each model defines definition of Black growth city as proximity to nearest city
that experienced greater than or equal to the n-th percentile of Black population growth between 1940 and
1960. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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distances were hand-keyed into a distance matrix and then compared to present day driving
distances.
I find that contemporary driving distance, drive time, and orthodromic distances all
correlate at greater than 0.98. Substituting driving distance and drive time in the model
as a proximity measure does not change the substantive relationship between proximity
and voting for Proposition 14, as I show in Table 2.9. Finally, 1966 and contemporary
driving distances correlate at 0.998, signaling to us that driving distances have not changed
dramatically over the last 50 years and therefore current driving distances are a good proxy
for 1960s driving distances.
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Table 2.9: Operationalizing Proximity as Driving Distance and Travel Time
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Proximity 5.88∗∗
(1.77)
Driving Distance 4.95∗∗
(1.53)
Travel Time 3.00∗∗
(0.97)
Median Income −0.72 −0.70 −0.68
(0.57) (0.57) (0.57)
Unemployment −6.53 −8.25 −9.36
(30.60) (30.54) (30.65)
Homeownership −7.14 −7.08 −7.11
(6.31) (6.32) (6.34)
Partisan Composition (%D) 1.49 1.48 1.26
(6.01) (6.02) (6.05)
Population Density 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 81.06∗∗∗ 81.05∗∗∗ 81.65∗∗∗
(6.70) (6.72) (6.81)
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08
Adj. R2 0.05 0.05 0.04
Num. obs. 181 181 181
RMSE 9.74 9.76 9.79
Note: OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is restricted to
90% or greater White cities. Column 1 displays my primary analysis using proximity to growing Black cities
as the primary independent variable using Euclidean distance between the centroids of cities as my opera-
tionalization of proximity. For comparison, in Column 2, I run the same model but operationalize proximity
as driving distance to growing Black cities. Driving distance was calculated using the OpenStreetMap pro-
tocol API. The third column uses estimated drive time instead of proximity using the same OpenStreetMap
protocol API. The differences in effect of proximity using any of these measures are trivial ∗∗∗p < 0.001,
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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2.6.8 H. 1940 Covariates
An issue worth addressing is the non-random settlement pattern of African Americans arriv-
ing into California. One possibility is that “redlining” (Rothstein 2017) led African Amer-
icans to settle in neighborhoods deemed less desirable, which may have housed lower so-
cioeconomic status, and consequently, more racially conservative whites. Such possibility
could explain the negative relationship I observe between black growth and white support
for Proposition 14. This possibility, however, is not suggested by the data, as proximity to
black growth cities among mostly (90% or greater) white cities is not strongly correlated
with pretreatment (i.e., pre-SGM) 1940 median home values (r = .10), homeownership rates
(r = .15), or 1940 unemployment rates (r = .01). Nonetheless, as an additional robust-
ness check, and to account for the possibility that the 1960 controls are post-treatment, I
re-estimated the model presented in Table 2.1 including pretreatment controls for 1940 me-
dian home values (median household income is not available in the 1940 census track file;
given this, I use median home value as a proxy for the level of wealth of a city in 1940) ,
1940 unemployment, 1940 homeownership, and 1940 population density. When replacing
the 1960 covariates with 1940 covariates, I find that the effect of proximity remains positive
and statistically significant (p=0.035). Full model results are in Table 2.10.
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Table 2.10: Effect of Proximity on Voting 1940 Covariates
Model 1
Proximity 23.37∗∗
(10.88)
Partisan Composition (%D) −19.57∗∗∗
(6.92)
Population Density 0.14∗
(0.071)
Homeownership 0.13
(0.09)
Median Home Values. −0.37∗∗
(0.17)
Unemployment. 140.15
(112.38)
Intercept 80.80∗∗∗
(7.64)
R2 0.194
Adj. R2 0.116
Num. obs. 69
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Sample restricted to 90% and greater White
cities. All controls, with the exception of partisan composition were from the 1940 census. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 (two-tailed).
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2.6.9 I. Confounding: Placebo Tests with Ideological Non-Racial Ballot Propo-
sitions and Sensitivity Analyses
I include a number of placebo tests to ensure that my measure of proximity was not cor-
related with non-racial ballot propositions that were otherwise ideologically conservative or
liberal on economic and social dimensions. While city-level vote tabulations for other ballot
propositions in 1964 were not available in the Supplement to the Statement of the Vote, I
did locate city-level tabulations for two other non-racial ballot propositions in 1966.
The 1966 Supplement contained tabulated city-level results for two prominent race-
neutral ballot measures: Proposition 1 (economic), which authorized the investment of public
pension or retirement funds in the stock market and was supported by the conservative
business community, and Proposition 16, which enhanced the prohibition on the production,
distribution, sale, and possession of obscene materials and was opposed by liberal interests in
the state. The argument written in favor of Proposition 1 concerned the outdated law that
prevented public employee retirement fund managers from investing in common stocks which
impeded a business-like approach to the management of the funds, whereas the argument
written against Proposition 1 argued that the stock market was simply too risky given the
speculative nature and fluctuations of the stock market. The argument written in favor of
Proposition 16 concerned the necessity of protecting teenagers and young children from smut
publishers, whereas the argument against concerned the constitutionality of California trying
to censor art and literature. Voter information guides from these and other past California
General Elections are archived at UC Hastings College of the Law.
In Table 2.11 I display the results of placebo tests estimating the effect of proximity
to black growth cities on support for these two race-neutral propositions. The results from
the placebo tests indicate that proximity to Black growth cities is only associated with a
statistically significant increase in voter support in the case of Proposition 14. In the case of
Propositions 1 and 16 in 1966, the effect of proximity to black growth cities is statistically
indiscernible from zero. These findings increase my confidence that my measure of proximity
is tapping into racial threat and not a different underlying phenomenon.
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Table 2.11: Placebo Tests – Effect of Proximity on Voting for Non-Racial Propositions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Proximity 5.88∗∗ 0.79 −0.19
(1.77) (1.13) (1.35)
Median Income −0.72 1.14∗∗ −1.35∗∗
(0.57) (0.36) (0.43)
Unemployment −6.53 −18.71 23.78
(30.60) (19.58) (23.29)
Homeownership −7.14 0.25 −1.76
(6.31) (4.04) (4.80)
Partisan Composition (%D) 1.49 −14.41∗∗∗ 6.14
(6.01) (3.85) (4.58)
Population Density 0.01 0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 81.06∗∗∗ 59.87∗∗∗ 51.02∗∗∗
(6.70) (4.29) (5.10)
R2 0.08 0.29 0.18
Adj. R2 0.05 0.27 0.15
Num. obs. 181 181 181
RMSE 9.74 6.24 7.42
OLS coefficients and heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses with sample restriction to 90%
or greater White cities. Column 1 displays my main model result for reference. Column 2 displays model
results for 1966 CA Proposition 1. Proposition 1 allowed public pension funds to invest in equities, lifting
the requirement that these funds only invest in bonds. Column 3 displays results for 1966 Proposition 16,
which was a prohibition on obscene materials. I find that these non-racial propositions are not positively
correlated with proximity to growing Black communities. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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Figure 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis
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2.6.10 J. Estimating Individual-Level Level Support for Proposition 14
Another way I can operationalize proximity, which hews more closely to existing literature
on racial threat, is to look at racial threat as a function of growing black population within
an individual’s county. Fortunately, three surveys in 1964 asked California respondents how
they intended to vote on Proposition 14.
With this data, I can bypass the issue of discerning individual-level White behavior from
aggregate data and instead examine individual level attitudes as a function of proximal grow-
ing black population. To do this, I downloaded and pooled California Field Poll data from
1964 on support for Proposition 14 (survey 6405, n=1128, fielded 8/31/64-9/5/64, survey
6406, n=1193, fielded 10/2/64-10/7/64, survey 6407, n=1148, fielded 10/23/64-10/28/64).
In Model 1 in Table 2.12 I display individual-level white support for Proposition 14, con-
trolling for county and individual level demographics, as a function of county-level black
population growth. I find that this county-level demographic change is correlated with sup-
port for Proposition 14, consistent with my findings on aggregate vote results for Proposition
14. This finding provides additional evidence that my results are robust to a more traditional
operationalization of racial threat in California.
While this type of analysis is comparable to what typically is done in the extant liter-
ature on racial threat, this type of analysis is also highly vulnerable to the modifiable areal
unit problem (MAUP) (Enos 2016). In the end, the value of this analysis is to demonstrate
that the results from the aggregate city-level analyses presented in the main manuscript
hold when utilizing an alternative analytic strategy employing individual-level survey data
and conducting contextual analysis (i.e., on nested or multilevel data). The consistency of
the results increase my confidence that white support for Proposition 14 derived from racial
threat from growing black populations.
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Table 2.12: Individual-Level White Opposition to Rumford Act 1964
Logit OLS
Growth in Black Pop 1940-1960 6.82∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗
(1.91) (0.45)
Pop Density County 1940 −0.04∗∗ −0.01∗∗
(0.02) (0.004)
Unemployed County 1940 3.36∗∗ 0.88∗∗
(1.14) (1.89)
Female −0.19∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.09) (0.02)
Age 30-39 −0.06 −0.01
(0.14) (0.03)
Age 40-49 −0.28∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.14) (0.03)
Age 50-59 −0.06 −0.01
(0.15) (0.04)
Age 60-69 −0.22 −0.05
(0.16) (0.04)
Age Over 70 −0.27 −0.07
(0.18) (0.04)
Homeowner −0.25∗∗ −0.06∗∗
(0.10) (0.02)
College −0.27∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.11) (0.03)
Income −0.06∗∗ −0.01∗∗
(0.03) (0.01)
Survey 6406 −0.02 −0.004
(0.12) (0.03)
Survey 6407 0.44∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.02)
Intercept 0.02 0.50∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.07)
Num. obs. 2,630 2,630
Note: Logistic regression (column 1) and OLS coefficients (column 2) with heteroskedastic robust standard
errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Regression analysis uses survey weights. Growth in Black
population measured as percent change in Black population at the county level between 1940 and 1960.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 (two-tailed).
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2.6.11 K. Robustness Residential Tenure, White Growth, and Housing Markets
Table 2.13: Controlling for Residential Tenure, White Growth, and Housing Markets
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Proximity 4.51 5.92∗∗ 6.94∗∗ 4.24 4.42∗∗ 4.42∗∗
(2.59) (2.10) (2.60) (2.70) (1.36) (1.37)
Contracting Housing 4.97∗∗∗
(0.45)
Home Values 4.27∗∗∗
(0.39)
Median Income −5.06∗∗∗ −0.29 −2.37∗ 0.11 −0.33 −0.25
(1.23) (0.63) (0.95) (0.75) (0.44) (0.44)
Unemployment 14.58 −12.65 −62.40 110.62 −23.11 −21.56
(58.71) (34.82) (36.12) (61.01) (23.47) (23.60)
Homeownership 12.52 −17.11∗ −18.79 1.73 3.76 2.12
(9.28) (8.46) (10.25) (9.17) (4.93) (4.93)
Partisan Composition −29.07∗∗∗ 5.90 18.40 −11.60 4.73 5.03
(7.85) (7.88) (9.90) (9.59) (4.61) (4.64)
Pop Density 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.10∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 113.84∗∗∗ 81.00∗∗∗ 92.22∗∗∗ 67.65∗∗∗ 77.31∗∗∗ 76.73∗∗∗
(11.72) (8.48) (9.44) (10.24) (5.14) (5.17)
R2 0.45 0.11 0.27 0.15 0.47 0.46
Adj. R2 0.38 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.44 0.44
Num. obs. 53 128 64 84 181 181
RMSE 6.32 10.29 8.55 9.83 7.46 7.50
Note: OLS regression coefficients and heteroskedastic robust standard errors for fully specified models in
90% White or greater cities with samples split at median residential tenure before 1940 (columns 1 and
2), median White population growth (columns 3 and 4), and controlling for proximity to cities with the
most rapidly contracting housing markets and cities with the fastest growing cost of living (columns 5 and
6).∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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2.6.12 L. White Flight
To explore the possibility that racially threatened white residents fled further away to outer
ring suburbs and rural areas, leaving behind some mixture of presumably racially tolerant
(i.e., liberal) whites and those unable to relocate, I estimate the mean level of change in
white population at various binned distances from black growth cities. I find that almost all
of the white flight, to the extent that it occurred, was concentrated in the first five miles.
Figure 2.8: Mean Levels of White Population Change As a Function of Proximity to Black
Growth Cities
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Note: Mean percentage point change in white population 1940-1960 conditional on proximity
to black growth city (98th percentile). White flight appears to largely be restricted to cities
less than five miles from black growth cities.
49
M. Additional Maps
Figure 2.9: Map of Central Valley Black Growth Cities
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Black Growth, 1940−1960
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Note: 95th percentile growth cities of Bakersfield, Fowler, and Madera in Central Valley.
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2.6.13 N: Analysis with Various City Outlier Restrictions
Table 2.14: Sample Restrictions by Varying Proximities
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Proximity 6.76∗∗∗ 13.12∗∗∗ 18.67∗∗∗ 34.43∗∗∗
(1.97) (3.71) (5.41) (8.21)
Median Income −0.83 −1.17 −1.30 −0.89
(0.58) (0.61) (0.69) (0.69)
Unemployment −1.14 15.99 40.38 129.89∗
(31.06) (41.81) (44.89) (54.93)
Homeownership −6.60 −4.63 −1.44 0.99
(6.35) (6.78) (7.22) (7.26)
Partisan Composition (%D) 0.04 −2.18 −5.82 −15.57
(6.17) (6.85) (7.42) (8.30)
Population Density 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 82.28∗∗∗ 85.18∗∗∗ 85.61∗∗∗ 84.69∗∗∗
(6.81) (7.69) (8.26) (8.44)
R2 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.18
Adj. R2 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.14
Num. obs. 179 158 148 134
RMSE 9.77 9.88 10.03 9.78
Note: OLS coefficients and heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. All samples restricted to
90% or greater White cities. Results of further sample restrictions where I drop cities that are more than
200 miles away (column 1), 100 miles away (column 2), 75 miles away (column 3) and 50 miles away (column
4) from the nearest Black growth city. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
51
CHAPTER 3
Racial Threat as Potential Outgroup Entry: Historical
Evidence Using New Mass Transit
One of the oldest and largest bodies of work in the study of American politics is the literature
on “racial threat,” which explores the effect of racial context on white Americans’ political
attitudes and behavior. Beginning with V.O. Key’s (1949) investigation of the impact of the
size of geographically proximate African American populations on white voting behavior in
the American South, the literature on racial context has seen continued growth (Enos 2016;
Hopkins 2012; Reny and Newman 2018). One primary methodological issue in the study
of racial context is residential self-selection (Oliver 2010), as estimating the causal effect of
local minority population characteristics on political behavior is hindered by the tendency
for neighborhood racial composition to shape individuals’ residential location decisions in
the first place (Clark 2009; Tam Cho et al. 2013). Scholarship has attempted to overcome
this issue by various means, including the use of field experiments (Enos 2014a) and the
identification of case studies involving sudden and sizable demographic shocks (Hangartner
et al. 2018; Hopkins 2012; Enos 2016; Reny and Newman 2018).
One vehicle for the study of racial threat that centers on demographic change which
has gone relatively undeveloped in the political science literature is new mass transit (NMT).
Most urban areas throughout the United States are racially segregated due to discrimination
in housing practices (Clark 2009; Massey and Denton 1993). The establishment of NMT has
the capacity to create high-speed and affordable arterial connections between segregated
white and minority communities, potentially increasing the entry of nonwhites into predom-
inately white areas previously difficult to access due in part to transportation cost barriers
(Ong and Miller 2005). The urban planning literature documents how the delivery of NMT
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to minority enclaves historically constitutes a source of contention, with white residents op-
posing NMT due to ethnic prejudice and apprehension over outgroup entry (Bullard et al.
2004; Henderson 2006; Weitz 2008). The political science literature has examined the unwill-
ingness of whites residing in racially diverse settings to contribute to public goods believed
to benefit racial outgroups (Alesina et al. 1999; Glaser 2002; Hopkins 2009b). However,
absent from this corpus of work are studies focusing specifically on NMT, where a principal
theme is the concern among whites that the inauguration of the public good will cause their
residential setting to become more diverse (Bullard et al. 2004; Henderson 2006; Weitz 2008).
In this article, I focus on NMT as a novel arena for investigating the role of racial threat
on white Americans’ political behavior. I argue that NMT represents a unique vehicle for
triggering racial threat that is distinct from the conceptualization and operationalization of
threat in the existing literature. The bulk of existing studies on racial threat assesses the
effect of the size or growth of a geographically proximate outgroup on white political attitudes
(Oliver 2010; Gay 2006; Newman 2013a) and behavior (Enos 2016; Giles and Buckner 1993;
Voss 1996), with a common underlying feature being the measurement of already occurred or
occurring outgroup entry. In contrast, the case of NMT offers the literature the innovation of
the conceptualization and operationalization of racial threat as potential outgroup entry—
what I call prospective racial threat. Recent work leveraging rapid demographic shocks claim
an advantage of their design to be observing outcome variables before white residential
selection processes occur (Hopkins 2009b; Reny and Newman 2018). My focus on NMT
extends this design goal by using a treatment (outgroup entry) that occurs in the future;
thus, outcome measures are collected before white residential selection processes commence.
In short, I argue that the analysis of NMT completes the temporal spectrum of intergroup
threat treatment effects by adding to published work evaluating the effect of past outgroup
exposure (Goldman and Hopkins 2018) and present outgroup exposure (Enos 2014a; Key
1949; Oliver 2010) research investigating the effect of future outgroup exposure.
To examine NMT as a vehicle for racial threat, I take advantage of a unique historical
case where the funding necessary for the establishment of a new urban mass transit system
was put to a popular vote. I focus on the case of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system
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in the San Francisco Bay Area of California, and a local ballot measure, Proposition A, in the
1962 General Election that would issue a $792 million bond to fund the construction of the
BART. A contentious component of the system plan was the Transbay Tube, which would
facilitate the entry of African American riders from heavily-black cities in the East Bay (e.g.,
Oakland) into employment and recreation centers in predominately-white San Francisco in
the West Bay. I argue that Proposition A evoked a cross-pressure for white voters in San
Francisco residing near planned BART stations, as the proposed system promised the benefit
of ease-of-access to fast and affordable mass transit but also the racially threatening prospect
of the entry and increased presence of African Americans. Using fine-grained historic admin-
istrative data on precinct-level election results in San Francisco County combined with data
from the 1960 Census, I analyze the countervailing effects of self-interest and racial threat
on voter support for the funding measure. My analyses uncover evidence that racial threat
nullified self-interest in shaping white voter support for Proposition A. The robustness of
this finding is established by ancillary analyses using ecological inference, placebo tests, and
checks on the theorized mechanisms.
3.1 New Mass Transit as a Vehicle for Racial Threat
Theories of racial threat posit that, among the dominant ethnic group, living in geographic
proximity to large or rapidly growing ethnic outgroups will engender actual and/or perceived
interracial competition over economic, political, or social resources and lead to racial hostility
and support for anti-minority policies and candidates (Key 1949; Enos 2017). A common
feature of studies on racial threat is analysis of the effect of a “treatment” that has already
occurred—in nearly all extant studies, the presence or entry of the outgroup in question took
place decades or even centuries before the outcome of interest is measured. For example,
examinations of racial threat in the U.S. South (Key 1949; Giles and Buckner 1993; Voss
1996) analyze the effect on white voting behavior of the size of nearby black populations
which may have been established hundreds of years prior (Acharya et al. 2016) and stabilized
at their measured size decades or generations before data collection. The selective migration
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of people during the time windows between outgroup entry and data collection introduces
the possibility of selection bias (Enos 2016; Sampson 2012) which in turn hinders estimation
of the causal effect of outgroup presence on white political behavior.
Recent studies attempt to overcome this issue by leveraging dramatic influxes of an
outgroup (Hangartner et al. 2018; Hopkins 2012; Reny and Newman 2018) or experimentally
manipulating exposure to an outgroup (Enos 2014a; Shook and Fazio 2008). The goal of this
research is the collection of data when outgroup entry is recent or in progress and “white
flight” has yet to occur, or when outgroup exposure is randomly assigned. This work makes
a vital contribution to the literature by employing design-based approaches that augment
our confidence in estimated effects of exposure to outgroups. Yet, recent work focusing on
demographic shocks combined with older studies focusing on prevailing outgroup population
size still only define two points on the temporal spectrum of outgroup entry and exposure:
past and present. One point on this spectrum yet to be explored is future outgroup entry.
Theories of racial threat argue that the mechanism linking outgroup presence to anti-
minority political attitudes and behavior is actual or perceived interracial competition and
the desire to maintain dominant status (Bobo and Tuan 2006). This framework can be
expanded to allow for a future time horizon, where racial threat is effectuated in scenarios
where the entry or growth of an outgroup is forthcoming and triggers perceptions of threat
via future resource competition and loss of ingroup dominance. Indeed, variants of group
conflict theory focusing on demographic change already emphasize white concern over future
outcomes, such as changing neighborhood racial identity (Green et al. 1998) and eroded white
dominance (Bobo 1988; Craig and Richeson 2017). This work establishes a foundation for
the relevance of future-oriented fears in bringing about anti-minority attitudes and behavior.
What is needed to move the literature forward is identifying an arena in which potential
outgroup entry and population growth is paramount. While extant survey experimental
work explores the threatening effect of the hypothetical entry of immigrant groups (Ferwerda
et al. 2017; Newman et al. 2015), the discipline is placing an increasing premium on real-
world treatments and behavior occurring outside of the artificial survey context (Hangartner
et al. 2018; Enos 2014a) especially in light of evidence that treatment effects observed in
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survey experiments may fail to materialize in the real world (Barabas and Jerit 2010).
One real-world vehicle for racial threat that focuses on future outgroup entry is new
mass transit (NMT). NMT refers to the establishment of systems of large-scale transportation
in metropolitan areas comprised of buses or trains. NMT serves as a critical vehicle for racial
threat due to (1) the entrenched level of racial segregation in urban areas throughout the
U.S. (Massey and Denton 1993; Trounstine 2019), and (2) its capacity to establish high-speed
and affordable arterial connections between segregated white and minority populations, thus
enhancing minority access to recreation and employment centers in predominately-white
urban areas. White opposition to NMT due to apprehension over racial mixing is well-
documented in the planning literature (Bullard et al. 2004; Henderson 2006; Weitz 2008) and
examples can be found in nearly any U.S. city with mass transit. Fear of racial mixing and
crime famously halted the expansion of Atlanta’s MARTA trains and buses into largely white
Fulton and DeKalb counties (Jarvie 2019), and similar fears are rumored to have blocked the
expansion of Boston’s Red Line into Arlington (Lynch 2018), DC’s Metro into Georgetown
(Schrag 2014), and the LA Metro into Beverly Hills (Ulin 2018). Where proposed NMT
systems are approved, there are myriad examples of their creation of arterial connections
between white and minority urban enclaves (e.g., NYC, D.C., and Chicago).
Given that NMT in many instances involves the potential entry or growth of ethnic
minority groups into predominately white spaces, it provides scholars with opportunities to
examine its impact on white political behavior. According to prior work, the experience of
racial threat is a function of the salience of an outgroup, which is theorized to be driven
by outgroup proximity and size. Enos (2016) applies the racial threat framework to the
case of public housing in Chicago and argues that the most racially threatened whites were
those in closest proximity to projects housing large black populations. Reny and Newman
(2018) apply this framework to the “Second Great Migration” of African Americans to the
American West and argue that the most racially threatened whites were those in closest prox-
imity to California neighborhoods experiencing dramatic black population growth. Finally,
Hangartner et al. (2019) apply this framework to Greece’s exposure to the Syrian refugee
crisis, arguing that the most threated Greeks were those in closest proximity to refugee entry
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points. When applied to the case of NMT where the planned system will establish arterial
connections between white and minority populations, this framework suggests that the most
racially threated whites will be those residing in closest proximity to planned transit stations
serving as exit points for incoming outgroup passengers. This may especially be the case
where planned stations are situated in neighborhoods already containing small enclaves of
the outgroup, where NMT evokes the prospect of the expansion of the size of the outgroup
and potential loss of white majority-status.
3.2 Proximity to Transit Hubs: Self-Interest and Outgroup Aver-
sion
Importantly, while proximity to NMT stations may capture the likelihood of exposure to
daily influxes of outgroups, it may also capture another relevant process: self-interest. Un-
like the cases analyzed by Enos (2016), Reny and Newman (2018), and Hangartner et al.
(2018), where proximity singularly captures increasing closeness to the site of large outgroup
populations, proximity to NMT stations may under some conditions simultaneously capture
exposure to incoming outgroup passengers and access to a vital public good. NMT can trans-
form life for residents in urban areas previously lacking mass transit. In the absence of mass
transit, urban dwellers in American cities typically rely on auto-based transportation, which
engenders problems such as traffic congestion and long commutes, the dissolution of social
capital and civic life (Kunstler 1996), and stress and other health problems associated with
commuting and air pollution (Jackson and Koctitzky 2001). NMT can improve and shorten
commutes, decrease stress, reduce pollution, and increase home values and development.
Importantly, like many location-based public goods (e.g., parks and libraries), proximity to
the good decreases the costs associated with use. As such, proximity to planned stations
captures the ease-of-access and likelihood of use, which I conceptualize as self-interest. To be
sure, self-interest is often considered a financial phenomenon; however, scholarship demon-
strates that the concept can apply to a broad array of policy domains where an individual
possesses a clear, certain and substantial personal stake in the outcome (Chong et al. 2001).
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Compared to those residing further away from planned stations, residents located near NMT
stations may have a greater self-interest in supporting the establishment of the system due to
intended ridership and/or the prospect of increasing business development and home values
(Cervero 2007; Hess and Almeida 2007).
In sum, proximity to transit stations may capture an important “cross-pressure” (Brader
et al. 2014), as residents near planned transit stations may simultaneously possess greater
self-interest in seeing the system established and experience the highest level of racial threat.
Thus, one challenge for the use of NMT as a vehicle for studying racial threat is resolving
the issue where the same variable—proximity to new transit stations—capturing threat may
also capture self-interest. One means of resolving this is to focus on heterogeneity in the
racial composition of urban enclaves housing planned transit stations. Critically, I rely on
the presence of minority enclaves to theoretically adjudicate the conditions under which
proximity to planned stations should evoke the strongest cross-pressure between self-interest
and racial threat. The presence of preexisting minority enclaves is relevant for the potential
entry of additional outgroup members via NMT, as it has implications for the overall size of
an outgroup, which, along with proximity, is theorized to be a central driver of racial threat
(Enos 2016).
While segregation in urban areas has major dividing lines, typically by waterways
(Trounstine 2016), even the predominately “white side” of town in major American cities
contain small enclaves with minority populations. Focusing on the 1960s, which is the time
period used in the analysis that follows, we observe small minority enclaves situated in the
predominately white sections of segregated cities: Pacoima in the San Fernando Valley of Los
Angeles, Maywood in the Westside suburbs of Chicago, and the north end of Hell’s Kitchen
in Manhattan, among others. One way of addressing cross-pressure is to leverage variation in
the racial composition of enclaves housing planned transit stations to capture variation in the
salience of potential incoming outgroup riders, and thus variation in the strength of operation
of self-interest vis-a-vis racial threat. In cases where planned stations are situated in white
enclaves embedded within predominately white sections of a city, the size of an outgroup
population entering via NMT is overall relatively small. However, planned stations situated
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in minority enclaves of predominately white sections of a city would imply that incoming
outgroup passengers will expand the size of an already present outgroup enclave.
The racial threat framework—particularly sub-theories focusing on “white flight” and
tipping-points (Clark 1992) suggests that whites may tolerate the presence of minority pop-
ulations as long as their size remains small and whites remain the predominant racial group.
However, as minority populations grow to achieve more than a “token presence” in white
neighborhoods, feelings of racial threat among whites are expected to rise (Bobo et al. 1986).
Thus, when NMT implies the entry of outgroup riders, proximity to planned stations in white
sections of a metropolitan area should impart less racial threat than proximity to planned
stations in minority enclaves of white sections of a metropolitan area, as the latter scenario
involves greater outgroup salience via larger potential outgroup size. As such, self-interest
should be operative for whites residing close to white-enclave stations, as self-interest is only
minimally countervailed by racial threat. However, for white voters residing in close proxim-
ity to minority-enclave stations, self-interest should be strongly countered by racial threat,
resulting in a strong cross-pressuring. I label this the Cross-Pressuring Hypothesis.
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Figure 3.1: Racial Composition of the SF Bay Area During Formation of the BART System
A: West and East Bay
(a) West and East Bay
(b) Central San Francisco
Note: Maps indicate tract-level black population percentage for the greater SF-Oakland Bay Area (Panel
A) and downtown SF centered on the Fillmore-Tenderloin Districts with BART train icons indicating the
location of BART stations (Panel B). The Fillmore-Tenderloin is a custom polygon based on district bound-
aries from Google Maps, with black population averaged across underlying tracts. Data from the 1960 U.S.
Decennial Censuses.
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3.3 The Bart Train and the 1962 Election
The construction of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in the early 1960s in the
San Francisco Bay Area provides a rare and ideal historical case to test the concept of racial
threat as potential outgroup entry and the cross-pressuring hypothesis. Following WWII, it
was clear that there was a strong need for NMT in the Bay Area, as the region’s population
was growing rapidly, traffic congestion increasing, and ferry traffic across the bay reached
peak capacity (Healy 2016). Planning for rapid transit was initiated by civic leaders in
1946 and culminated in the formation of the BART District in 1957. The District was
an administrative entity comprised of the five counties in the Bay Area (Alameda, Contra
Costa, Marin, San Francisco, and San Mateo) and tasked with designing a plan for the
system, which was completed in 1961. In contrast to many urban mass transit systems in
the U.S., the funding for the construction of the BART was put to a popular vote in the form
of a local ballot measure named Proposition A. Proposition A would provide $792 million
in funds for building the system. The vote, which needed 60% support to pass, appeared
on the ballot in the 1962 General Election and was voted on by all residents in the counties
comprising the BART District.
Proposition A affords a rare opportunity to assess the operation of racial threat in white
voter support for the establishment of the BART system. In addition to providing observable
voting behavior, features of the case render it highly suitable, or a “most likely case,” for
observing racial threat. First, the Bay Area in 1960 was highly racially segregated between
the West and East Bay: African Americans primarily resided in the East Bay in cities such
as Oakland, Richmond, Berkeley and Emeryville, while the West Bay comprised of the city
and county of San Francisco was predominately white, with only 10% of the population in
1960 being African American. Importantly, the slim African American population in SF was
largely concentrated in one enclave in the center of the city, as well as two nascent enclaves
on the periphery. Figure 3.1a panel A provides an overview of the racial composition of the
West and East Bay during the formation of BART system, rendering a clear depiction of the
concentration of African Americans in the East Bay.
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Second, the BART would establish a new arterial connection between predominantly-
white SF and black Oakland via the Transbay Tube. One of the most central and contentious
features of the BART system was the construction of 3.6 miles of underwater tube which
would enable rapid transit between West Oakland and downtown SF in less than 3 minutes at
speeds of over 70 miles per hour. Thus, white and black communities previously separated
by a body of water and a heavily congested toll-bridge would be connected quickly and
affordably by subaqueous rail. Third, rail lines and stations were public knowledge because of
a widely circulated Composite Report released in 1962 by the BART District in collaboration
with regional engineering, financial, and economic consultants. In addition to making public
the system map, this report outlined the expected size and direction of passenger flows,
with a primary expectation being large flows of passengers from Oakland into employment
and recreation centers throughout SF via the Transbay Tube (Parsons Brinckerhoff-Tudor-
Bechtel et al. 1962). Findings from this report were widely disseminated by BART public
relations and advertising campaigns and by regional media outlets (Healy 2016). Ads and
media stories emphasized how the system would provide mobility to the “non-white ghetto”,
offering residents the ability to “move out of the ghetto life on a daily basis; for others, on
a lifetime basis” (Self 2003) and allowing for the “easy and early mixing of race and class”
(Brown 1969). One ad appearing in the magazine San Francisco Business argued that, by
creating “accessibility to sources of training, learning and wage-earning,” the system would
be “of particular value to those caught in the net of stagnation and immobility in the ghetto”
(Brown 1969).
Thus, voters knew the proposed station locations and the expected flow and racial
composition of riders, which establishes the feasibility of a treatment composed of a potential
influx of black passengers into stations in SF. Racially coded concerns about “crime” coupled
with concerns about cost and population growth made for a contentious public debate,
leading two counties—Marin and San Mateo—to exit the BART District before the vote
over Proposition A took place (Healy 2016). With Marin and San Mateo exiting, the main
arena for the operation of racial threat surrounding the BART was SF. Applied to voting
on Proposition A, the racial threat framework would predict that threat would be maximal,
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and therefore BART support suppressed, among whites in SF residing in closest proximity
to planned BART stations.
While there is strong evidence of racial contention surrounding the BART, there is
also significant evidence that self-interest was a highly operative factor in the vote. The
BART train was expected to introduce 75 miles of train to the Bay Area; modern trains
traveling up to 70 mph would service 37 stations (8 in SF alone), many with off-street
parking, and move 30,000 seated passengers per hour in each direction. Rides were expected
to be fairly inexpensive, costing each rider an average round trip fare of $0.60 (compared
to the average $1.80 daily cost for automobile drivers) and each Bay Area homeowner an
average of $27 dollars per year in taxes. In addition, the train was expected to boost
local employment, increase home values, position the Bay Area as an engine of economic
growth and opportunity, and improve access to social and cultural opportunities (Parsons
Brinckerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel et al. 1962). The stakes of the policy were clear to voters, as were
the proposed costs and benefits (Chong et al. 2001), thus, increasing proximity to planned
stations may capture increasing self-interest among voters in seeing the system established.
One potential means of adjudicating the effect of proximity is to focus on stations located in
black neighborhood enclaves in SF. Applied to voting on Proposition A, the cross-pressuring
hypothesis would predict that whites residing in close proximity to planned stations situated
in black enclaves would experience the greatest cross-pressure between a self-interest in easy-
access to and use of the train and the countervailing concern over the potential expansion
in the size of an extant black enclave.
This expectation can be operationalized by focusing on variation in the racial composi-
tion of the neighborhoods in SF housing planned BART stations. Two stations in particular,
Powell Street and Civic Center, were situated next to the oldest and most prominent black
enclave in the center of the city—the neighboring Fillmore and Tenderloin Districts. The first
black church, Third Baptist Church, was established in SF in 1852 in the Fillmore District
and the only black community of note in SF from the mid-19th through the mid-20th century
was in the Fillmore-Tenderloin. Indeed, according to the 1940 Decennial Census, over 4,000
African Americans resided in the Fillmore-Tenderloin Districts of SF, which prior to the
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“Second Great Migration” (Reny and Newman 2018), was the only Black enclave in the city.
Figure 3.1b panel B depicts the racial composition of central SF, highlighting the presence
of African Americans in the Fillmore-Tenderloin. These Districts comprised the epicenter of
black SF—often referred to as the “Harlem of the West” (Elberling 2017)—due to having the
largest jazz music scene on the West Coast and serving as a hotspot for contentious racial
politics. Indeed, throughout the 1950s, white communities neighboring these Districts who
were worried about the expanding black population supported an urban redevelopment plan
that razed black homes and cultural establishments in the Fillmore and halted northward
expansion of the neighborhood with the construction of the Geary Expressway (Elberling
2017).
The racial threat framework would suggest that whites residing near planned stations
in the Fillmore-Tenderloin would be more concerned about the entry of black passengers from
the East Bay than whites whose nearest planned station was in a white enclave. Indeed, if
racial threat is maximized by proximity to a large or growing black population (Enos 2016;
Key 1949), then whites residing near the Fillmore-Tenderloin would be most threatened by
the BART, as entering black passengers may expand the size of a prominent black enclave. In
turn, such voters should have experienced the strongest cross-pressure between the personal
benefits of immediate access to the BART and the experience of racial threat. In the following
section, I subject this expectation (e.g., the cross-pressuring hypothesis) to empirical scrutiny.
To foreshadow, I should note that the Fillmore-Tenderloin, while the oldest and most
culturally and politically prominent, was not the only black enclave in SF in 1962. Indeed,
two other black enclaves existed in 1962: Balboa Park and Hunters Point. As of 1962,
however, these two enclaves were nascent, having formed in the 1950s after WWII during
the Second Great Migration. In contrast, the black population in the Fillmore-Tenderloin
was established in the mid-19th century and expanded following the 1906 SF earthquake.
Moreover, Balboa Park and Hunters Point were geographically marginal relative to the
Fillmore-Tenderloin, as Balboa Park resides on the southern border of the city and Hunters
Point is notoriously isolated on the southeastern stretches of the city and is disconnected
from the BART system (Figure 3.1a panel A). Thus, my analysis focuses on the Fillmore-
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Tenderloin as the principal black enclave in SF, and I utilize the presence of nascent black
communities in Balboa Park and Hunters Point for robustness checks presented following
my main results.
3.4 Data and Methods
My empirical strategy centers on analyzing the effect of voter proximity to BART stations on
support for Proposition A in SF County. I constructed a dataset from historical administra-
tive data from the California Secretary of State (CASOS), San Francisco City Hall (SFCH),
and the U.S. Census Bureau . Election results for SF County were reported by the CASOS
in the “1962 Statement of the Vote” at the precinct-level (each containing an average of 500
residents), which is the finest level of aggregation available for election results in California.
My dataset includes election results for N=1,326 precincts, and my dependent variable
is precinct-level support—percent Yes vote for Proposition A (mean=67.2, sd=8.4, min=30.9,
max=89.8). While historic accounts of this vote depict voters in SF County as strongly
favoring the BART (Healy 2016), the precinct-level results uncover notable and previously
unacknowledged variation in support for the BART throughout the city. My key independent
variable is Proximity to Station, which is the proximity (orthodromic distance) of the centroid
of each precinct to the exact location of the nearest planned BART station. To calculate
this distance, I collected hand-drawn historic precinct maps from SFCH used between 1961
to 1965, employed georeferencing (Gandhi 2016) to construct a complete map of SF County
with all precinct boundaries, and then used QGIS mapping software to geo-locate each BART
station in SF using its current day address (which corresponds to their planned locations).
Precincts in SF are organized as numbered units within State Assembly Districts, which
enables the CASOS data to be matched with precinct maps from SFCH.
I conceptualize Proximity to Station as a compound continuous treatment variable
simultaneously capturing two factors: (1) increasing access to and ease-of-use of the BART
system, and (2) increasing exposure to the potential points of entry of black passengers from
the East Bay. According to my theoretical framework, the relative salience of each factor
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captured by Proximity to Station should be altered by a moderating variable: the racial
composition of the enclave housing a BART station. The moderating variable in my analysis
is Black Enclave, which is coded 1 for precincts whose nearest planned BART station is one of
the two stations (Powell St. and Civic Center) situated near the historically-black Fillmore-
Tenderloin Districts, and 0 otherwise. For precincts whose nearest station was located outside
of the Fillmore-Tenderloin in a predominantly-white enclave of SF, my framework suggests
that the entry of black passengers would be much less salient relative to the benefits of
access to and ease-of-use of the system. Thus, for these precincts, I conceptualize Proximity
to Station as capturing increasing self-interest in the establishment of the BART system and
passage of Proposition A. In contrast, for precincts whose nearest station was located next
to the predominantly black Fillmore-Tenderloin, my framework suggests the presence of a
cross-pressure, where the benefits of a nearby station were countered by the stations’ location
in a black enclave, making the entry of black passengers from the East Bay more salient.
Thus, for these precincts, I conceptualize Proximity to Station as capturing increasing cross-
pressuring between self-interest and the racial threat of an expanding black enclave.
My analytic strategy involves the use of moderated multivariate regression. While
this limits my ability to make definitive causal claims, I both control for a variety of con-
ceivable confounders and conduct a series of validity checks and placebo tests to help me
rule out alternative explanations and omitted variable biases. Demographic variables for
each precinct were obtained from tract-level data from the 1960 Decennial Census using a
weighted spatial join (Gandhi 2016). My analysis includes precinct-level controls for income
level (% of residents with incomes > $25K), home values (% of housing units with values >
$35K), home ownership (% of housing units that were owner-occupied), racial composition
(% white), residential tenure (% taking residence prior to 1940), and population density. For
more information about the data, including variable measurement and descriptive statistics,
see Appendix A. I estimate a moderated linear regression model, where precinct-level sup-
port for Proposition A is regressed on Proximity to Station, Black Enclave, Proximity Black
Enclave, and the above listed controls.
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3.5 Results
The main results from my analysis are presented in Figure 3.2 (Table A1). This figure
depicts the change in predicted “Yes” vote for Proposition A moving proximity to the nearest
planned train station from its minimum to its maximum and holding all other variables at
their means for precincts whose nearest station is in a white neighborhood (left) or in a black
neighborhood (right). For voters whose nearest station would be located in white enclaves,
we see that increasing proximity to the station is associated with a 2.4 point increase (p=.005)
in aggregate support for the BART. This effect is comparable to treatment effects observed
in studies of voting behavior (Green and Gerber 2000). Thus, when focusing on voters for
whom the racial implications of NMT were arguably less salient, as an influx of black riders
would not challenge the neighborhood predominance of whites, we see suggestive evidence
of self-interest in the form of voters closer to the train being significantly more likely to vote
in favor of its funding.
For voters whose nearest station would be located in a black enclave, however, the
estimated effect of Proximity to Station is zero. This effect is striking in comparison to
that observed for stations in white enclaves, as it represents a complete attenuation of the
previously observed effect of Proximity to Station. These results suggest that the presence of
racial considerations facilitated by the prospect of the BART expanding the size of a nearby
black enclave functioned to nullify the self-interest effect observed among voters residing in
close proximity to stations in white neighborhoods. Worthy of note is the imprecision in
the estimated effect of proximity for precincts near black enclave stations, which is more
likely due to wider variation in voter behavior in these precincts than reduced common
support (Hainmueller et al. 2018), as there are n=330 precincts whose nearest station is
in the Fillmore-Tenderloin and considerable variation in Proximity to Station among these
precincts (see Appendix A). The decrease in the point estimate for Proximity to Station from
2.4 (Station - White Enclave) to 0 (Station – Black Enclave) is on par with the observed
effects of cross-pressure in recent research on elector behavior (Brader et al. 2014).
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Figure 3.2: Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for Proposition A
Note: Figure plots change in predicted Proposition A yes vote moving proximity from min-
imum to maximum value when the nearest proposed station is in a white enclave (left) or
black enclave (right) with bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals. Black Enclave stations are
defined as Civic Center and Powell Street stations near the Fillmore-Tenderloin Districts.
Full results presented in Table A1.
3.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, I conduct a series of critical checks on my results. The function of these checks
varies, with some intended to aid ecological inference or rule out confounding variables and
alternative explanations for my results, while others are intended to serve as validity or
placebo tests aimed at corroborating the mechanism underlying my results. Across each
test, I find that my results hold and that the findings conform to theoretical expectations
concerning the “treatment” variable, moderator, and mechanism generating the results.
To begin, my main results hold when using beta regression, which bounds the dependent
variable between 0 and 1 (Table A2) and when using walking distance as an alternative to
Euclidean distance to measure Proximity to Station (Table A2). Next, I turn to an obvious
concern with my findings: my aggregate election results include all voters, which limits my
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ability to draw conclusions about the behavior of white voters specifically. To be sure, the
ability to observe my results among white voters constitutes an important validity check:
in theory, the findings in Figure 3.2 should be driven by white voters and not observed
among black voters. To provide such a test, I utilize ecological inference (King 1997), which
allows me to leverage precinct variation in racial composition and support for Proposition
A to estimate the white and black vote in each precinct. I re-estimate the main model
using estimates of the white and black vote as dependent variables, and present the results
from these analyses in Figure 3.3 (Table A3). The estimated effects of Proximity to Station
observed for the full vote are nearly identical when analyzing the white vote, which provides
an important validity check on the main results. Interestingly, when analyzing the black
vote in panel A, there is suggestive evidence that proximity to stations in the Fillmore-
Tenderloin is associated with an increase in support for Proposition A, though this effect
is not statistically significant. These findings present important evidence of the racialized
nature of the vote, with only the white vote systematically varying as a function of proximity
to BART stations and the racial composition of the neighborhood housing a planned station.
A separate concern is the presence of alternative explanations for my findings due to
omitted variables. First, it is possible that white voters residing in close proximity to planned
stations near the Fillmore-Tenderloin happen to be more politically right-leaning than those
residing in close proximity to planned stations outside of the Fillmore-Tenderloin. While
controlling for partisanship may introduce post-treatment bias into my analysis, I nonethe-
less demonstrate in Table A4 that my results hold when controlling for precinct partisanship.
Second, it is possible that my results are due to the higher density of development near the
Fillmore-Tenderloin, where a higher share of residents are able to walk as their primary
means of transportation and thus have a lower self-interest in NMT. In short, it is possi-
ble that Proximity to Station is capturing the density of pedestrian-commuters for voters
whose nearest station is in the black enclave of the Fillmore-Tenderloin. Additionally, the
relatively lower density of development outside of central SF, where the Fillmore-Tenderloin
are located, could mean that Proximity to Station in these areas is capturing the density of
auto-commuters. To assuage these concerns, I demonstrate in Table A4 that my results hold
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Figure 3.3: Effect of Proximity on White and Black Voting for Proposition A
Note: Predicted change in support for Proposition A among white voters (left) and black
voters (right) in white and black enclaves, holding all other variables at their means. 90%
bootstrapped confidence intervals. Black Enclave Stations are Civic Center and Powell Street
and all other stations are classified as White Enclave stations.
when controlling for the percent of the precinct population who walk, as well as who drive,
as their primary means of transportation.
An additional check on my results concerns testing whether the nullification of the
self-interest effect for white voters near the Fillmore-Tenderloin is confined to residing near
a black enclave versus any enclave housing an ethnic outgroup. A key theorized mechanism
underlying my results is that residing near a black enclave makes the prospective entry
of black passengers more salient. If this is the case, we should not observe a nullification
of the self-interest effect for proximity to stations in enclaves housing non-black minority
groups, such as Latinos. I understand this expectation as “outgroup treatment-enclave
correspondence,” where there should be an observable link between the outgroup underlying
the NMT treatment (entry of African Americans from the East Bay) and the outgroup
inhabiting the enclave with a planned BART station. If I were to find that Proximity to
Station exerted null effects for white voters whose nearest station is in a Latino enclave, it
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would suggest that the mechanism generating the nullification effect for voters near black
enclave stations is not specific to concerns about growing black populations but instead
potentially due to (1) aversion to using NMT when the nearest station is located in an
enclave housing any nonwhite minority group; or (2) aversion driven by a general opposition
to public goods that might be perceived as primarily benefiting an out-group (Nelson and
Kinder 1996).
I test this by separating out two planned stations located in heavily Latino enclaves
with few to no black residents: the 16th Street and 24th Street stations located in San
Francisco’s Mission District. The results in Figure 3.4 (Table 3.5) indicate that the seeming
self-interest effect captured by Proximity to Station holds when focusing on voters whose
nearest station is situated in either a predominately non-Latino white enclave or a Latino-
heavy enclave. Importantly, for the full vote, and the white vote specifically, I only observe
null effects for Proximity when the nearest planned station is in a black enclave. These results
provide evidence that the nullification of the self-interest effect among whites is confined to
residing near a black enclave, which correspondents to the treatment (i.e., potential influx
of black riders). In this way, these findings provide suggestive evidence of the theoretical
mechanism I posit, which is apprehension among white voters residing near a black enclave
in the potential expansion of the black population.
An additional concern with my results is that the attenuation of the self-interest effect
observed for voters near a black enclave is not due to proximity to the Fillmore-Tenderloin
making the entry of black riders more threatening, but rather that the volume of black
riders exiting the BART would be larger for these downtown black enclave stations (Civic
Center and Powell St.) compared to stations outside of the Fillmore-Tenderloin. In other
words, rather being driven by variation in the racial composition of the enclave housing a
BART station (i.e., variation in my moderator), what varies is the “treatment” itself, with
the Fillmore-Tenderloin receiving a larger potential treatment of incoming black passengers.
A compelling means of assuaging this concern is to focus on the southernmost planned
BART station in Balboa Park, which rests on the southern border of the city. While the
Fillmore-Tenderloin in 1962 housed the county’s most prominent and longstanding black
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Figure 3.4: Outgroup Treatment-Enclave Correspondence
Predicted change in support for Proposition A among all voters (left), white voters (middle)
and black voters (right) in white, Latino, and black enclaves, holding all other variables at
their means. 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals.
population, a nascent black community was forming in Balboa Park following the Second
Great Migration in the 1950s. If the attenuation of the self-interest effect observed among
white voters residing near the Fillmore-Tenderloin is due to the presence of a black enclave
making the entry of black riders more salient and threatening, I should observe a nullification
of self-interest among white voters whose nearest planned station is in Balboa Park, as it
housed a budding black community. Figure 3.5 (Table 3.5) demonstrates that Proximity to
Station exerts a null effect (β=.013, se=.029, p=.639) for the white vote among the precincts
(n=301) whose nearest planned station is Balboa Park station. This finding highlights the
importance of the location of a station in a black enclave making the entry of black riders
more salient and threatening: even when focusing on a black enclave that was relatively new
and less geographically and socially prominent than the Fillmore-Tenderloin, I still observe
an attenuation of the self-interest effect.
Moving on, an important validity check involves demonstrating that the results I have
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Figure 3.5: Effect of Treatment for White Voters Near Alternative Black Enclaves
Note: Predicted change in support for Proposition A among white voters moving values of
Proximity to Station from minimum to maximum and holding all other variables at their
means for precincts whose nearest planned station is Balboa Park station (left) and Hunters
Point (right). Full results presented in Table 3.6.
presented so far are driven by the interactive dynamics of proximity to a planned BART
station and a black enclave. In theory, proximity to a black enclave lacking a station should
have no effect on white voter support for Proposition A, as the “treatment” (entry of black
passengers from the East Bay) would be absent. One way of testing this is to utilize a black
enclave in SF lacking a planned station: Hunters Point. Hunters Point is located on the
remote southeastern stretches of the city. Similar to Balboa Park, the black community
in Hunters Point in 1962 was recent relative to the Fillmore-Tenderloin, having become
established in the 1950s followingWWII. Critically, Hunters Point was and still is far removed
from the BART system, with the nearest stations (24th Street Mission and Glen Park) being
over 4 miles from the heart of Hunters Point. I calculated the distance from the centroid of
each precinct in southeastern SF to the center of Hunters Point and demonstrate in Figure 3.5
(Table 3.6) that proximity to Hunters Point exerted a null effect (β=.016, se=.041, p=.684)
on the white vote for Prop A. This finding is critical—it illustrates that voter behavior was
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driven by the location BART stations and that residing near a black enclave lacking a station
exerted no effect on the white Vote.
Next, a critical check on my results involves placebo tests on irrelevant outcomes: the
effects I have shown should be confined to the vote over the BART train (Proposition A),
and should not be observed for measures on the 1962 ballot having nothing to do with the
BART. Figure 3.6 presents the results from two tests where I estimate the model underlying
Figure3.2 replacing the vote over Proposition A with two ballot measures unrelated to the
BART train: (1) Proposition 1A involving a $270 million bond to fund higher education
facilities, and (2) Proposition 4, concerning tax assessments for agricultural lands. The
proximity of white voters to planned BART stations should have no systematic relationship
to their support for either ballot measure. Of specific interest is Proposition 1A, which is
similar to Proposition A in terms of involving support for issuing a bond to fund public
goods; however, unlike Proposition A, Proposition 1A has nothing to do with NMT or the
BART system. Thus, Proposition 1A provides an ideal placebo test to determine whether
the pattern of relationships I uncover in Figure 3.2 has less to do with voter proximity to
planned BART stations and more to do with the happenstance of having (white) voters
who support public goods provision in general residing near planned stations outside of the
Fillmore-Tenderloin. The results in Figure 3.6 (Table 3.7) illustrate this is not the case, as
there are null effects for Proximity to Station for the white vote regardless of whether the
nearest planned station is in a white or black enclave. These null results mitigate concern
over a feasible alternative explanation for my main results: the “diversity discount” (Hopkins
2009b), whereby white voters in more diverse contexts oppose public goods spending (e.g.,
on NMT) believed to benefit an outgroup. The null effects in Figure 3.6—especially for
Proposition 1A—indicate that whites residing near planned stations in white enclaves, while
more likely to support the BART train, were not more likely to support a different public
goods funding initiative. These additional analyses impart added validity to my main findings
given these placebo outcomes do not pertain to the BART system.
My final check concerns a key theorized mechanism generating my results: a cross-
pressure between self-interest and racial threat and the assumption that the voters experi-
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Figure 3.6: Placebo Tests on Irrelevant Outcomes
Note: Figure plots the change in predicted Yes vote for Propositions 1A and 4 moving
proximity to station from minimum to maximum values, holding all other variables at their
means, with 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. See Table 3.7 for full model results.
encing the highest degree of cross-pressure were white voters residing close to the planned
stations near the Fillmore-Tenderloin. According to the literature, one of the primary reper-
cussions of the experience of cross-pressuring is reduced participation (Brader et al. 2014;
Mutz 2002). Thus, to the extent that the null effect of Proximity to Station among white
voters residing close to planned stations in the Filmore-Tenderloin is due to the experience
of cross-pressure, we should observe evidence of cross-pressuring via lower overall engage-
ment with Proposition A. To assess this, I analyze total votes cast for Proposition A by
precinct. For this analysis, the use of ecological inference was not an option due to the lack
of precinct-level information of the citizen voting-age population or voter registration figures
that could serve as a denominator for estimates of precinct turnout. The best available op-
tion was to estimate a regression for total votes cast for Proposition A while controlling for
total precinct population over the age of 20, as the 1960 Census only provides estimates for
population over 16 or 20 years of age. Such a model would enable the estimation of the effect
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of Proximity to Station holding constant variation in the size of the precinct population old
enough to vote.
Figure 3.7: Evidence of Cross-Pressuring—Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Total
Votes Cast for Proposition A
Note: Figure plots the change in predicted number of votes cast for Proposition A moving
proximity to station from its minimum to maximum values, holding all other variables at
their means, with 90% confidence intervals in predominantly white precincts (precinct Percent
Black in 1960 is either less than 15% or less than 5%). See Table 3.8 for full model results.
Figure 3.7 (Table 3.8) presents the effects of Proximity to Station on total votes cast for
Proposition A among predominantly white precincts. As can be seen, increasing proximity
to a station is associated with a significant decrease in votes cast for Proposition A among
voters whose nearest planned station is in a white enclave. However, this negative effect
is significantly enhanced (β=-0.216, se=0.120, p=0.072) when focusing on voters whose
nearest station is in the black enclave of the Fillmore-Tenderloin. Indeed, the negative effect
of Proximity to Station for white voters residing closer to planned stations in the Fillmore-
Tenderloin is double the size of the effect for white voters residing close to planned stations
in white enclaves of the city. Substantively, and focusing on precincts that are 95% or greater
white, proximity to a station in a white enclave is associated with roughly 26 fewer votes cast
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for Proposition A, whereas proximity to a station in the Fillmore-Tenderloin black enclave is
associated with roughly 69 fewer votes cast for Proposition A, a nearly three-fold decrease.
These findings lend credence to the claim that Proposition A evoked a cross-pressure for
white voters in SF.
3.7 Conclusion
The findings presented in this article highlight how considerations of the racial impact of
public goods decisions (e.g., NMT) can shape voter behavior and consequently the social ge-
ography of urban and suburban spaces. These decisions can impact decades or centuries of
future urban planning decisions, in many cases entrenching segregation (Massey and Denton
1993), devastating minority urban neighborhoods (Avila 2014), aggravating geographic po-
litical polarization (Nall 2015), and exacerbating political, social, and economic inequalities.
This article makes several important contributions to the literature on racial threat.
First, the literature on racial threat is moving towards greater reliance on case studies involv-
ing large demographic changes to empirically assess the effect of exposure to outgroups on
dominant-group political behavior. As such, I identify NMT as an additional case for eval-
uating theories of racial threat, as NMT often precipitates demographic shifts and increases
racial mixing. Second, my focus on NMT introduces the concept of racial threat as potential
outgroup entry. While existing work has given considerable attention to white Americans’
apprehension over the entry of racial outgroups into their communities, most studies on racial
threat focus past or present exposure to already present, and often long-standing, outgroups.
As such, this focus on NMT is attractive in light of concerns over residential self-selection, as
the “treatment” is future oriented and offers a case where observation of political behavior
could occur before (additional) outgroup entry or dominant-group exit happen.
Aside from these contributions, there are several limitations of my analysis worth ad-
dressing. First, while I argue that NMT offers an attractive case by potentially bypassing the
problem of “white flight,” it is important to acknowledge that new transit stations are likely
located non-randomly, perhaps in lower SES or nonwhite neighborhoods. In the context of
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my study of the BART, however, concern over this issue is mitigated by several factors: SF
in 1962 was predominately white, five out of eight planned BART stations were located in
white neighborhoods and in prominent employment, tourist, and retail areas of the central
city and inner-ring suburbs, and my analysis controls for prior economic conditions and racial
composition. Second, my analysis represents a single historical case and relies on aggregate
election results. While I view this case as unique and ideal in that support for the BART
system was put to a popular vote, future research should strive to assess the robustness of my
results using additional cases. To be sure, one of the benefits of NMT as an arena to assess
racial threat processes is the seemingly ample opportunity for replication tests given many
mass transit systems throughout the U.S. and abroad. Moreover, while precincts represent
notably smaller levels of geographic aggregation than that usually found in the racial threat
literature (e.g., county, zip code, tract) and I address the aggregate nature of my data and
utilize ecological inference methods, future research could potentially utilize individual-level
data which simply was not available in this case.
Finally, my exploration of NMT focuses on racial threat from the white-centered angle
of how NMT may facilitate the entry of non-Anglo groups into white communities. However,
NMT can also be used to explore the reaction of non-Anglo groups to the entry of whites.
Indeed, recent work on gentrification finds that NMT can lead to gentrification (Grube-
Cavers and Patterson 2015) and “white return” to urban areas experiencing white flight
many decades prior. Focusing on the U.S., where many cities eschewed mass transit in favor
of automobiles and freeway systems, we have seen a growth in NMT in the midst of concern
over pollution, peak oil, and traffic congestion. Each of these cases affords an opportunity
to explore processes of racial threat from the perspective of “gentrification threat” (Newman
et al. 2016) and the effect of white entry into majority-minority communities.
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3.8 Supplemental Appendix
3.8.1 1962 General Election Results
1962 San Francisco County election returns were hand tallied by the California Secretary of
State, organized by state assembly district-precinct, and bound in a returns ledger that is
currently housed at the San Francisco History Center in the San Francisco Public Library.
The data were retrieved and digitized by the authors in October 2018. Figure 3.8 is a picture
of the first page of the election ledger.
Figure 3.8: San Francisco County Election Returns Ledger
The data included Proposition A precinct vote returns for 1,326 precincts. My depen-
dent variable is precinct-level support—percent “Yes” vote—for Proposition A (mean=67.2,
sd=8.4, min=30.9, max=89.8).
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3.8.2 1960 Decennial Census
I pulled census tract data from the 1960 Decennial Census from the U.S. Census Bureau
via Social Explorer ‘(https://www.socialexplorer.com/)’. Polygons for cities and tracts were
obtained from the IPUMS historic GIS map database.
My key independent variable is proximity to nearest BART station, calculated as the
Euclidean distance (WGS84 projection lat/lon units) of the centroid of each precinct to the
address of the nearest planned BART station (mean=18,127.27, sd=5,824.64, min=160.224,
max=26,435.5). Georeferencing of precinct polygons is explained in detail in the next section.
I include a variety of control variables in my models. I describe each and display basic
descriptive statistics below.
Income level: Percent of residents in precinct with incomes > $25k (mean=0.02, sd=0.03,
min=0, max=0.19)
Home values: Percent of housing units with values > $35k (mean=0.12, sd=0.20, min=0,
max=1)
Home ownership: Percent of housing units that were owner occupied (mean=0.42, sd=0.30,
min=0, max=1).
Racial composition: Percent of precinct that is White (mean=0.85, sd=0.20, min=0.01,
max=1). Other models utilize measures of percent Black (mean=0.08, sd=0.20, min=0,
max=0.68) and percent Hispanic surname (mean=0.07, sd=0.06, min=0, max=0.35).
Residential tenure: Percent of precinct taking residence prior to 1940 (mean=0.41, sd=0.19,
min=0, max=1).
Population density: (mean=2,627.33, sd=3,519.31, min=4.39, max=45,941.78).
Drive to work: Percent of precinct that drives to work (mean=0.42, sd=0.14, min=0.02,
max=0.74).
Walk to work: Percent of precinct that walks to work (mean=0.09, sd=0.11, min=0, max=0.63).
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3.8.3 Georeferencing
To calculate precinct distance from BART stations and link precinct-level election returns
to census data, I geo-referenced hand-drawn 1962 precinct maps (Gandhi 2016a). I collected
historic precinct maps from San Francisco City Hall that were used for all elections between
1961 to 1965, photographed each map, and used QGIS mapping software to geolocate each
precinct map onto a current street map of San Francisco. I include three examples below
that show how the larger state assembly districts fit into SF county, how precincts fit within
an assembly district, and the finished geo-references precinct shapefile for all of SF county.
3.8.4 Weighted Spatial Join
To generate precinct level estimates of census tract variables, I overlaid precinct shapefiles
described above with 1960 tract shapefiles and used the sf package in R to conduct an areal-
weighted interpolation (weighted spatial joins), reaggregating data from a larger polygon
(tract) to a smaller polygon (precinct).
3.8.5 Ecological Inference
To estimate White and Black voting trends we relied on Gary King’s EI package (King
2004). EI provides a method for inferring individual-level behavior from aggregate data by
implementing a statistical procedure outlined in King (1997).
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Figure 3.9: San Francisco County State Assembly Districts
Note: map indicates how SF County was parceled into state assembly districts.
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Figure 3.10: Precinct Map 18th Assembly District
Note: Polygons represent electoral precincts embedded in state assembly districts. Numbers correspond to
electoral returns from the Secretary of State.
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Figure 3.11: Full Shapefile of Electoral Precincts San Francisco County
Note: Polygons represent geo-referenced electoral precincts for all of San Francisco County.
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3.8.6 Regression Tables
Table 3.1: The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for Proposition A
Model 1
Proximity 0.024∗∗
(0.008)
Black Enclave 0.012
(0.021)
% Income>$25k 0.096∗∗∗
(0.018)
% Values>$35k 0.020
(0.015)
% Homeowners −0.154∗∗∗
(0.009)
% White −0.106∗∗∗
(0.010)
Residential Tenure −0.001∗∗
(0.000)
Population Density −0.025
(0.027)
Proximity * Black Enclave −0.024
(0.026)
Intercept 0.818∗∗∗
(0.011)
R2 0.517
Adj. R2 0.514
Num. obs. 1326
RMSE 0.059
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from an OLS regression model. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 (two tailed)
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for Proposition A
Beta Regression Walking Distance
Proximity 0.107∗∗
(0.038)
Black Enclave 0.037 −0.014
(0.099) (0.008)
Proximity * Black Enclave −0.082
(0.124)
Walking Distance −0.025∗∗
(0.008)
Walking Distance * Black Enclave 0.031
(0.023)
% Income>$25k 0.441∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.018)
% Values>$35k 0.097 0.019
(0.073) (0.015)
% Homeowners −0.689∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.009)
% White −0.533∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.010)
Residential Tenure −0.004∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.002) (0.000)
Population Density −0.113 −0.024
(0.135) (0.027)
Phi 62.352∗∗∗
(2.405)
Intercept 1.430∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.009)
Pseudo R2 0.513
Log Likelihood 1891.450
Num. obs. 1326 1326
R2 0.517
Adj. R2 0.514
RMSE 0.058
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a beta regression model. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on White and Black Voter Support for
Proposition A
White Black
Proximity 0.021∗ 0.007
(0.010) (0.006)
Black Enclave −0.042 −0.047∗∗
(0.023) (0.015)
% Income>25k 0.097∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.013)
% Values>35k 0.043∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.011)
% Homeowners −0.169∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007)
% White 0.090∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.011) (0.007)
Residential Tenure −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Population Density −0.047 0.070∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.020)
Proximity * Black Enclave 0.045 0.040∗
(0.029) (0.019)
Intercept 0.620∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.008)
R2 0.391 0.453
Adj. R2 0.386 0.450
Num. obs. 1320 1318
RMSE 0.063 0.042
Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p <
0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.4: The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for Proposition A Control-
ling for Partisanship and Density of Car and Pedestrian Commuters
Model 1 Model 2
Proximity 0.017∗ 0.019∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Black Enclave 0.013 0.006
(0.021) (0.023)
% Income>25k 0.111∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018)
% Values>35k 0.027 0.023
(0.015) (0.015)
% Homeowners −0.156∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.014)
% White −0.097∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010)
Residential Tenure −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Population Density −0.010 −0.011
(0.028) (0.031)
Percent Dem 0.031∗
(0.014)
Proximity * Black Enclave −0.023 −0.009
(0.026) (0.030)
Percent Drive 0.058∗
(0.028)
Percent Walk 0.024
(0.020)
Intercept 0.792∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
R2 0.519 0.519
Adj. R2 0.515 0.515
Num. obs. 1326 1326
RMSE 0.058 0.058
Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p <
0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Proximity to Balboa Park BART Station and Hunters Point on
White Voter Support for Proposition A
Balboa Park Hunters Point
Proximity Balboa 0.014
(0.029)
Proximity Hunters 0.016
(0.049)
% Income>25k 0.233∗ −0.118
(0.103) (0.270)
% Values>35k −0.370 0.404
(0.214) (0.530)
% Homeowners −0.193∗∗∗ −0.121
(0.027) (0.097)
% White 0.021 0.204
(0.043) (0.144)
Residential Tenure −0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Population Density 0.009 0.196
(0.345) (0.304)
Pct Drive 0.115 0.094
(0.122) (0.181)
Intercept 0.626∗∗∗ 0.399∗
(0.080) (0.186)
R2 0.282 0.058
Adj. R2 0.262 0.011
Num. obs. 298 169
RMSE 0.065 0.065
Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.∗∗∗p <
0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.7: The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Support for Treatment-Irrelevant
Ballot Measures
Higher Ed Taxes
Proximity −0.007 −0.004
(0.009) (0.010)
Black Enclave −0.012 0.004
(0.021) (0.023)
% Income>25k 0.069∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021)
% Values>35k 0.037∗ −0.018
(0.015) (0.017)
% Homeowners −0.104∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
% White 0.103∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.011) (0.012)
Residential Tenure −0.018 −0.034∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
Population Density −0.007 −0.038
(0.028) (0.032)
Pct Dem 0.129∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015)
Proximity*Black Enclave −0.002 0.015
(0.026) (0.029)
Intercept 0.551∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
R2 0.201 0.338
Adj. R2 0.195 0.333
Num. obs. 1326 1326
RMSE 0.059 0.065
Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.∗∗∗p <
0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.8: The Effect of Proximity to BART Station on Total Votes Cast for Proposition A
<15% Black <5% Black
Proximity −0.163∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037)
Black Enclave 0.134 0.125
(0.096) (0.099)
% Income>25k 0.263∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗
(0.077) (0.080)
% Values>35k −0.041 −0.048
(0.071) (0.076)
% Homeowners 0.175∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(0.042) (0.044)
% White 0.390∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.080)
Residential Tenure −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Population Density 0.575∗∗∗ 0.430∗
(0.161) (0.171)
Total Pop Over 20 0.256∗ 0.335∗∗
(0.108) (0.117)
Proximity*Black Enclave −0.216 −0.219
(0.117) (0.121)
Intercept 4.881∗∗∗ 4.940∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.080)
AIC 11270.285 10042.658
BIC 11330.157 10101.148
Log Likelihood -5623.142 -5009.329
Deviance 1093.739 972.309
Num. obs. 1085 967
Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression models. Standard errors in parentheses.∗∗∗p <
0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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CHAPTER 4
Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: Racial and
Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explains
Shifts in White Voting
The realignment of party coalitions around issues of race and civil rights stands as one of the
most consequential political developments of the 20th century. By the 1990s, political elites
were well sorted into racially liberal and racially conservative camps and most politically
informed voters had followed suit (Layman and Carsey 2002; Black and Black 2009a; Lowndes
2008; Hood III et al. 2014; Carmines and Stimson 1989a; Schickler 2016a), suggesting that
there may be little further room for racial attitudes to influence white Americans’ partisan
attachments.
More recently, however, the two-term presidency of the nation’s first Black presi-
dent, partisan polarization over immigration policy, and visible and rapid Latino population
growth may be further transforming mass partisanship. Existing partisan coalitions that
have characterized the two parties in American politics for several decades are shifting and
may be contributing to the further partisan realignment of white citizens. As Republicans
have pushed right on race, Democrats are increasingly relying on minority voters to win
elections, strengthening the link between the Democratic Party and racial and ethnic mi-
norities (Segura and Bowler 2006; Frymer 2010a; Tesler 2016b; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015;
Greenberg 1996; Ahler and Sood 2018).
This paper tests whether Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton’s unique candidacies may
have facilitated cross-partisan voting in the 2016 election, a precursor to durable partisan
change. First, did a sizable number of white voters switch their vote in 2016 and was this vote
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switching unique to the white working class? Second, are immigration and racial attitudes
or economic dislocation and marginality more strongly associated with this vote switching?
I find evidence that a non-trivial number of both working class and non-working class
white voters did switch their votes in the 2016 election and that this vote switching was
associated more with racial and immigration attitudes than economic factors.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on white racial attitudes and white re-
sponses to demographic change and perceived immigrant threat in American politics. While
others have shown that contextual demographic threat contributed to Trump support during
the 2016 primary election (Newman et al. 2017), and that racial and immigration attitudes
were associated with Trump support among voters (Sides 2017; Schaffner et al. 2017), this
paper is the first to thoroughly examine the correlates of vote switching in the 2016 elec-
tion. My findings suggest that the United States may be in the midst of further electoral
realignment as partisan voting continues to polarize around issues of race and immigration.
4.1 Literature
4.1.1 Racial Realignment: Conceptions of Partisanship And Partisan Change
Partisanship is one of the most widely studied phenomena in political science. Traditional
views of partisan identification focus on the issues, ideologies, and groups connected to each
party, what Huddy et al. (2015; 2018) call the instrumental conception of partisanship
(Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1964; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006;
Niemi and Jennings 1991).1 More recently, scholars have conceived of partisanship as a
social identity, comparable to race or religion (Green et al. 2002; Greene 2004; Huddy et al.
2015; Theodoridis 2017; Rothschild et al. 2018; Huddy and Bankert 2017; Mason and Wron-
ski 2018). In this view, partisan affiliation is akin to a salient social group attachment (Tajfel
1981) and partisanship the result of “comparing a judgment about oneself with one’s con-
1Another traditional or foundational work in political science and political psychology points to partisan-
ship as more simply the product of childhood socialization (Campbell et al. 1960).
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ception of a social group. As people reflect on whether they are Democrats or Republicans
(or neither), they call to mind a mental image, or stereotype, or what these sorts of people
are like and square those images with their own conception” (Green et al. 2002, pg 8).
While these two conceptions are often pitted against one another as mutually exclu-
sive, they need not be. Studies of voter conceptions of partisanship find evidence for both
(Rothschild et al. 2018), and both allow for partisan change, albeit via different mechanisms.
Instrumental partisan change can occur if parties shift positions on issues that may be im-
portant to certain voters. Changes in partisan identity can occur if the primary social groups
that make up parties change (i.e. which racial and regional groups “go with” each party).
I argue that three parallel trends have opened the door for vote switching in 2016 among
partisans via both channels: the election of Barack Obama, mass immigration from Latin
American countries, and the slow collapse of American manufacturing.
While these three trends affect all voters, there is reason to believe that the white
working class—increasingly alienated from the two-party system, threatened by demographic
change, and unsure of its future economic prospects—was uniquely positioned to be cross-
mobilized in the 2016 election. Indeed, politicians haven’t courted the white working class
for some time. Democratic base building strategies have focused on adding a growing Latino
and Asian American electorate (Barreto et al. 2010; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ramakr-
ishnan 2005; Wong et al. 2011; Barreto and Collingwood 2015) to its existing coalition of
Black and educated white voters (Silver 2016), rather than courting working class whites.
The contemporary Republican Party has similarly struggled with white working class mo-
bilization. Though it has not been shy about using dog-whistle racial appeals to try and
appeal to racially conservative whites (López 2015), it may be too strongly associated with
the wealthy elite (Ahler and Sood 2018) for working class whites to feel like they belong
(Green et al. 2004). As a result, the white working class has felt increasingly alienated from
both parties, neither of which look like their group or are perceived as representing their
group’s interests (Kurtzleben 2016; Gest 2016).
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America’s First Black President
The election of a Black man to the White House served as a highly visible and symbolic
political shock (Parker and Barreto 2013), shattering the long era of racial silence ushered in
by Clinton’s presidency (Tesler 2016a). The Democratic Party was no longer just associated
with civil rights and Black voters but had succeeded in electing an African American to
the most powerful and visible position in the world. As a result of President Obama’s
election, racial attitudes began to spill over into Americans’ evaluations of numerous political
phenomena including economic trends, public policies, and public figures (Tesler 2016b;
Yadon and Piston 2018; Enders and Scott 2018).
This increased racialization of American politics spilled over into partisanship as well
(Tesler 2016b), low-information whites with lower levels of attitude constraint (Converse
1964; Carpini and Keeter 1996) increasingly linked their racial attitudes with their partisan
identities during the Obama presidency, producing a racially polarized shift of white racial
liberals towards the Democrats and white racial conservatives towards the Republicans.2
4.1.2 Changing Demographics and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes
The racial symbolism of electing the first non-white president has been coupled with rapid
demographic change. It is likely that attitudes towards other non-white out-groups, like
Latino immigrants, also spill over into white partisanship. “Latino threat” has been opera-
tionalized as both contextual and symbolic, with anti-immigrant attitudes being triggered by
local demographic shifts (Hopkins 2010b; Newman 2013b; Newman and Velez 2014b; Enos
2014b) as well as national rhetoric and trends (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). As a result,
attitudes towards a variety of policy issues like welfare, health, education are now associated
with immigration attitudes and Latino affect (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Garand et al. 2015;
Fox 2004).
More importantly, Latino affect and fear of demographic change has also been linked to
2This is consistent with David Sears’s large body of work on symbolic politics (Sears and Funk 1990).
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individual level ideology and partisanship (Craig and Richeson 2014b; Abrajano and Hajnal
2015; Shin et al. 2015; Valentino et al. 2013a). Lab experiments have shown that exposure
to news about shifting demographics moves white Americans in an ideologically conservative
direction and towards the Republican Party (Craig and Richeson 2014b), a shift also seen
in observational data (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Hajnal and Rivera 2014a). Ostfeld (2018)
finds that when White voters learn about Democratic outreach to Latinos, they become less
supportive of the Democratic Party. Indeed, Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) show that in the
near-term, Latino population growth will likely result in many white Americans shifting into
the Republican Party as partisan elites continue to polarize on issues of immigration and
race.
4.1.3 Partisan Groups, Issues, and Cross-Partisan Voting
How do these visible changes translate into cross-partisan voting and partisan change? Ac-
cording to instrumental views of partisan change, the increased political attention to racial-
ized issues (policing, immigration) during Obama’s tenure and the increased reliance on
non-white voters is shifting the Democratic Party’s median position on issues away from the
median white citizen’s position, resulting in white shifts towards the Republican Party as
white voters update their partisanship to match their policy positions. According to identity-
based conceptions of partisan change, the increased perception of the Democratic Party as
a coalition of non-white voters is changing perceptions of where many white voters feel they
belong.
There is evidence that both processes are occurring, with perceptions of policy shifts
following logically from perceptions of a diversifying Democratic Party. There is little doubt
that Obama’s election increased the visibility of Black voters as a core Democratic con-
stituency (Tesler 2016b). Sood and Ahler (2018) find that Americans consistently overesti-
mate the proportion of Democrats that are Black (41.9% compared to the true composition
of 23.9%). Kirill and Valentino (2018) find that white voters, Republicans in particular,
are very likely to implicitly associate the Democratic Party with African Americans and the
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Republican Party with whites.
The Democratic Party is also increasingly associated with Latinos (Hajnal and Rivera
2017; Abrajano and Hajnal 2017). The Democratic Party, particularly Democratic presiden-
tial candidates, frequently and openly court Latino voters (Collingwood et al. 2014a), which
has been shown to turn off White Democrats (Ostfeld 2018). Finally, most Latino elected
officials are Democratic3 and Latino voters are increasingly voting Democratic.
This shift in real and perceived composition of parties is no doubt intertwined with
perceptions of the ideological orientation and issue priorities of the Democratic Party. As the
party has diversified, white Americans have increasingly perceived the Democratic Party as
being further from their own positions on economic issues (Zingher 2018), and increasingly
aligned with issue priorities of African Americans (Tesler 2016b) and immigrants (Abrajano
and Hajnal 2015; Ostfeld 2018).
Regardless of the conceptualization of partisanship and partisan change, there is evi-
dence to suggest that white voters are increasingly perceiving the Democratic Party as the
party of racial and ethnic minorities and racially liberal policy and the Republican Party
as the party of White Americans and racially conservative policy. Together, these trends
could lead to vote switching and eventual shifts in white partisanship. White voters who are
racially conservative, who have more punitive immigration attitudes, or who live in commu-
nities undergoing rapid demographic change, may be particularly put off by the Democratic
Party’s increasing diversity and shifting issue priorities and drawn to Trump for his clear and
consistent anti-immigrant policy positions and rhetoric appealing specifically to white voters
(e.g., see Knuckey 2017; Moore 2017; Stern 2017). At the same time, Donald Trump’s immi-
gration policy proposals and rhetoric may have driven more traditional, business-oriented,
and racially moderate white voters who are comfortable with diversity away from the Re-
publican presidential candidate and towards Clinton, who embraced a more accommodating
position on racial and immigration issues.
• H1a: Racial attitudes: white voters who express more conservative racial attitudes
3According to NALEO, in 2014, among the partisan offices held by Latinos, 88% were Democrats
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will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump than similarly situated white voters
with more liberal racial attitudes.
• H1b: Anti-immigrant attitudes: white voters who express higher levels of anti-immigrant
sentiment will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump than similarly situated
white voters with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment.
• H1c: Latino immigrant threat: white voters living in counties undergoing rapid Latino
growth will be more likely to switch their vote to Trump relative to similarly situated
white voters who do live in counties with lower levels of Latino growth.
• H2a: Racial accommodation: white voters who express more liberal racial attitudes
will be more likely to switch their vote to Clinton than similarly situated white voters
with more conservative racial attitudes.
• H2b: Pro-immigrant attitudes: white voters who express higher levels of pro-immigrant
sentiment will be more likely to switch to Clinton than similarly situated white voters
with lower levels of pro-immigrant sentiment.
• H3: The relationship between racial attitudes, immigration attitudes, Latino threat
and vote switching to Trump will be stronger among working class than non-working
class whites. The relationship between racial attitudes, immigration attitudes, Latino
threat and vote switching to Clinton will be stronger among non-working class than
working class whites.
4.1.4 Economic Marginality and Local Economic Dislocation
I have argued that white voters are a prime target for Trump’s racially conservative rhetoric,
particularly after Obama’s presidency and in an era of increased immigration. Recent eco-
nomic changes and dislocation in an era of globalization and worker disaffection may have also
driven white voters, particularly the white working class, to support the populist appeals of
Donald Trump, whose rhetoric often dovetailed anti-immigrant with anti-globalization and
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anti-trade themes. Indeed, the media was quick to declare economic dislocation as a key
driver of white voting for Trump (Adams 2016; Sargent 2017).
There is little doubt that the white working class has been hit particularly hard by
structural economic changes(Gest 2016). Today there are three times as many white col-
lar workers as manual workers and wages are stagnant for those without a college education
(Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008). In this sense, manufacturing decline may be disproportion-
ately felt among the white working class (Meyerson 2015). In addition, the upward mobility
and union protections that defined the working class’s support for Democrats throughout
the middle of the 20th century is no longer a reality. The post-recession job recovery during
President Obama’s tenure benefited almost exclusively college educated workers, leaving out
many middle income earners (Carnevale et al. 2015). These economic dislocations have been
compounded by the fraying of the community based institutions that used to provide safety
nets in times of need (Putnam 2001).
Moreover, a broad body of work in political science argues that economic conditions
play an outsize role in determining the outcomes of elections (Norpoth 1984; Norpoth et al.
1991; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Political scientists regu-
larly forecast elections using macroeconomic metrics such as second quarter GDP growth
(Abramowitz 2016) and change in unemployment (Jerome and Jerome-Speziari 2016). This
body of work suggests that voters who switch from one party to another may do so for retro-
spective economic reasons — their personal and local economic conditions have deteriorated
under the leadership of the party from which they switched (Fiorina 1981).
Thus, despite the large body of work showing that racial and immigration attitudes play
a central role in recent voting trends, we cannot discount the possibility that white individuals
who switched votes in 2016, particularly white working class voters, did so because they were
economically marginalized and, consistent with theories of retrospective voting, did not see
Hillary Clinton’s Democratic Party as one that would address their economic concerns after
eight years of Democratic control of the White House. Conversely, individuals who had
not supported a Democratic president in the previous election but who have seen economic
improvements under a Democratic president, or who live in a thriving economic community,
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may have been drawn to switch allegiances to Clinton in the 2016 election.
• H4a: Economic marginality: white citizens who are economically marginal — negative
retrospective economic evaluation or experiencing relative economic deprivation — will
be more likely to switch their vote to Trump than similarly situated voters without
such economic marginality.
• H4b: Local economic dislocation: White citizens living in counties undergoing eco-
nomic decline (growth in unemployment or loss in manufacturing) will be more likely
to switch their votes to Trump, relative to similarly situated voters who do not live in
such counties.
• H5a: Economic integration: White citizens who are economically integrated — pos-
itive retrospective economic evaluations and greater relative income— will be more
likely to switch their vote to Clinton than similarly situated voters without such eco-
nomic integration.
• H5b: Local economic expansion: White citizens living in counties undergoing eco-
nomic growth (decline in unemployment or gains in manufacturing) will be more likely
to switch their votes to Clinton, relative to similarly situated voters who do not live
in such counties.
• H6: The relationship between economic indicators and vote switching for Trump will
be stronger among working class whites than non-working class whites. The rela-
tionship between economic indicators and vote switching for Clinton will be stronger
among non-working class whites than working class whites.
4.2 Data and Methods
I use a large (n=64,600) opt-in Internet panel survey, the 2016 Cooperative Congressional
Election Studies (CCES) Survey, to evaluate my hypotheses (Ansolabahere and Shaffner
2016). The CCES is administered by YouGov/Polimetrix and has an interview period of
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September to November. The CCES sample selection follows a two-stage process. First,
YouGov draws a stratified random sample from the 2012 American Community Survey
(ACS). This sample is then matched to members of the YouGov/Polimetrix panel, such that
the resulting panel looks the same on observables as the national population.4 The resulting
survey includes 64,600 completed interviews with a within-panel participation rate of 41.9%
and an AAPOR response rate 1 of 0.139. The final sample is weighted to be representative of
the U.S. adult population. Finally, 2016 vote has been validated using the Catalist database
of registered voters in the U.S.5
For Trump switching models, I restrict the data to only examine white 2016 voters
who voted in 2012 for either the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, or a third party
candidate, because these are the only voters who are eligible to switch (n=19,296). Clinton
switching models I restrict the sample to white 2016 voters who voted in 2012 for either the
Republican candidate (Romney) or for a third party candidate (n=17,493). Split sample
models of the white working class further restrict my sample sizes to (n=10,341) for Trump
models and (n=11,299) for Clinton models.6 I present results for working class whites,
non-working class whites, and all whites in each analysis.
My dependent variable is voting for Trump (1=yes,0=no) or for Clinton (1=yes,0=no).
Because of the model sample restriction, therefore, a Trump vote switchers can be interpreted
4While online nonprobability samples typically include more politically and civically engaged individuals,
a Pew Research Center study finds that YouGov surveys show the smallest deviations from benchmarks
compared to other well-known online opt-in survey panel competitors (Kennedy et al 2016; Rivers 2016),
producing a largely representative and accurate national sample.
5See https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/ for full details about the survey methodology including full question
wordings, the sampling frame, sampling design, response rates, and voter list matching.
6I define white working class as those without a four-year college degree. There are numerous ways to
define working-class. Educational levels, which I use for my models, serve as a proxy for skill and human
capital, which is increasingly essential in our changing economy (Carnevale et al. 2015). Of course, those with
college degrees can hold blue-collar jobs and those without college degrees can be (and frequently are) very
successful financially. Nevertheless, using income to determine working class can be arbitrary, depending on
region and cut-points used, and are often poorly reported on surveys (Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008). I thus
settle define working class as lacking a 4-year college degree. I estimated similar models defining working
class as those in the lower tercile of the income distribution and find very similar results which are presented
in Online Appendix A.
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Table 4.1: Vote Switching Combinations
2012 Vote 2016 Vote Non-WC Whites WWC
Congruent Voting Romney Trump 35.2% 50.4%
Obama Clinton 48.4% 31.5%
Other Other 1.3% 1%
Partisan Vote Switching Romney Clinton 3.1% 2%
Other Clinton 1.1% 0.3%
Obama Trump 2.4% 6.2%
Other Trump 0.7 % 1.4%
Total N 9,129 13,842
Note: Partisan vote switching combinations and weighted percentage of all non-working
class white and working class white adult voters who voted in 2012 and 2016. I also display
congruent voting for comparison. Note that the columns do not sum to 100% because several
vote combinations were omitted from the table,including demobilization (Romney, Obama, or
Other in 2012 to not voting in 2016), third party switching (Romney, Obama, or Other in
2012 to third party in 2016) and mobilization (not voting in 2012 to voting for Trump,Clinton,
or Other in 2016).
as a white 2016 Trump voter who voted in 2012 for Barack Obama (the Democrat) or a third
party candidate. A Clinton vote switcher is a white 2016 Clinton voter who voted in 2012
for Mitt Romney (the Republican) or a third party candidate.7 I outline most of the possible
vote combinations for 2012 and 2016 voters in Table 4.1 and display the proportion of non-
working class and working class whites who fall into each strata. I find, not surprisingly,
that the vast majority of the samples are congruent voters (Romney to Trump and Obama
to Clinton). Among vote switchers, the focus of this paper, I find that about 6% of white
working class and 2.4% of white non-working class voters switched to Trump and 2% of
white working class and 3.1% of white non-working class voters switched to Clinton. Given
that there were over 50.5 million college educated white voters and over 46.4 million working
class white voters in 2016 (CNN 2016), these percentages are not trivial and suggest that, in
raw numbers, many more working class whites than non-working class whites switched their
votes in 2016 from Obama to Trump and far fewer from Romney to Clinton.
7Given concerns of bias in 2012 recalled vote—due to poor memory or simply social desirability and
lying—I undertake a number of additional analyses in Online Appendix B to assess the extent that misreport
could bias the results of these analyses. In line with Rivers and Lauderdale (2016), I conclude that very
few respondents lie about which candidate they supported in the previous election, reducing concerns about
significant bias in the measure.
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Nonetheless, these descriptive statistics do not say anything about which factors were
most strongly related to switching to either Trump or Clinton and whether those factors
varied by partisan affiliation. To answer these questions, I use logistic regression to model
vote switching as a function of racial, immigration, and economic attitudes and contexts.
Rather than pool across partisans, I conduct my analyses separately among voters who
identify with the two major parties or as independents.8
For racial and immigration attitudes, I relied on two batteries of questions. Following
Schaffner (Schaffner et al. 2017), I combine three questions about acknowledgement of race
and racism into a scale of racial attitudes (α = 0.68, average r = 0.42) and recode it to range
between 0 (racially liberal) and 1 (racially conservative). For individual-level immigration
attitudes, respondents chose which of four immigration policy proposals they supported. The
four questions were combined into a single immigration attitude scale (α = 0.69, average
r = 0.35) and recoded to fall between 0 (least punitive) and 1 (most punitive).9
To measure demographic change, I calculated Latino growth as the percentage change
in the county Latino population from 2000 to 2014. The larger the number, the greater the
level of Latino growth. This measure is calculated for all counties in the United States then
appended to the individual-level survey data based on county FIPS code.
I measured economic marginality and local economic dislocation each in two ways:
retrospective economic evaluation operationalized as change in annual household income and
relative economic deprivation is operationalized as family income relative to the county level
median, change in county level manufacturing, and change in county level unemployment.
Retrospective economic evaluations were measured with a question about whether over the
previous four years the respondent’s household annual income increased or decreased. The
responses were recoded to fall between (0) for increased a lot and (1) for decreased a lot.
8Pooled models, presented in Online Appendix C, return substantively similar results.
9Full question wording, distributions for key covariates, and scale statistics can be found in Online Ap-
pendix D. Readers might be concerned that horse race models pitting the regression coefficient of single
items, which are more prone to measurement error, against scales, which are less prone to measurement
error (Ansolabahere et al 2008), is setting us up for an unfair comparison. In Online Appendix E, I run
additional models where I disaggregate the scales into single items and find no differences.
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Relative deprivation is a combination of the respondent’s self-reported family income and
their surrounding economic environment. I code the respondent as economically marginal
if their family income is lower (1) or higher (0) than the median income in their county of
residence. Manufacturing loss is calcualted as the percentage change in county manufacturing
employment between 2000 to 2014 and change in unemployment as the percentage change
in unemployment rate at the county level between 2000 and 2014.10
Beyond these key independent variables, I included several control variables in my
analyses that may be related to vote switching including change in county foreign-born
population, personal income, employment status, self-reported ideology, union membership,
gender, geographic region, and in pooled all white respondent models, education.11.12
4.3 Results
Table 4.10 and Table 4.3 present my core logistic regression model results. The models
include variables testing for both racial and immigration attitudes and contexts (H1,H2)
and economics-related hypotheses (H4, H5) for all whites (columns 1 through 3), the white
working class (columns 4 through 6), and non-working class whites (columns 7 through 9)
(H3 and H6). I omitted control variables from the table for space concerns but full regression
tables are presented in Online Appendix H. Because logistic regression coefficients are difficult
to interpret, I simulate counterfactuals and plot the results for each variable of interest. 13
10In Online Appendix F, I model results using difference contextual economic measures between shorter
time spans, which return substantively identical results.
11For each variable I have simply recoded DK and “Refuse” responses as missing, with the exception of
ideology where DK respondents were recoded as moderates (Treier and Hillygus 2009). I have also run
the core analyses using imputed values via the MICE package in R. The results, which are substantively
identical, are reported in Online Appendix G
12The full model is: Trump/ClintonVote ∼ β0 + β1RacialAttitudes + β2ImmigrationAttitudes +
β3HispanicGrowth(00−14)+β4RetrospectiveEconomics+β5RelativeDeprivation+β6ManufacturingLoss(00−
14)+ β7CountyUnemploymentChange(00− 14)+ β8Income+ β9Unemployed+ β10ForeignBornChange(00−
14) + β11Union+ β12Female+ β13Ideology+ β14South+ β15College
13Model fit statistics are presented in Online Appendix I
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I begin by looking at the role of racial and immigration factors on vote switching for
Trump. In Figure 4.1 I display the effect of racial attitudes (min to max), immigration
attitudes (min to max) and change in county level Latino population (mean ± 2 s.d.) on
vote switching for all white (circles), white working class (triangles), and white non-working
class (squares) Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.14
Figure 4.1: Race, Immigration, and Switching to Trump
Note: Points indicate effect of moving each variable from its minimum to maximum value (except Latino
growth which was moved from 2 s.d. below to 2 s.d. above its mean so I am not extrapolating to extreme
outliers) while holding all others at their means. Lines indicate simulated 95% confidence intervals.
First, I show that the associations between each variable and switching for Trump for
working class and non-working class whites are generally not statistically distinguishable,
with the exception of immigration attitudes among Democrats and Independents. While
working class whites were more likely to switch their vote to Trump in 2016 than non-
working class whites, both working class and non-working class whites with strong racially
conservative or anti-immigrant views were more likely to switch than those with racially
liberal or pro-immigration views. The relationships are of similar magnitude across the
board.
14I split respondents by party because I expect that baseline propensity to switch will vary by partisanship.
For instance, it will be easier for a self-identified Republican who voted for Obama in 2012 to ’come home’
to their party in 2016 than it will be get a Democrat who voted for Obama in 2012 to vote for Trump in
2016.
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Second, I show that the association between racial and immigration attitudes and
switching to Trump is stronger among Independents and Republicans than among Democrats.
It is easier for Trump’s campaign to “bring home” Republicans or sway Independents than
to persuade Democrats to vote across party lines. Nevertheless, I find that moving white
Democratic racial conservatism and anti-immigrant attitudes from their minimum to max-
imum values, holding all other variables at their means, is associated with a 12.6 (95% CI:
[7.4,20.4]) and 3.7 (95% CI: [2.5,5.2]) percentage point increase in the likelihood of switching
to Trump in 2016, a relationship that only strengthens in the WWC sample.15
Third, I find little support that county level demographic change is associated with
vote switching. While the marginal effects are positive, they are substantively small and
generally statistically indistinguishable from zero. If I simulate the probability of Trump
vote switching for the full range of Latino population change (-100 to 1409), the marginal
effect increases substantially to 66, 18, and 6 percentage points for working class white
Democrats, Independents, and Republicans, respectively, but because I am extrapolating to
extreme outliers, these estimates are highly imprecise. These findings could be due to the fact
that politics is increasingly becoming nationalized (Hopkins 2018), fueled by declining local
media (Prior 2007; Martin and Mccrain 2018) and decreasing knowledge of and interest of
local political events, and fit nicely in with the sociotropic literature on immigration attitudes
which suggests that immigration attitudes are driven more by national than local concerns
of the cultural and economic threat of immigrants (Citrin et al. 1997; Sides and Citrin 2007;
Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).
In Figure 4.2 I display marginal effects of racial attitudes (max to min) and immigration
attitudes (max to min) for all white (circles), white working class (triangles), and white non-
working class (squares) Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. Note that I invert the
direction of the counterfactual scenario to be consistent with my hypotheses. In other words,
15Readers might be concerned that these relationship are endogenous and that respondents are simply
learning and adopting the racial or immigration views of their candidate of choice. I am skeptical that this
is the case, given that group antagonisms are generally crystallized attitudes (Tesler 2015). Nevertheless I
leverage a panel dataset to examine how wave one racial and immigration attitudes are correlated with vote
switching. I find similar trends, presented in Online Appendix J, suggesting that racial and immigration
attitudes preceded Trump’s rise.
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Figure 4.2: Race, Immigration, and Switching to Clinton
Note: Points indicate marginal effect of moving each variable from its maximum to minimum value (except
Latino growth which was moved from 2 s.d. above its mean to two s.d. below) while holding all others at their
means. Circles indicate model for all white respondents, triangles for just white working class respondents,
and squares for non-working class white respondents. Lines indicate simulated 95% confidence intervals.
I can interpret these plots as the increase in the predicted probability of switching for Clinton
given a shift from most racially conservative to racially liberal and from the most conservative
to the most liberal immigration views.
I find similar trends in my Clinton models as I did in my Trump models. The most
racially liberal Democrats, Independents, and Republicans were more likely to switch to Clin-
ton in the 2016 election than the most racially conservative. This relationship is stronger
among non-working class whites than among working class whites. The same goes for
Democrats, Independents, and Republicans who held the strongest pro-immigrant views
compared to those with the strongest anti-immigrant views.
In sum, I find support for part of hypotheses H1 and H2. Symbolic racial and immi-
gration attitudes were strongly associated with vote switching in the 2016 election. White
voters who held strong anti-immigrant or racially conservative views were more likely to
switch to Trump in the 2016 election than those with strong pro-immigrant or racially lib-
eral views, who were more likely to switch to Clinton. This suggests that symbolic racial
attitudes played an important role in shuffling some white voters in the 2016 election. I
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did not uncover strong evidence for the hypothesis that living in counties with the most
rapidly changing Latino population was associated with vote switching to Trump. Most of
the coefficients were positive and significant but the effects were substantively meaningless.
With respect to H3, I note that the effects of these attitudinal dispositions were slightly
more associated with switching to Trump among working class whites and to Clinton among
non-working class whites, though the differences were small and often statistically indistin-
guishable. While more working class whites switched to Trump and more non-working class
whites to Clinton, the association between their symbolic racial attitudes and vote switching
were not substantively different.16
I turn now to my economic indicators. In Figure 4.3, I construct a similar marginal
effect plot with four panels for personal economic marginality (min to max), relative economic
deprivation (min to max), county level manufacturing loss (µ±1 s.d.), and change in county
level unemployment (µ± 1 s.d.) for the same subgroups.
Across the board, I find weaker relationships between economic indicators and vote
switching to Trump than with my race and immigration measures. Hypothesis 4a predicted
that white voters experiencing economic marginality — negative economic retrospective
evaluations or relative economic deprivation—will be more likely to switch to Trump than
those who do not. I find weak support for this argument. In panel 1 I show that those
with the strongest decline in family income over the previous year were only slightly more
likely to switch to Trump than those with improving family incomes. White working class
Democrats and Independents who reported the steepest declines in family income were only
about 5.4 (95% CI: [3.5,8]) and 6.9 (95% CI: [2.3,11.7]) percentage points more likely to
switch to Trump. That jumps to an imprecisely estimated 19.4 points (95% CI: [3,35]) for
Republicans. I find no relationship between relative economic deprivation and switching to
16Readers may be wondering why racially conservative white voters were supporting Obama in 2012 in
the first place. I suggest two explanations. First, the 2016 election was far more racialized than the 2008
or 2012 elections, sending a clearer signal of racial positions between the two candidates which might filter
down to even the least politically aware citizens. Second, the 2016 election follows a longer trend of racially
white conservative Democrats sorting into the Republican Party, a process that was far from complete in
2012 and will likely continue past 2016. I expand on these arguments in Online Appendix K.
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Figure 4.3: Economic Marginality and Switching to Trump
Note: Points indicate marginal effect of moving from minimum to maximum values (retrospective economic
evaluations and economic deprivation) or from two s.d. below to above the mean (manufacturing loss and
change in unemployment). Circles indicate model for all white respondents, triangles for just white working
class respondents, and squares for non-working class white respondents. Lines indicate simulated 95%
confidence intervals.
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Trump for any subgroup.17
While individual-level measures of economic marginality are only weakly associated
with switching to Trump in 2016, perhaps contextual-level indicators are more robust pre-
dictors of vote switching given the Trump campaign’s focus on widespread job losses and
manufacturing decline in the U.S. Hypothesis 5a posited that white citizens who lived in
economically declining counties were more likely to switch to Trump than similarly situated
voters whose communities were not undergoing economic decline. As I show in Figure 4.3, I
find no relationship between county-level economic decline and vote switching in 2016.
Finally, in Figure 4.4 I display the same results for my Clinton models. Hypothe-
sis 5 posited that positive retrospective evaluations and positive relative income would be
associated with switching to Clinton. Once again, I flipped the direction of the marginal
effect estimation to be consistent with my hypotheses. I find no substantively and statisti-
cally significant relationship between economic marginality or local economic dislocation and
vote switching for Clinton, and little evidence that economic marginality and local economic
dislocation have stronger associations with vote switching for
In sum, my analyses yield two core findings that both run counter to dominant media
narrative on the 2016 election. First, I find a much stronger association between symbolic
racial and immigration attitudes and switching for Trump and Clinton than between eco-
nomic marginality or local economic dislocation. In fact, I find marginally small or no
associations between any of my economic indicators and vote switching in either direction.
Second, while significantly more working class whites switched votes to Trump in 2016 than
non-working class whites, lending some credence to election reporting, I find little evidence
that working class whites were significantly more motivated by racial and immigration atti-
tudes to switch than non-working class whites. Racially conservative whites and those with
strong anti-immigrant attitudes were more likely to switch votes to Trump in the 2016 elec-
17While the retrospective measure is positively related to vote switching, I also note that evaluations of
personal finances are influenced by respondent’s partisanship and the party that happens to be in power
(Healy 2017), though far less so than evaluations of the national economy (Bartels 2002; Flynn et al 2017),
suggesting that part of the effect found here could be simply reflecting partisanship.
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Figure 4.4: Economic Integration and Switching to Clinton
Note: Points indicate marginal effect of moving from minimum to maximum values (retrospective economic
evaluations and economic deprivation) or from two s.d. below to above the mean (manufacturing loss and
change in unemployment). Circles indicate model for all white respondents, triangles for just white working
class respondents, and squares for non-working class white respondents. Lines indicate simulated 95%
confidence intervals.
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tion than those with racially liberal or strong pro-immigrant attitudes, regardless of their
class. The opposite was true for switching to Clinton.
4.4 Conclusion and Discussion
The 2016 election was unique both for the unorthodox candidacy of Donald Trump and for
featuring the first female nominee of the two major parties. Trump surprised the world by
pulling off an upset victory, with unexpected wins in a number of “blue firewall” states.
Subsequent media analyses of the election highlighted the role of both economic anxiety
and racial and ethnic attitudes among the white working class in driving this outcome. In
this investigation, I sought to understand whether immigration or economics played a bigger
role in this process, whether this vote switching was isolated among the working class, and
whether voters were switching away from the Republican Party and towards Clinton.
Throughout this paper I presented evidence that Trump and Clinton’s candidacies and
campaign messages did likely have an effect on voting trends. White voters with racially
conservative or anti-immigrant attitudes switched votes to Trump at a higher rate than those
with more liberal views on these issues. At the same time, white voters who had liberal
views on race and immigration moved towards Clinton. Congruent with media coverage,
vote switching to Trump was, in raw numbers, far more prevalent among the working class
than non-working class, though the relationship between attitudes and switching did not
vary significantly by class. The inverse was true for Clinton. I find little evidence that
economic dislocation and marginality were significantly related to vote switching in 2016.
While this, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of partisan realignment, history suggests
that significant changes in voting across party lines, particularly for the presidency, precede
changes in party identities, the basis for realignments. This sequence of events played out
during the Southern realignment (i.e., Democrats voting for GOP presidential candidates but
maintaining their party attachment) and here I provide evidence that it may be happening
again after two terms with a black president and during an era of mass demographic change
due to immigration. Racial conservatives and those with the most anti-immigrant views are
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moving right and were the most likely to switch to Trump in 2016. My data suggest the
same is happening in the opposite direction as those with racially liberal may be sorting into
the Democratic Party.
My findings also speak to how elites are responding to changing demographics and
racial realities. As communities around the country diversify, immigration and race have
become increasingly potent campaign messages (Hillygus and Shields 2014). Many white
voters feel left behind as the Democratic Party becomes the party of highly educated whites
and a consortium of minority groups. The Republican Party, historically the party of the
wealthy and of business interests, has not offered many of these white voters a home either.
But after eight years of the nation’s first black president, Trump, the candidate who spurned
the GOP establishment and played so well to a sense of resentment over a changing country,
reached out and signaled that he would, in so many words, make the country white and
working class again.
4.5 Supplemental Appendix
4.5.1 Appendix A: Alternate Working Class Operationalization
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Table 4.4: Working Class as Lower Income
Dependent variable:
Vote Switch Trump Vote Switch Clinton
WWC Dem WWC Ind WWC GOP WWC Dem WWC Ind WWC GOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Race & Immigration
Racial Attitudes 2.935∗∗∗ 2.013∗∗∗ 0.913 −0.610 −3.024∗∗∗ −5.057∗∗∗
(0.510) (0.389) (0.710) (1.039) (0.724) (1.225)
Immigration Attitudes 1.800∗∗∗ 1.875∗∗∗ 1.653∗∗∗ −2.119∗∗∗ −1.622∗∗∗ −1.930∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.258) (0.420) (0.636) (0.427) (0.656)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14) −0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.007∗ −0.005∗ −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Economics
Personal Econ Situation Worse 1.835∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗ 0.893∗ 0.796 −0.456 −2.108∗∗
(0.421) (0.317) (0.540) (0.881) (0.499) (0.827)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14) −0.003 0.005 0.013 0.003 −0.018∗ 0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14) −0.004 0.002 0.005∗ −0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Controls
Family Income (low-high) 0.106 0.139∗ −0.091 −0.043 0.034 0.256
(0.106) (0.083) (0.136) (0.203) (0.127) (0.213)
Unemployed −0.345 0.077 0.331 0.650 −0.102 0.534
(0.433) (0.321) (0.509) (0.971) (0.470) (0.776)
Pct. Foreign Born 0.003 0.0002 −0.005 −0.007 −0.0002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Union (no, was, is) −0.023 0.220∗ −0.506∗∗ −0.229 −0.097 −0.089
(0.149) (0.129) (0.229) (0.314) (0.215) (0.313)
Female −0.151 0.218 −0.054 0.274 0.772∗∗∗ 0.388
(0.204) (0.160) (0.291) (0.403) (0.275) (0.437)
Ideology (lib-consv) 0.573∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗ −0.487∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗ −1.088∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.106) (0.183) (0.239) (0.154) (0.250)
South 0.111 0.498∗∗∗ 0.044 0.060 0.303 −0.659
(0.247) (0.180) (0.318) (0.439) (0.282) (0.499)
College −0.526 −0.494∗∗ −0.535 0.860∗ 0.319 −0.281
(0.340) (0.213) (0.388) (0.477) (0.282) (0.536)
Constant −7.258∗∗∗ −6.408∗∗∗ −2.302∗∗ 1.094 0.684 3.254∗∗
(0.670) (0.565) (1.028) (1.172) (0.768) (1.418)
Observations 2,663 1,706 294 211 1,556 2,120
Log Likelihood −405.922 −553.991 −178.879 −100.324 −246.923 −123.452
Akaike Inf. Crit. 841.843 1,137.981 387.758 230.649 523.847 276.905
Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Work-
ing class in these models is specified as being in the lower tercile of the 2016 CCES income
distribution. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
117
4.5.2 Appendix B: Bias in 2012 Vote Recall
Previous research has argued that poor recall, social desirability, and lying may bias such
self-reports of past voting (Tourangeau et al. 2000; Krosnick 1991). If this is the case in
the CCES, it could be artificially inflating the number of Obama to Trump vote switchers.
Further, if racially conservative white Trump voters were concerned about being labeled
racist for their support of Trump, they might say they voted for Obama in 2012 as an act of
what Effron et al. 2009 call “moral credentialing,” an alternative explanation for this study’s
core findings. In this section, however, I argue that poor recall is actually a smaller problem
than past research suggests and does not threaten analyses that rely on past vote recall.
Several studies have suggested that vote recall is biased towards the winner of an elec-
tion (Wright 1993). This research finds, though, that misreporting in presidential elections is
actually quite small, somewhere between 1% (Rivers and Lauderdale 2016) and 1.5% (Wright
1993), and that it is a product of memory, not intention to mislead interviewers (Wright
1993). Higher rates of winner bias in self-reported votes generally emerge in recalled House,
Senate, and Gubernatorial votes (Carsey and Jackson 2007).
Other research finds that biased recall doesn’t tend to move in favor of the winning
candidate but in the direction of making the previous vote consistent with the vote the re-
spondent most recently cast (Benewick et al. 1969; Himmelweit et al. 1978) leading to an
overestimate of stability in voting, not towards the winner of the previous election. This
effect, some argue (Van Elsas et al. 2014), is due to the desire to reduce cognitive inconsis-
tencies and strengthens as time passes between actual vote and recall. If this bias is present
in my data, it would actually reduce rates of switching, not inflate it.
Finally, a recent study commissioned by Doug Rivers and Ben Lauderdale (2016) at
YouGov finds little cause for concern about poor recall of past presidential voting. In 2016,
the researchers selected 1,597 YouGov panelists who had been interviewed immediately after
the 2012 election, matched them to voter files, and re-contacted them to ask who they had
voted for in 2012. They found extremely high levels of correct recall between 2012 and 2016.
About 95% of respondents gave the same answer both times and there was little asymmetry
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in who they recalled voting for, leading to about a 1% overstatement in vote for Obama
(Rivers and Lauderdale 2016).
Given these findings, I am less concerned about bias towards the winner in recall of
past vote that might be producing the results I find in my study. Nevertheless, I wanted to
further investigate the possibility that White voters who supported Trump but who wanted
to avoid appearing racist on the survey might have lied about voting for Obama in 2012 as
an act of “moral licensing” (Effron et al. 2009). I first argue that the order of the questions
in the CCES reduce the likelihood of social desirability in lying about voting for Barack
Obama in 2012. Second, we use the 2008-2009 ANES panel survey to assess the number of
racially conservative voters who say they were supporting McCain in October of 2008 but
report voting for Obama just after the election in November. I estimate that about 1.25%
of racially resentful Whites did so, a number just slightly higher than but not statistically
distinguishable from all White voters (1%) or racially liberal voters (0.66%), and in line with
previous estimates of vote lying.
First, I argue that several components of the design of the CCES survey will minimize
social desirability and thus lying about 2012 vote choice. Researchers have shown social
desirability to be minimized in a web-based research setting, as opposed to in-person or
phone-based, both of which feature live interviewers asking the questions (Krysan 1998;
Tourangeau et al. 2000). The CCES is completed by respondents on their own computers,
is completely anonymous, and can be completed in as private a location as the respondent
chooses. Second, respondents might be more likely to lie about their 2012 vote choice if
the question was asked close to or immediately after respondents were asked their 2016 vote
choice. This is not the case. In the CCES, respondents were asked about their 2012 vote
early in the survey and in the middle of a number of questions about political knowledge
and general approval of different institutional bodies (congress, parties, etc.), before Trump
was even mentioned in the survey, reducing the priming effect that might have accompanied
questions about Donald Trump.
Second, I analyzed existing panel data with questions on candidate support before an
election and vote choice after an election to try and get a sense of what proportion of white
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voters might lie about voting for Obama and whether certain subsamples of White voters are
more likely to lie about their votes. Given the secret ballot in the US, I cannot, of course,
know whether respondents are truly lying. And indeed there are some voters who might
switch their votes at the last minute. This analysis, however, will give us an upper bound
estimate of how many White voters might lie about voting for Obama.
To do this, I collected and analyzed the 2008-2009 ANES panel dataset which includes
a candidate support question asked in the October 2008 wave and retrospective vote reported
in the November 2008 wave. Using this dataset, we can look at how many racially resentful
White voters indicated support for McCain one month or less before the election and then
reported voting for Obama almost immediately after the election occurred, a group that is
likely to contain both liars and actual last-minute vote switchers. I can then conduct several
subgroup analyses to see if this lying is more pronounced among those with above-median
levels of racial resentment.
I present the weighted proportion of all whites, all whites with or without a college
education, and whites who fall above or below the median racial resentment score in Table 4.5
below. Assuming every respondent here actually voted McCain in 2008 and lied about it, I
estimate a ceiling of less than 1% for all whites and 1.28% for white respondents high in racial
resentment and 0.66% for those low in racial resentment, a statistically indistinguishable
difference (p = 0.19). In sum, there may be a very small bias in favor of reporting a vote
for Obama in 2012, but the size of the bias is small enough to not elicit concerns about the
manuscript’s core analyses and does not appear to be significantly more pronounced among
those high in racial resentment than those low in racial resentment.
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Table 4.5: Assessing Potential Lying in 2008 Vote Recall
Subgroup ANES 08-09
All Whites 0.83%
College Whites 0.94%
WWC 0.78%
Low Racial Resentment Whites 0.66%
High Racial Resentment Whites 1.28%
Note: Weighted percent who indicated support for McCain in October wave and a vote for Obama in November
wave of the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Survey.
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4.5.3 Appendix C: Pooled Regression Models
Table 4.6: Full Model Pooling over PID
Dependent variable:
Trump Clinton
(All) (WWC) (Non-WC) (All) (WWC) (Non-WC)
Race & Immigration
Racial Attitudes 2.556∗∗∗ 2.306∗∗∗ 3.241∗∗∗ −2.846∗∗∗ −2.501∗∗∗ −3.305∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.198) (0.342) (0.116) (0.151) (0.184)
Immigration Attitudes 1.921∗∗∗ 1.821∗∗∗ 2.201∗∗∗ −1.062∗∗∗ −1.084∗∗∗ −1.040∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.127) (0.224) (0.067) (0.086) (0.106)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002 0.0004 −0.0001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Economics
Personal Econ Situation Worse 1.042∗∗∗ 1.175∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗ −0.163∗∗ −0.477∗∗∗ 0.162
(0.142) (0.164) (0.283) (0.080) (0.109) (0.118)
Relative Deprivation −0.270∗∗ −0.284∗∗ −0.215 −0.211∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.130) (0.232) (0.060) (0.084) (0.086)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14) 0.002 0.0003 0.010∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls
Family Income (low-high) −0.024 −0.018 −0.036 −0.036∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.023) (0.039) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
Unemployed −0.034 0.040 −0.394 −0.209∗∗ −0.335∗∗ 0.034
(0.171) (0.183) (0.482) (0.106) (0.135) (0.180)
Pct. Foreign Born −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0003 0.001 0.001 −0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Union (no, was, is) 0.053 0.0003 0.204∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.046) (0.054) (0.089) (0.024) (0.034) (0.034)
Female 0.252∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.025 0.017 0.028
(0.069) (0.080) (0.140) (0.036) (0.050) (0.053)
Ideology (lib-consv) 0.614∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.051) (0.087) (0.023) (0.031) (0.034)
South 0.096 0.140 −0.050 0.004 −0.038 0.077
(0.083) (0.096) (0.169) (0.045) (0.063) (0.066)
Partisanship (R) 0.375∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ −0.402∗∗∗ −0.504∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.042) (0.080) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028)
College −0.634∗∗∗ −0.058
(0.083) (0.040)
Constant −6.964∗∗∗ −6.825∗∗∗ −7.832∗∗∗ 2.330∗∗∗ 2.506∗∗∗ 2.166∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.321) (0.565) (0.136) (0.187) (0.198)
Observations 15,661 8,422 7,239 15,661 8,422 7,239
Log Likelihood −3,147.305 −2,314.319 −821.592 −9,307.065 −4,930.421 −4,333.113
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,328.609 4,660.639 1,675.185 18,648.130 9,892.843 8,698.225
Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.5.4 Appendix D: Question Wording, Variable Coding, Key Variable Distri-
butions, and Detailed Survey Information
Racial Attitudes
The racial attitudes scale was constructed of three items in the CCES, listed below
(α=0.68), have an average inter-item correlation of 0.42, and all load highly together on a
single factor (Q1: 0.61, Q2: 0.72, Q3: 0.62).
1. “I am angry that racism exists” (1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=neither
agree nor disagree, 4=somewhat agree, 4=strongly agree)
2. “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin”
(1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=some-
what agree, 4=strongly agree)
3. “Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.” (1=strongly disagree,
2=somewhat disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=somewhat agree, 4=strongly
agree)
Figure 4.5: Distribution of racial attitude scale
Note: Bars indicate distribution of racial attitude scale for all white respondents (Source: CCES 2016).
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Immigration Attitudes
The immigration attitudes scale was constructed of four items in the CCES, listed
below (α=0.69), have an average inter-item correlation of 0.35, and all load highly together
on a single factor (Q1: 0.73 , Q2: 0.66, Q3: 0.48, Q4: 0.53). Respondents were asked “What
do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply.”
1. Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at
least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes. (0=selected, 1=not selected)
2. Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border. (0=not selected,
1=selected)
3. Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who
have graduated from a U.S. high school (0=selected, 1=not selected)
4. Identify and deport illegal immigrants (0=not selected, 1=selected)
Figure 4.6: Distribution of immigration attitude scale
Note: Bars indicate distribution of immigration attitude scale for white respondents.
While the Cronbach’s alpha for both scales falls slightly below the frequently cited 0.70
minimum for non-applied settings (Nunnally 1978; Hair et al. 2010), I follow Cho and Kim
2015 in suggesting that arbitrary cut offs for acceptable criteria are not advised and instead
focus on a range of criteria including average inter-item correlation and single-factor loading.
I find that the two scales are measuring a single underlying latent variable with moderate
levels of internal consistency.
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of county Latino growth
Note: Histograms indicate the distribution of county level Latino population growth for white respondents.
Growth of County Latino Population
Retrospective Economic Evaluations
• “Over the past FOUR YEARS, has your household’s annual income increased a lot
(1), increased somewhat (2), stayed about the same (3), decreased somewhat (4), or
decreased a lot (5)?”
Figure 4.8: Distribution of retrospective economic evaluations
Note: Bars indicate distribution of retrospective economic evaluations (better to worst) for white respondents.
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of relative economic deprivation
Note: Bars indicate distribution of relative economic deprivation for all white respondents.
Figure 4.10: Distribution of percent change in manufacturing
Note: Bars indicate distribution of percent change in manufacturing in respondents’ counties for all white
respondents.
Figure 4.11: Distribution of percent change in unemployment in respondent counties
Note: Bars indicate distribution of percent change in manufacturing in respondents’ counties for all white
respondents.
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Control variables:
• Which of the following best describes your current employment status? 1=unemployed,
0=else
• Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income? 1=Less
than 10, 000; 2 =10,000 - 19, 999; 3 =20,000 - 29, 999; 4 =30,000 - 39, 999; 5 =40,000
- 49, 999; 6 =50,000 - 59, 999; 7 =60,000 - 69, 999; 8 =70,000 - 79, 999; 9 =80,000 -
99, 999; 10 =100,000 - 119, 999; 11 =120,000 - 149, 999; 12 =150,000 or more.
• Are you a member of a labor union? Other than yourself, is any member of your
household a union member? 1 = Yes, I am currently a member of a labor union; Yes,
a member of my household is currently a union member; 2 = I formerly was a member
of a labor union; A member of my household was formerly a member of a labor union,
but is not now 3 = I am not now, nor have I been, a member of a labor union; No, no
one in my household has ever been a member of a labor union
• Are you male or female? 1 = female, 0 = male
• In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? Very liberal (1);
Liberal (2); Moderate / Not sure (3); Conservative (4); Very conservative (5)
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4.5.5 Appendix E: Disaggregating Scales
There has long been debates over the true stability of public opinion (Zaller 1992), sug-
gesting that responses to single survey items may be plagued by measurement error due to
inattentiveness, vague response categories, and confusing question wording among others.
One way to reduce measurement error is to use multiple measures and average across the
responses (Ansolabehere et al. 2008), which is what I do for the immigration attitudes and
racial attitudes questions from this survey.
I don’t suspect, however, that this is cause for concern with the economic measures.
First, concern about attitude stability and measurement error typically focus on questions
about policy attitudes (Ansolabehere et al. 2008), which can be confusing to respondents
or for which individuals may simply have no views (Zaller 1992). Of the four economic
indicators, only one question is actually asking respondents to give us their subjective opin-
ion on their economic standing (retrospective measure) and the other three are constructed
from their response to their income question (relative deprivation) or from county level mea-
sures (change in unemployment and change in manufacturing). Further, asking respondents
whether they and their families are better off today than they were a year before is far less
prone to measurement error than other economic perception questions (Healy et al. 2017).
Nevertheless, I attempt to level the playing field and disaggregate the racial attitude and
immigration attitude scales into single issue items in the models, which I display in Table 4.7.
I find that some of the individual items do indeed have stronger associations than others,
but that the substantive story is the same.
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Table 4.7: Disaggregating Race and Immigration Scales
Dependent variable:
Vote Switch Trump Vote Switch Clinton
Dem Ind Rep Dem Ind Rep
Race and Immigration
Not Angry Racism Exists 0.295∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.065 −0.053 −0.300∗∗∗ −0.100
(0.073) (0.052) (0.086) (0.133) (0.096) (0.112)
Whites Don’t Have Advantages 0.385∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.042 −0.428∗∗∗ −0.456∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.042) (0.063) (0.096) (0.068) (0.082)
Racial Problems are Rare 0.112∗ 0.054 0.048 −0.342∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.045) (0.069) (0.113) (0.073) (0.093)
Deport Undocumented 0.750∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ −0.188 −0.376∗∗ −0.226
(0.157) (0.114) (0.174) (0.272) (0.180) (0.204)
Don’t Grant Legal Status 0.123 0.0004 0.032 −0.456∗ −0.262 −0.424∗∗
(0.152) (0.113) (0.176) (0.248) (0.166) (0.208)
Increase Border Patrol 0.466∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.154 −0.020 −0.421∗∗∗ −0.810∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.107) (0.165) (0.248) (0.155) (0.185)
No Dream Act 0.670∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗ −0.668∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗ −0.711∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.112) (0.177) (0.234) (0.155) (0.194)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14) 0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002 −0.004∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Economics
Personal Econ Situation Worse 1.871∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗ 0.699∗∗ −0.582 −0.751∗∗∗ −1.343∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.202) (0.315) (0.500) (0.283) (0.387)
Relative Deprivation −0.140 −0.330∗∗ −0.281 0.043 0.065 0.021
(0.218) (0.166) (0.261) (0.354) (0.222) (0.292)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14) −0.004 0.006 0.007 −0.004 −0.001 0.005
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14) −0.003∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.003 0.003∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Controls
Family Income (low-high) −0.001 −0.042 −0.052 −0.0002 −0.004 0.045
(0.039) (0.028) (0.044) (0.060) (0.038) (0.050)
Unemployed 0.092 −0.204 0.457 0.066 −0.298 0.145
(0.319) (0.261) (0.395) (0.635) (0.370) (0.553)
Pct. Foreign Born −0.002 0.0005 0.0001 −0.002 0.002 −0.0002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Union (no, was, is) 0.110 0.126∗ −0.135 −0.110 −0.057 −0.372∗∗
(0.085) (0.069) (0.105) (0.152) (0.101) (0.148)
Female −0.169 0.243∗∗ 0.252 0.344 0.634∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗
(0.135) (0.100) (0.159) (0.241) (0.140) (0.193)
Ideology (lib-consv) 0.537∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ −0.305∗∗ −0.418∗∗∗ −1.036∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.069) (0.096) (0.131) (0.089) (0.125)
South 0.100 0.175 −0.169 0.049 0.173 −0.489∗∗
(0.169) (0.119) (0.182) (0.262) (0.160) (0.220)
College −0.510∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗∗ −0.690∗∗∗ 0.183 0.318∗∗ 0.350∗
(0.177) (0.116) (0.184) (0.272) (0.147) (0.197)
Constant −8.210∗∗∗ −5.985∗∗∗ −2.991∗∗∗ 0.858 1.610∗∗∗ 4.203∗∗∗
(0.532) (0.403) (0.679) (0.793) (0.523) (0.814)
Observations 9,389 5,357 915 584 5,526 7,925
Log Likelihood −957.748 −1,452.551 −528.143 −282.227 −831.426 −549.018
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,957.495 2,947.102 1,098.285 606.453 1,704.851 1,140.035
Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.5.6 Appendix F: Different Time Spans
Table 4.8: Vote Shifting Robustness Economic Time Span
Dependent variable:
Vote Switch Trump Vote Switch Clinton
00-14 10-14 14-16 00-14 10-14 14-16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Race and Immigration
Racial Attitudes 2.737∗∗∗ 2.756∗∗∗ 2.743∗∗∗ −3.404∗∗∗ −3.391∗∗∗ −3.396∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.170) (0.169) (0.282) (0.282) (0.282)
Immigration Attitudes 1.930∗∗∗ 1.926∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ −1.625∗∗∗ −1.614∗∗∗ −1.610∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economics
Personal Econ Situation Worse 1.168∗∗∗ 1.179∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗ −0.910∗∗∗ −0.902∗∗∗ −0.878∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.141) (0.140) (0.200) (0.200) (0.200)
Relative Deprivation −0.250∗∗ −0.232∗∗ −0.235∗∗ 0.053 0.085 0.067
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.155) (0.154) (0.155)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14) 0.003 −0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14) 0.001∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (10-14) −0.002 −0.001
(0.003) (0.005)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (10-14) −0.005∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (14-16) 0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.005)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (14-16) −0.001 −0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
Controls
Family Income (low-high) −0.018 −0.014 −0.015 −0.002 0.005 0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Unemployed −0.026 −0.025 −0.027 −0.142 −0.143 −0.133
(0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.274) (0.274) (0.275)
Female 0.190∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Ideology (lib-consv) 0.652∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ −0.704∗∗∗ −0.698∗∗∗ −0.706∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
South 0.112 0.148∗ 0.130 −0.084 −0.045 −0.034
(0.082) (0.080) (0.080) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111)
College −0.591∗∗∗ −0.595∗∗∗ −0.597∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
Constant −6.434∗∗∗ −6.381∗∗∗ −6.477∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗ 1.529∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗
(0.268) (0.261) (0.270) (0.356) (0.345) (0.360)
Observations 15,665 15,663 15,665 14,037 14,037 14,037
Log Likelihood −3,199.565 −3,198.076 −3,201.251 −1,791.560 −1,795.121 −1,791.980
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,431.130 6,428.153 6,434.503 3,615.120 3,622.242 3,615.960
Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Con-
trols are included in model but results are omitted for readability. Full tables can be provided
by request to authors. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.5.7 Appendix G: Multiple Imputation
Table 4.9: Full Models With Imputed Missing Values
Vote Switch Trump Vote Switch Clinton
Dem Ind Rep Dem Ind Rep
Race and Immigration
Racial Attitudes 1.362∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ −2.126∗∗∗ −3.202∗∗∗ −3.080∗∗∗
(0.471) (0.138) (0.120) (0.153) (0.198) (0.547)
Immigration Attitudes 0.309 1.153∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −1.092∗∗∗ −1.359∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.096) (0.081) (0.080) (0.107) (0.305)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14) 0.004∗∗ −0.0003 0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.002)
Economics
Personal Econ Situation Worse 1.220∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −0.238
(0.412) (0.117) (0.096) (0.096) (0.126) (0.388)
Relative Deprivation −0.392 −0.175∗ −0.271∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.189∗ −0.508
(0.302) (0.098) (0.078) (0.068) (0.101) (0.329)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14) −0.003 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.002 0.019∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14) −0.003 0.001 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.002)
Controls
Family Income −0.052 −0.002 −0.029∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.012
(0.055) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.055)
Unemployed −0.119 −0.527∗∗∗ −0.225∗ −0.222∗ −0.319∗ −0.552
(0.498) (0.135) (0.126) (0.125) (0.164) (0.751)
Pct. Foreign Born Growth (00-14) −0.00002 0.001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Union (no, was, is) 0.219∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.047∗ 0.035 0.122
(0.124) (0.040) (0.033) (0.028) (0.040) (0.127)
Female −0.052 0.011 0.129∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.060 0.296
(0.193) (0.055) (0.045) (0.043) (0.059) (0.203)
Ideology (lib-consv) 0.491∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.043 −0.288∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.037) (0.032) (0.029) (0.038) (0.111)
South −0.074 0.219∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.009 −0.009 −0.118
(0.229) (0.062) (0.051) (0.053) (0.072) (0.226)
College −0.282 −0.379∗∗∗ −0.453∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ 0.116∗ −0.046
(0.252) (0.060) (0.049) (0.046) (0.063) (0.215)
Constant −3.689∗∗∗ −3.407∗∗∗ −1.455∗∗∗ 1.466∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 1.029
(0.733) (0.230) (0.209) (0.154) (0.226) (0.741)
Observations 11,400 6,636 1,248 687 6,998 9,802
Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All
missing values were imputed using mice() in R. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.5.8 Appendix H: Full Regression Tables Core Models
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4.5.9 Appendix I: Model Fit
Given that “vote switchers” represent a low percentage of the overall electorate, I calculated a
number of fit statistics to determine how well these models were performing. Because I want
to avoid selecting arbitrary thresholds to classify predicted probabilities as successes and
failures, I instead follow Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks 2011 and produce both ROC plots (and
AUC scores) and separation plots. The ROC plot and AUC score gives us a general overview
of model fit while the separation plot provides a nice visual representation where each line
represents the predicted probability of a success. I find that my model does a very good
job predicting Trump vote switching among Democrats and Independents, and Clinton vote
switching among Republicans and Independents. It has a harder time predicting Republican
Obama to Trump switchers and Democratic Romney to Clinton switchers, the two categories
with the smallest numbers in my data. Nevertheless, the AUC numbers generated from the
ROC plots indicate a decent fit for all of the models. I display the results in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Assessing Model Fit for Clinton and Trump Vote Switch Models
Note: ROC curves (Robin et al. 2011) and separation plots (Greenhill et al. 2011) for Trump and Clinton vote
switching models. In Panel A I display ROC curve plots for pooled and partisan split-sample models of Trump
switchers (AUC: Pooled 0.88, Democrat 0.90, Independent 0.96, Republican 0.73) and their corresponding
separation plots in Panel B. In panel C I display ROC curve plots for pooled and partisan split-sample
models of Clinton switchers (AUC: Pooled 0.87, Democrat 0.73, Independent 0.88, Republican 0.87) and
their corresponding separation plots in Panel D.
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4.5.10 Appendix J: Panel Data
Learning or Priming?
Recent research in political science has shown that, rather than holding policy attitudes
that inform their candidate choices, most voters simply adopt the policy views of the leaders
they support (Lenz 2012). This may lead some readers to worry that voters in my data
switched their support to Trump for reasons not captured by my independent variables, and
then simply adopted his anti-immigrant views. I am skeptical that this is the case with
immigration attitudes, which like racial attitudes are likely to be sufficiently crystallized,
salient and durable as to constitute a predisposition largely immune to change (Tesler 2015).
Nevertheless, the possibility of reverse causality between immigration attitudes and vote-
switching exists and requires an approach different from mine to rule out.
To address this, I leveraged a multi-wave study, the Democracy Fund Voter Study
Group VOTER Survey, and tested the extent to which immigration attitudes as measured
in 2011, long before Trump’s rise to prominence, predicted a vote-switch to Trump in Novem-
ber of 2016.18 The panel nature of the VOTER Survey allows us to test whether pre-existing
immigration attitudes are related to switching to Trump, before respondents had been ex-
posed to Trump’s racially conservative or anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric. If respondents’
pre-existing immigration attitudes, free of exposure to leaders’ policy positions, are related
to vote-switching, I will be less worried about a reverse causal process.
The VOTER Survey worked with YouGov to poll adults whom had participated in
political surveys in 2011, 2012, and 2016. In total, 8,000 adults (age 18 or older) with
internet access took the 2016 survey between November 29 and December 29, 2016 (margin
of error +/- 2.2%). Respondents had been interviewed in December of 2011 and a second
time in 2012 as part fo the 2012 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) survey.
The sampling strategy is the same as that for the CCES, as reported in the body of this
18I again defined my dependent variable as switching from voting for someone other than Romney in 2012,
to voting for Trump in 2016 and voting for someone other than Obama in 2012 and voting for Clinton 2016.
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All variables in the VOTER Survey have been coded the same way as variables in the
CCES with minor changes. First, racial attitudes were measured using the classic 4-item
racial resentment battery (Kinder and Sanders 1996) that has been rescaled to range between
0 (racially liberal) to 1 (racially conservative). Immigration attitudes were measured using a
3-question battery of immigration policy attitudes, which are detailed below. The economic
measures were identical to those used with the CCES.
Because the VOTER Survey contains a much smaller sample size than the CCES,
we have far less statistical power and therefore have to pool the data rather than estimate
models for each partisan group. Despite this limitation, the pattern of results, presented in
Table 4.12, is essentially identical to those reported previously. I find that white citizens with
racially conservative or conservative immigration views (as measured before Trump’s rise)
were significantly more likely to switch their vote to Trump in 2016, compared to those with
racially conservative views or positive attitudes towards immigrants. Similar effects also hold
for the Clinton models. Racially liberal whites and whites with more expansionary views on
immigration were more likely to switch to Clinton compared to their racially conservative
or anti-immigrant counterparts. Similar effect sizes emerge for the retrospective economic
measure as well as the three contextual economic measures for both Trump and Clinton
models. These results help assuage my concerns about the potential endogeneity of racial
and immigration attitudes.
Racial Resentment
1. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve (5=Strongly agree;
1=Strongly disagree).
2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors (5=Strongly disagree;
1=Strongly agree).
19More information can be found at: https://www.voterstudygroup.org/
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3. It’s really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would just
try harder they could be just as well off as whites (5=Strongly disagree; 1=Strongly
agree).
4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult
for African Americans to work their way out of the lower class (5=Strongly agree;
1=Strongly disagree).
Immigration Attitudes
1. Overall, do you think illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or
are a drain? (3=Mostly a drain; 2=Neither; 1=Mostly make a contribution)
2. Do you favor or oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants already in the United
States to become a U.S. citizens? (1=Oppose; 0=Favor)
3. Do you think it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the United
States legally than it is currently? (5=Much harder; 1=Much easier)
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Table 4.12: Predictors of Vote Switching (VOTER Survey Sample)
Dependent variable:
Trump Clinton
All Whites WWC Non-WC All Whites WWC Non-WC
Race and Immigration
Racial Attitudes 2.201∗∗∗ 2.334∗∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗ −1.902∗∗∗ −1.085 −2.904∗∗∗
(0.367) (0.438) (0.721) (0.490) (0.698) (0.745)
Immigration Attitudes 1.844∗∗∗ 1.278∗∗∗ 3.191∗∗∗ −1.197∗∗∗ −0.464 −1.689∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.349) (0.585) (0.373) (0.539) (0.556)
Pct. Latino Growth (00-14) −0.00003 −0.00001 −0.001 −0.003∗ −0.002 −0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Economics
Personal Econ Situation Worse 1.184∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗∗ −0.690∗∗ −0.113 −1.319∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.306) (0.458) (0.311) (0.435) (0.479)
Relative Deprivation 0.057 0.084 0.148 −0.209 0.095 −0.842∗
(0.268) (0.321) (0.489) (0.312) (0.430) (0.503)
Pct. Manufacturing Loss (00-14) −0.003 −0.006 0.002 0.003 0.014∗ −0.024∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
Pct. Unemployment Diff (00-14) −0.002 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.00004 −0.0004 0.0002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls
Family Income (low-high) −0.028 0.007 −0.095 −0.053 −0.056 −0.088
(0.040) (0.048) (0.078) (0.048) (0.065) (0.077)
Unemployed 0.082 0.213 −1.156 −1.897∗∗∗ −0.886 −3.992∗∗∗
(0.351) (0.384) (0.974) (0.715) (0.670) (1.348)
Pct. Foreign Born Change 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Union (no, family, is) −0.015 −0.073 0.171 −0.156 −0.210 −0.170
(0.107) (0.127) (0.217) (0.163) (0.231) (0.244)
Female 0.123 0.222 −0.160 0.687∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗ 0.558∗
(0.153) (0.186) (0.291) (0.189) (0.270) (0.293)
Ideology (lib-consv) 0.718∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ −0.855∗∗∗ −0.945∗∗∗ −0.941∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.124) (0.231) (0.137) (0.185) (0.234)
South 0.010 0.009 0.161 0.232 0.336 −0.178
(0.174) (0.205) (0.345) (0.214) (0.294) (0.335)
College −0.255 0.320
(0.172) (0.200)
PID (Republican) 0.675∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ −0.689∗∗∗ −0.729∗∗∗ −0.632∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.053) (0.106) (0.064) (0.081) (0.114)
Constant −9.088∗∗∗ −8.781∗∗∗ −10.502∗∗∗ 6.334∗∗∗ 5.618∗∗∗ 7.830∗∗∗
(0.647) (0.761) (1.320) (0.762) (1.044) (1.230)
Observations 3,020 1,658 1,362 3,507 2,172 1,335
Log Likelihood −645.481 −457.388 −175.962 −467.156 −257.873 −192.985
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,324.962 946.775 383.923 968.311 547.746 417.970
Note: unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Racial
and immigration attitudes and 2012 vote were measured in 2011. All other variables were
measured in 2016 after the election. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
140
4.5.11 Appendix K: Racial Conservatives Still Supporting Obama in 2012?
Why would racially resentful voters who switched their votes to Trump in 2012, because of
their racial conservatism and anti-immigrant views, still be voting for President Obama in
2012, after four years of a highly racialized first term in office where numerous issues from
racial justice (Trayvon Martin) to immigration (DACA) dominated headlines and perceptions
of the Democratic Party as increasingly Black and Latino were already cemented (Tesler
2016b).
There is evidence that racial attitudes have become more strongly associated with a
variety of outcomes over time, including between 2012 and 2016. Enders and Scott 2018 show
that correlations between racial resentment and party identification, ideology, presidential
candidate thermometer ratings, voting, and attitudes towards health insurance and govern-
ment services strengthened between 2012 and 2016. Using different data, Tesler (2016a)
shows that racial attitudes mattered more in 2016 voting than in 2008 or 2012, helping
explain why some racial conservatives were still supporting Obama in 2012. Indeed, Tesler
(2016b) shows that fully a quarter of Whites who strongly opposed interracial dating still
supported Obama in 2012. Finally, Sides 2017 finds that attitudes related to immigration,
religion, and race were more salient to voter decision making in 2016 than in 2012 and that
this pattern is not found for other attitudes.
How could this be the case? First, I argue that race and immigration were more salient
in 2016 than in 2012. President Trump was more explicitly racial in his appeals than any
previous candidate, shifting norms around what sort of prejudiced beliefs and rhetoric is
socially acceptable (Schaffner 2018). Similarly, Clinton moved to the left of Obama on a
number of race-related issues. As Gillion 2016 shows, Obama actually spoke less about race
than other recent Democratic candidates.
Second, the 2016 election is part of a longer process of sorting on issues of race. Let’s
assume that by 2008, the most racially conservative white voters were sorted into the Repub-
lican Party and were voting for Republican presidential candidates. That can be true while
at the same time there also remains some significant number of racially conservative white
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Democrats. Throughout 2008 and 2012, more of these racially resentful Democrats may have
voted for Republicans and switched their partisanship to the Republican Party. In 2016,
after eight years of a Black president, with a candidate espousing explicitly racial views, still
more racially resentful white voters switched their votes to the Republican candidate. But
again, some racially resentful whites could remain voting for the Democratic candidate.
If this story is true, I should see, on average, that congruent Romney to Trump voters
are more racially resentful and conservative on immigration issues than Obama to Trump
switchers. The corresponding inverse should be true of Obama to Clinton voters, who should
be more racially liberal and pro-immigration than Romney to Clinton switchers. As I show
in Figure 4.13, that is indeed the case. Trump vote switchers were significantly more con-
servative on immigration and more racially resentful than Obama-Clinton voters (p= <
0.001 ,p= < 0.001) and Clinton switchers (p= < 0.001,p=< 0.001), but less conservative
on immigration and less racially resentful than Romney-Trump voters (p= < 0.001,p= <
0.001).
Figure 4.13: Vote Switchers’ Racial and Immigration Attitudes
Note: Circles indicate mean score for White voters on each attitude scale with high scores indicating more
conservative positions on the issue. Panel A displays immigration attitudes and Panel B displays racial
attitudes.
In other words, some significant variation in racial resentment and immigration atti-
tudes remains among Trump switchers, and even among Obama-Clinton voters and Clinton
switchers, even if it is lower on average than among congruent Romney-Trump voters.
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CHAPTER 5
Demographic Change, Latino Countermobilization, and
the Politics of Immigration in U.S. Senate Campaigns
On the 9th of October, just under a month before the 2014 mid-term elections, Republican
U.S. Senate candidate Scott Brown took to New Hampshire’s WGIR talk radio to hammer
home a central campaign theme: that “illegal” immigrants were threatening America’s na-
tional security. By October, generic anti-immigrant appeals had given way to a far more
dramatic style. Brown warned WGIR listeners that undocumented immigrants with Ebola
might be crossing the U.S.-Mexican border. “One of the reasons I’ve been so adamant about
closing our border, because if people are coming through normal channels, can you imagine
what they can do through a porous border?” Nearly 2000 miles west of New Hampshire,
Republican U.S. Senate candidate Cory Gardner ran an uphill battle against Democratic
incumbent Senator Mark Udall in Colorado, a state with over one million Latinos. Im-
migration appeals were conspicuously absent from Gardner’s campaign. Given Colorado’s
proximity to the U.S.-Mexican border, sizable Latino population, and frontier conservative
roots, we might expect immigration to emerge as a potent issue in Colorado, but not in
New Hampshire, a racially homogeneous state nestled in New England. What explains these
divergent approaches to campaign messaging?
More specifically, under what conditions do politicians politicize immigration in elec-
toral campaigns? Past research has examined the role of racial attitudes in electoral cam-
paigns (Mendelberg 2001; Tesler and Sears 2010), how immigration attitudes are formed
(Kinder and Kam 2010; Valentino et al. 2013b; Brader et al. 2008; Scheve and Slaughter
2001; Nicholson 2012), what drives variation in the political salience of immigration (Brader
et al. 2008; Newman et al. 2014; Hopkins 2010a), and the role that immigration plays in
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shaping party coalitions (Hajnal and Rivera 2014b), yet none have examined the supply-side
of immigration appeals. How are shifting demographics shaping modern political campaigns?
Nearly every county in the United States has been experiencing growing Latino popula-
tions over the last several decades. Politicizing these demographic shifts, I argue, can be used
towards two ends. First, anti-immigrant appeals might serve to mobilize conservative white
voters and potentially pull less partisan white voters into the Republican Party, particularly
for those in rapidly changing acculturating contexts (Newman 2013a; Hajnal and Rivera
2014b) as long as Latino counter-mobilization is not a credible threat. On the Democratic
side, candidates in states with large Latino populations use pro-immigration appeals in an
attempt to mobilize Latino voters (Barreto and Schaller 2015; Collingwood et al. 2014b).1
In what follows, I examine a novel dataset of U.S. Senate campaign web appeals in 2010,
2012, and 2014. I find evidence that supports a model of immigration appeals that takes into
account both political and demographic factors. I find that Republican candidates in states
with rapidly changing demographics are more likely to use anti-immigrant appeals as long
as the Latino population is not large enough to threaten a credible countermobilization. I
find further evidence that Democratic candidates generally refrain from using pro-immigrant
appeals until the Latino voting population reaches a critical mass. These relationships are
moderated by the level of competition in each campaign, a variable that further shapes the
incentives and strategic decision making of candidates.
This study makes three distinct theoretical and methodological contributions. First,
in contrast to the majority of research on immigration politics, I look jointly at the electoral
influence of both white and Latino voters in contemporary immigration politics rather than
a single racial or ethnic group. Second, this study contributes to a broad literature on
campaign communication and racial appeals, which has focused overwhelmingly on the use
of traditional anti- or pro-Black racial appeals. Third, while the vast majority of studies
on campaign communications rely on television advertising data, which necessarily omits
1While the strategic decisions of presidential campaigns are different, many credit anti-immigrant appeals,
at least in part, for President Donald Trump’s success in the 2016 primary and general presidential elections
(Sides et al. 2018).
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a significant number of candidates, this study exploits a unique data sources—campaign
websites—allowing for a far more comprehensive look at campaign strategy. It suggests
that scholars can use a combination of web archives and scraping techniques to gather large
datasets of professional campaign appeals from nearly every candidate running for many
professional elected offices from the national to the state and local level. Using this data,
inferences about candidate messaging and data can be made about a far more comprehensive
sample of candidates, not just those that are able to raise enough money for television
advertising.
5.1 Literature
5.1.1 The Electoral Connection
The collapse of the Southern Democratic Party and party re-alignment throughout the latter
half of the 20th century has been one of the most important and consequential political devel-
opments of contemporary American politics, illustrating the importance of race in American
politics (Black and Black 2009b; Carmines and Stimson 1989b). As the Democratic Party
threw its support behind Civil Rights, Southern Democrats began to trickle out of the Party.
Goldwater, Nixon, and Reagan’s attempts to woo moderate or conservative whites into the
GOP helped tear apart the southern Democratic coalition and establish a strong Republican
presence south of the Mason-Dixon line (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Giles and Hertz 1994;
Hajnal and Rivera 2014b; Sears et al. 1987; Schickler 2016b).
The Democratic Party, while still majority white, continues to rapidly diversify. Over
the last three decades, the Democratic Party has dropped from 80% to about 60% white.
A majority of Latinos and Asian Americans now vote for Democratic candidates and most
Latino and Asian American elected officials are Democrats. The Republican Party, by con-
trast, is now about 90% white and increasingly defined by its racial homogeneity (Olson
2008; Hajnal and Rivera 2014b). These trends have only accelerated since President Barack
Obama’s election in 2008 (Tesler and Sears 2010).
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The potential impact of shifts in social group composition of each party cannot be
overstated. Even those who believe strongly in the durability of partisan attachments (Green
et al. 2002; Goren 2005) argue that changing social group imagery has the power to shift
voter partisanship, establishing a set of racialized incentives and strategies for Democratic
and Republican candidates seeking to win elections (for strategic campaign decisions, more
generally, see Jacobson and Kernell (1983)).
Republicans have a strong incentive to mobilize their conservative white base and
expand their electoral coalition, most fruitfully through appeals to racially conservative
whites (Hillygus and Shields 2009). One of the most powerful and frequently used tools
in the Republican repertoire has been racial appeals. Kinder and Sanders (1996) theorize
that the “electoral temptations of race” are potent, given the historical success of racial
appeals in mobilizing white participation (see also Edsall and Edsall (1992); Tesler and
Sears (2010)). As I argue in the next section, immigration has become a highly racialized
issue that conservative candidates can exploit for electoral gain (Craig and Richeson 2014a).
Democratic candidates face a different set of incentives. For a brief period from the late
1960s through the early 1990s, the Democratic Party served as the home of pro-racial policies
and ideas like affirmative action and busing. In the 1990s, vast reforms spearheaded by Pres-
ident Clinton and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) helped purge non-colorblind
policies from the party’s platform and steer it back towards the political center (Frymer
2010b). The dominance of colorblind ideology today coupled with the party’s continuing
reliance on both white and non-white voters structures Democratic electoral incentives. The
key challenge for Democrats is maintaining enthusiasm among African American, Latino,
and Asian American voters without alienating racially conservative white Democrats (Kinder
and Sanders 1996).
5.1.2 The Politicization of Immigration
While the Black-White racial divide in the United States has traditionally shaped racial
appeals in American politics, candidates are increasingly racializing and politicizing immi-
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grants, particularly Latino immigrants (McIlwain and Caliendo 2011). After years of massive
immigration into the United States, conservative politicians honed anti-immigrant and anti-
Latino appeals (Haney-Lopez 2006; 2016). Pat Buchanan warned of the cultural and political
threat from the Hispanic ‘invasion’ (Huntington 2005; Buchanan 2007). Republican word-
smith Frank Luntz wrote memos encouraging Republican candidates to focus on illegality,
criminality, and anti-social behavior of Latinos in the U.S. The illegality narrative has now
become commonplace in Republican political campaigns (Haney-Lopez 2016).
At the same time, pro-immigration appeals are becoming common additions to Demo-
cratic candidate toolkits. With increasingly larger Latino voting populations, effective mobi-
lization can make the difference between winning and losing elections (Fraga and Leal 2004).
Senator Harry Reid’s effective mobilization of Latino voters in Nevada’s contentious 2010
senate race assured his victory against Sharron Angle. Senator Mark Udall’s loss to Cory
Gardner in Colorado’s 2014 senate race can be attributed, in part, to Udall’s disregard of
Latino voters. Immigration has become a ‘qualifying’ issue for Latino voters (Barreto and
Schaller 2015).
In sum, immigration appeals are a new form of racial appeal. As the social group
imagery of the parties continues to change, Republicans face a set of electoral incentives
that strongly encourage racialized anti-immigrant appeals. Democrats, on the other hand,
face incentives to avoid pro-immigration appeals generally, unless a sizable portion of their
electorate is Latino. But what drives variation across candidate-campaigns?
5.1.3 Immigration Politics: When Do Candidates Go Nativist?
Immigration appeals may be unique in their potent ability to mobilize both the Repub-
lican base (see Miller and Schofield (2008)) and Democratic base (Barreto 2012), as well
as persuade cross-pressured swing voters (Hillygus and Shields 2009). It is likely that any
campaign will employ both strategies, though it may prioritize one over the other.
In the following sections, I argue that three key variables explain much of the variation
in whether candidates and their campaign teams utilize immigration appeals: demographic
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change (rate of growth of the Latino population), voter composition (anticipated voting
influence of Latino voters), and campaign competition.
5.1.4 Demographic Change and Immigration Threat
Attempts to apply the racial threat hypothesis to immigrants have resulted in conflicting
findings (Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Stein et al. 2000; Campbell et al. 2006; Oliver andWong
2003; Gay 2006; Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004). Recent work on immigrant threat, however,
persuasively shows that demographic change, particularly rate of demographic change con-
ditioned on baseline demographics, threatens personal and collective goods attached to a
community (Newman and Velez 2014a; Newman 2013a; Reny and Newman 2018).
This demographic change is affecting some states and communities more than others.
For much of American history, Latino immigrants traditionally settled in just a handful of
immigrant receiving states: California, Texas, New York, Illinois, and Florida. Over the last
few decades, however, immigrants and their children have been bypassing these traditional
receiving states in favor of new destinations, mostly across the South and Midwest. Similarly,
there is considerable variation in percentage of Latinos who are registered voters in each state.
In West Virginia, Maine, and Vermont, Latinos make up less than one half of one percent of
registered voters. In New Mexico, California, and Texas, they make up a quarter or more of
voters.
While the actual impact of Latino immigrants in these new receiving states is likely
quite localized (Hopkins 2010a; Newman 2013a), and its effect on state-level policies mixed
(Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015), I hypothesize that rapid demographic change in
a state will increase the probability that conservative candidates will attempt to mobilize
anti-immigrant attitudes with anti-immigrant appeals. Rapid demographic change is likely
to impact at least some communities and voters, generate media coverage in the state,
increase the salience of immigration and demographic change, and provide a bridge for
voters between local change and national debates (Hopkins 2010a). If a candidate decides
that politicizing demographic change and mobilizing attitudes around immigration will be
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electorally beneficial, immigration appeals will likely be featured prominently in campaigns
(Druckman et al. 2004). Not all of the variation in appeals will be determined by demographic
shifts, some candidates will attempt to mobilize immigration attitudes as a general racialized
dog whistle appeal regardless of state demographics (Haney-Lopez, 2014), but I expect an
overall positive relationship between demographic change and Republican anti-immigrant
appeals.
H1: Republican candidates in states with a rapidly growing Latino population are more
likely to utilize anti-immigrant appeals than Republican candidates in states with slowly
growing Latino populations.
5.1.5 Latino Voters and Counter-Mobilization
While rapid demographic change could incentivize anti-immigrant appeals among conserva-
tive candidates, Latino counter-mobilization could disincentivize such appeals. This counter-
mobilization theory, or “Pete Wilson Effect,” posits that anti-immigrant political appeals can
increase ethnic solidarity (Martinez 2008; Pérez 2010). As the U.S. Latino population con-
tinues to grow, register to vote, and engage in political activity, Latino counter-mobilization
is increasingly becoming a political risk for politicians who opt for xenophobic appeals.
California’s experience in 1994 provides an illustrative case study. Governor Pete Wil-
son’s full throated support of famously anti-immigrant Proposition 187 was smart short-term
politics. As Nicholson (2005) notes, by linking his campaign to the proposition, immigration
became the defining issue of the election. It paid off. Wilson won the election with the help
of white voters who cared deeply about immigration.
The long-term consequences, however, were devastating for California Republicans.
After Proposition 187, immigration activists quickly shifted resources to electoral politics
(HoSang 2010). By 1996, Latinos were naturalizing, registering to vote, and turning out in
record numbers. In fact, Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura (2001) found that newly naturalized
Latinos in California after the Proposition 187 fight turned out at higher rates than Latinos in
other states without the same nativist political climate. Latinos were also voting increasingly
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for the Democratic Party. Bowler et al. (2006) find that Proposition 187 (together with
other racial propositions 207 and 229) nearly doubled the probability that Latinos would
vote Democratic (see also Barreto and Woods, 2005). By 2000, the Latino share of the state
electorate increased from 7% in 1990 to 14% with an addition of more than one million
Latino voters to the rolls (California Field Poll, 2000), and by 1998, Democrats had won
back the statehouse, state assembly, and state senate.
Politicians and political strategists learn from past mistakes and conduct cost-benefit
calculations when constructing campaign agendas and strategies. Republican candidates
need to decide if the increase in support that they might gain from mobilizing their base will
have a net-positive impact given the probability of Latino backlash. The relationship be-
tween Latino voters and anti-immigrant appeals will therefore be non-monotonic, an inverted
U-shaped curve, where the probability of anti-immigrant appeals in racially homogeneous
states is relatively lower due to the low salience of immigration, high in racially bifurcated
states with moderate numbers of Latino voters where the population is visible but not po-
litically threatening, and low again in states with large Latino voting populations where
political backlash becomes a real risk.
H2a: The fear of Latino counter-mobilization will decrease the likelihood that Republi-
cans use anti-immigrant appeals in states with large Latino voting populations.
There is electoral risk for Democrats making pro-immigrant appeals as well. The
key challenge for Democratic candidates is maintaining enthusiasm among African Ameri-
can, Latino, and Asian American voters without alienating racially conservative Democrats
(Kinder and Sanders 1996). In contemporary campaigns, this has often manifested in lip-
service appeals to racial minority groups while openly espousing programs that please white
“moderates,” as was the case with Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign (Frymer 2010b).
Democratic candidates will likely avoid pro-immigrant appeals unless the Latino voting pop-
ulation in the state is large enough to offset the risk of white voter alienation. Research in
comparative politics finds that when a group is large enough to constitute a viable partner
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in a political coalition, then that group will be mobilized (Posner 2004). We might expect
the same in the U.S. context. That is, when the Latino voting population is large enough,
pro-immigrant appeals signal to Latino voters that a candidate cares about Latino issues
(Barreto and Schaller 2015).
H2b: Larger Latino voting populations will be positively associated with Democratic
pro-immigrant appeals.
Taken together, hypothesis 2 suggest that Latino voters play a crucial role in mod-
erating immigration appeals. In states with small Latino voting populations, Republicans
are more likely to use anti-immigrant appeals without fear of Latino counter-mobilization.
In states with large Latino voting populations, Republicans are expected to avoid anti-
immigrant appeals and Democrats are expected to mobilize Latino voters with pro-immigrant
appeals.
5.1.6 Competition
Finally, candidate electoral strategy is heavily influenced by perceived electoral competition.
Competition is likely to increase or decrease the importance of each strategic decision made
my campaigns. As Cox and Munger (1989) put it: “closeness stimulates elite effort” (217).
In competitive elections, for example, candidates spend more money (Cox and Munger 1989),
are more likely to go negative (Theilmann and Wilhite 1998; Goldstein and Freedman 2002),
and are more likely to discuss issues (Kahn and Kenney 1999). Further, campaigns might be
more likely to attempt to reach out to and mobilize groups not represented by the other party
in competitive elections (Frymer 2010b). Competitive elections also amplify the importance
of smaller groups of voters, like Latinos, because small shifts in support can alter the outcome
of the election at the margins (Fraga 1992). Therefore, immigration appeals will also likely
vary by electoral competitiveness.
The interaction between competition and demographics is complex. Campaigns face
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trade offs in choosing who to mobilize with which issues. For Republicans and anti-immigrant
appeals, the trade off lies between mobilizing a conservative white base and risking Latino
counter-mobilization. If a GOP candidate is running in a competitive election in a state
with a small number of Latino voters who pose no electoral threat, anti-immigrant appeals
might provide a boost in support from the base that could help win the election. If that
same candidate is running in a state with enough Latino voters to swing an election, that
candidate might choose different issue appeals, deciding that anti-immigrant appeals are
too risky. If that same candidate is polling well ahead of the competition, those Latino
voters are far less likely to pose a threat to their candidacy, and fear of counter-mobilization
should diminish. Similarly, candidates that are losing by considerable margins often will use
risky and radical appeals to try and improve their electoral standings, regardless of potential
backlash.
For Democrats, the strategic trade offs are different. A Democratic candidate needs
to decide if it is more beneficial to mobilize white Democrats and ignore Latino voters or
to mobilize Latino voters and risk alienating white voters. As with Republicans, competi-
tion should increase the probability that candidates will attempt to mobilize Latino voters
with pro-immigration appeals. In these elections, the strategic importance of Latino voters
increases. For Democrats who hold a strong lead in the polls or are losing considerably,
mobilizing Latino voters with pro-immigration appeals becomes less necessary or appealing.
H4: Candidates are more likely to use immigration appeals in competitive races than
in non-competitive races.
In sum, my theory of immigration appeals posits that both demographic factors and
political factors determine when candidates mobilize immigration attitudes. It is the in-
teraction of demographic change, Latino voters, and competition that moderate campaign
appeals from both Republicans and Democrats.
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5.2 Data and Methods: Measuring Campaign Issues
I examine U.S. Senate races. U.S. Senate campaigns offer significant variation in media
coverage, competition, voter turnout, reactions to candidates and campaigns, incumbency,
levels of campaign fundraising and spending, state racial composition, and state demographic
change that is not available in presidential elections (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Abramowitz
and Segal 1992). Further, campaigns for U.S. House seats are increasingly safe for incum-
bents, rarely competitive (Abramowitz et al. 2008), and tend to focus less on issues and more
on candidate character and style (Fenno 1978).
In all, my data consists of 616 candidates who ran for U.S. Senate in 2010, 2012, and
2014. 56% were Republican (344) and 44% Democrats (272). 423 (68%) of the candidates
ran in the primaries, while 193 (31%) advanced to run general election campaigns. This num-
ber includes primary and general election Democratic and Republican candidates. Because
Senate races are staggered, using three campaign years of data allows me to include all major
U.S. Senate candidates from all 50 states and allows me also to control for a presidential
election year (Herrnson 2012).
5.2.1 Dependent Variables
Despite the importance of rhetoric and issue appeals in the study of campaigns and campaign
strategy, it is difficult to choose the appropriate source of data for analysis given the increas-
ing diversity of communication channels available to campaigns. Campaigns are complex
and candidates today use a variety of mediums to communicate with various constituencies
(Lau and Pomper 2004). In this study, I examine the website issue pages of 2010, 2012, and
2014 U.S. Senate candidate campaigns. Druckman et al. (2009) argue that websites are ideal
for studying campaign strategy, as they are unmediated by outside forces, cover a full range
of rhetorical strategies, and are representative of the population of campaigns, given their
wide adoption by candidates. Further, campaigns prioritize undecided voters when craft-
ing appeals (over press and other potential audiences). Therefore, we might assume that
the issue positions crafted by campaigns and consultants on campaign websites reflect the
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strategic calculations made regarding anticipated campaign competition and demographic
changes and composition, at least at the beginning of a campaign (Druckman et al. 2009).
Websites are ideal because nearly every candidate for political office creates a campaign
website to communicate campaign materials to constituents and potential voters, allowing
measures of campaign communication far more representative than TV ads and easily com-
parable across candidates. Further, campaign websites are part of web archives, allowing
researchers to more readily collect data on past elections. To my knowledge, television ad-
vertisements are the only form of political communication that is regularly collected and
coded for researchers. This data, however, is generally embargoed for several years after
elections, seriously hampering the ability of researchers to analyze campaign communication
until several election cycles have passed. Websites have drawbacks as well. Most impor-
tantly, the largest limitation of website data is that it fails to measure issue saturation the
same way that television advertising or other communications might. Though websites do
measure issue valence.
Website data was gathered from Stanford University’s web archiving initiative of at-risk
materials for the 2014 campaign cycle. Stanford’s Political Science Department coordinated
with web archive service, ArchiveIt, to provide an openly available and searchable database of
captures of 2014 primary and general election congressional candidate websites. Depending
on campaign site traffic, sites were archived between 2 and 145 times throughout the primary
and general election. For 2010 and 2012 data, I used ArchiveIt to find a scrape of candidate
websites during each respective primary and general election. Nearly all of the candidates
had campaign websites that had been crawled by ArchiveIt during both the primary and
general election. Since crawls are based partly on web traffic, the only sites that were not
archived were those of extremely marginal candidates who have no campaign apparatus or
communications strategy and whose messaging strategy would likely follow a different data
generating process.
My dependent variables are dichotomous measures of immigration web appeals. For
each candidate’s archived website, I searched for issues pages and hand coded pro- and anti-
immigrant language based on both issue framing and policy emphasis. There were very
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few ambiguous immigration appeals. Anti-immigrant appeals generally frame immigrants as
“illegal”, explicitly “oppose amnesty,” and take a “border first” approach to reform. Pro-
immigrant appeals generally refer to immigrants as “undocumented,” support DREAM Act
legislation, and call for “comprehensive immigration reform.” I explain my coding decisions
in greater detail in the supplemental materials.
5.2.2 Independent Variables
Demographic Change and Demographic Composition
In this paper I focus explicitly on change in the Latino population, as opposed to
Asian American, Arab American, or African immigrant populations for two reasons. First,
even though Asian Americans have surpassed Latinos and Hispanics as the fastest growing
foreign-born group, most of the growth in the immigrant population after the Immigration
and Reform Control Act of 1986 came from Mexican, Central American, and South Amer-
ican immigrants. Second, over the last two decades, immigration trends, media coverage,
and elite rhetoric have established the archetypal immigrant as a low-skilled undocumented
Latino. Therefore, most Americans associate immigrants with undocumented Latinos and
more ably recognize demographic changes in Latino population than in Asian America pop-
ulation (Newman and Velez 2014a).
To measure Latino population growth, I calculated changes in Latino population at
the state level from 2000-2010, 2002-2012, and 2003-2013. All demographic information was
collected from the U.S. Census and American Community Survey (ACS) estimates. 2000 is a
natural starting point for measuring Latino population growth. Throughout the immigration
wave of the 1990s, Latinos increasingly dispersed from traditional immigrant receiving states
into smaller towns, cities, and neighborhoods throughout the country. As they established
roots, many started families, fueling Latino population growth (net migration from Latin
America dropped to around zero during the great recession). Throughout the 2000s Latino
children enrolled in schools, increasing the salience of demographic change and the visibility
of the community to native residents. Further, September 11, 2001 is seen as an important
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turning point in public portrayals of immigrants, and Latinos in particular. Thus, measuring
Latino population growth from the early 2000s to the election year captures these important
contextual changes.
I also use the U.S. Census and ACS to collect information on the number of Latino
registered voters for determining Latino backlash and Democratic pro-immigrant appeals.
Competition
To measure competition I first collected all polling data from Real Clear Politics and
race ratings from Cook Report. For those with Cook Report ratings (general election candi-
dates), I coded the race as competitive for ”toss-up” races, and ahead or behind if the race
was leaning or safe for the candidate. For primary races, I calculated the average of the
earliest polls available during the primary when they were crafting their website appeals.
For races that had no polling, I substituted the final vote tally as an average measure of
campaign competition, though nearly every race that had two or more candidates and was
moderately competitive had at least one poll available. For those candidates that polled
ahead throughout the race, I calculated the spread between their poll average and the near-
est challenger. Each subsequent candidate in the race received a score equivalent to the size
of his or her spread with the leading candidate. I then split candidates into three categories
and created three dummy variables: ahead, behind, and competitive. Given variability and
uncertainty in polling, I categorized all candidates who averaged between 10 points behind
and 10 points ahead in a race as competitive, which is the average range of polling for
candidates who fell into the ”toss-up” or ”lean” categories in the Cook Report. Measuring
competition this way is an improvement over more convenient measures, like winner margin
of victory over opponents which is measured post-treatment, or worse, voter registration
figures (see Nicholson and Miller (1997) for an overview).
5.2.3 Controls
To control for confounding explanations I include a number of additional variables. I include
a dummy for incumbency (Skaperdas and Grofman 1995), a variable measuring 2012 vote
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spread for Mitt Romney by state to rule out variation that might occur due to general
voter ideology in a state, and a measure for mean immigration attitudes. For immigration
attitudes I summed responses to five questions on immigration in the 2010 and 2012 CCES
and then calculated the mean anti-immigrant attitude score for Republicans and Democrats
in each state.
In the pro-immigration models, I include a measure for white proportion of self-
identified Democrats by calculating the percentage of Anglo respondents who self-identify
as Democratic by state. I expect that Democratic candidates who have more white voters
in their states will be less likely to utilize pro-immigrant appeals given their increased re-
liance on white voters for electoral success. I include year dummies to control for effects of
the presidential election or other time variant events not explicitly measured in my models.
Means and standard deviations of all independent variables can be found in the supplemental
materials Table A3.
5.2.4 Methodology
Given that my dependent variables, whether a website includes anti- or pro-immigration
appeals, are dichotomous, I model them using a logistic regression. In the Republican
model, I interact Latino registered voters with level of campaign competition and Latino
registered voters with Latino population growth, as I expect candidates to care about Latino
voters differently across varying levels of campaign competition and state Latino population
growth. I also square Latino population in Republican anti-immigrant models because I
expect the relationship between Latino population and immigration appeals to be non-linear.
Specifically, I want to account for the theorized Latino counter-mobilization effect. For
Democratic pro-immigrant appeal models, I interact competition with Latino voters, but
not with Latino population growth, as population change should not matter for Democratic
candidate strategy. I include the covariate for percentage of Democrats who are white in the
model.
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5.3 Results
I posited that Republicans would be more likely than Democrats to utilize anti-immigrant
appeals and Democrats more likely than Republicans to utilize pro-immigrant appeals. In
Table 5.1, I disaggregate appeals by party. Nearly all of the pro-immigrant appeals are
found on Democratic campaign websites and anti-immigrant appeals on Republican cam-
paign websites. As expected, Republicans generally do not use pro-immigrant appeals and
Democrats generally do not use anti-immigrant appeals.
Table 5.1: Pro- and Anti-Immigrant Appeals Broken Out By Party
Pro-Immigrant Anti-Immigrant
Republicans 8 (2%) 163 (44%)
Democrats 82 (28%) 15 (5%)
5.3.1 Politicizing Demographic Change
For the remainder of the analyses in this paper I estimate two separate models of pro-
and anti-immigrant appeals for Republican and Democratic candidates. In Table 5.2, I
display the point estimates and standard errors for both the Republican anti-immigrant
model and Democratic pro-immigrant model. So few Democrats ran anti-immigrant and
Republicans pro-immigrant appeals and are not modeled. Because it is difficult to interpret
logistic coefficients, particularly when the model includes interactions and non-linear terms,
I instead calculate and plot counterfactual quantities of interest (King et al. 2000).
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Table 5.2: Effect of Context and Competition on Appeals
Anti-Imm (R) Pro-Imm (D)
Intercept −10.292∗∗∗ −3.372∗
(2.721) (1.635)
Latino Voters Sq 0.003
(0.006)
Behind 0.844 −0.577
(0.545) (0.639)
Competitive 1.180 −0.710
(0.822) (0.887)
Latino Pop Growth 0.016∗ −0.000
(0.008) (0.009)
Latino Voters −0.224 0.074∗
(0.198) (0.032)
Romney Vote 1.263 −2.053
(0.800) (1.277)
Unemployment 0.178 0.228
(0.093) (0.127)
Rep Nativism 5.314∗∗∗
(1.606)
General Election −0.374 0.284
(0.300) (0.387)
Incumbent 0.215 −0.572
(0.431) (0.475)
Year 2012 −5.180∗∗∗ −0.162
(1.140) (0.723)
Year 2014 −5.683∗∗∗ −0.105
(1.111) (0.747)
Latino Voters Sq*Behind 0.005 0.020
(0.005) (0.044)
Latino Voters Sq*Competitive 0.012
(0.019)
Latino Voters Sq*Latino Pop Growth −0.000
(0.000)
Latino Voters*Behind −0.139
(0.143)
Latino Voters*Competitive −0.137 0.151
(0.294) (0.087)
Latino Voters*Latino Pop Growth 0.008∗∗
(0.003)
Dem Nativism −0.765
(1.194)
White Dems −0.132
(1.241)
AIC 411.099 229.356
BIC 484.072 283.443
Log Likelihood -186.550 -99.678
Deviance 373.099 199.356
Num. obs. 344 272
Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Column one is for Re-
publican candidates only and two for Democratic candidates only.∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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As hypothesized above, rapid Latino population growth should increase the salience of
immigration in a state and prime anti-immigrant attitudes, particularly among conservative
voters, increasing the probability that Republican candidates will utilize anti-immigrant
appeals. I don’t expect Latino population growth to have a significant impact on Democratic
candidate strategy. Democrats care about cultivating Latino voters, which means that they
are more likely to avoid anti-immigrant appeals, in general, and use pro-immigrant appeals
only when there are enough Latino voters to make it electorally worthwhile. I visualize the
impact of the full range of Latino population growth on probability of immigration appeals in
Figure 5.1, holding all other covariates at their means. We see a strong positive relationship
between the two. Republican candidates in states experiencing the most rapid growth of their
Latino populations are about 77 percentage points [95% CI: 45.2, 92.8] more likely to utilize
anti-immigrant appeals than their counterparts in states with the slowest growing Latino
population. Democrats in rapid Latino growth states, however, are only 4 percentage points
[95% CI: -31, 43] more likely to utilize pro-immigrant appeals than their counterparts in
states with slow Latino population growth. As above, I calculate in-sample first differences,
and find a smaller but still significant effect for Republican candidates, 55.6% [95% CI: 22,
82], and a similar effect for Democratic candidates, 2.4% points [95% CI: –32.9, 36.3].
In general, Republicans are significantly more likely to utilize anti-immigrant appeals
in states with rapid Latino population growth, supporting my second hypothesis. Latino
population growth appears to have no effect on Democratic pro-immigrant appeals. I do,
however, argue that large Latino voting populations will incentivize Democratic candidates
to mobilize pro-immigrant attitudes, particularly in competitive elections. I test this next.
5.3.2 Mobilizing Pro-Immigrant Attitudes
Collingwood et al. (2014) find that Democratic presidential candidates face incentives to
mobilize Latino voters in states with large Latino populations, particularly in competitive
battleground states. I expect the same will be true with U.S. Senate candidates. As hypothe-
sized above, Democrats will avoid alienating white voters by avoiding pro-immigrant appeals
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Figure 5.1: Effect of demographic change on probability of Republican anti-immigrant and
Democratic pro-immigrant web appeals
Solid lines indicate the predicted probabilities of mobilizing immigration attitudes for hypothetical Republi-
can and Democratic candidates in states across the full hypothetical range of state Latino population growth.
All other covariates are held at their means. Shaded areas mark the average uncertainty of my predicted
probabilities (one standard error (95%)). Rug is jittered
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until the size of the Latino voting population is large enough to outweigh that risk. Compe-
tition should increase the importance of Latino voters, too, further increasing the probability
of pro-immigrant appeals, particularly in states with large Latino voting populations.
Figure 5.2: Effect of Latino population on probability of Democratic pro-immigrant web
appeals
Solid lines indicate the predicted probabilities of including pro-immigrant language on a website for Demo-
cratic candidates in competitive and non-competitive campaigns across the full hypothetical range of Latino
voting populations. Rug is jittered.
In Figure 5.2, I display the predicted probabilities of Democratic candidates utilizing
pro-immigrant web appeals given the full hypothetical range of Latino voting populations for
candidates with competitive, winning, and losing campaigns. The impact of Latino voters
also has a large and substantive impact on the probability of using pro-immigrant appeals.
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Democratic candidates in states with large number of Latino voters (mean + 1 s.d.) are
about 34 percentage points [95% CI: 5.9, 60.8] more likely to utilize pro-immigrant appeals
than Democratic candidates in states with an average number of Latino registered voters
(6.1%).
Also as expected, Democrats in competitive elections are more likely than others to
utilize pro-immigrant appeals and more likely to use pro-immigrant appeals in states with
smaller Latino voting populations than losing candidates. The predicted probability of using
pro-immigrant appeals surpasses 50% when Latinos compose around 11% of the state’s total
registered voters. Candidates in losing campaigns tend to only utilize pro-immigrant appeals
in states with much larger Latino voting populations, suggesting that losing candidates are
less likely to take risks mobilizing Latino voters than candidates with a large polling margin
or in a competitive race.
5.3.3 Anti-Immigrant Appeals
Using anti-immigrant appeals, I argue, is electorally tempting for Republican candidates, par-
ticularly in states with rapidly growing Latino populations and in competitive races. This
relationship, however, is moderated by the size of the Latino voting population. Sizable
Latino voting populations can counter-mobilize against anti-immigrant candidates. When
the Latino voting population reaches a certain size, I expect the probability that candidates
will peak and decrease. In the next plot I visualize the relationship between competition,
Latino population growth, and Latino voters for Republicans utilizing anti-immigrant ap-
peals. Figure 5.3 displays the predicted probability that Republican candidates use anti-
immigrant web appeals across varying levels of competition and Latino voting populations
with all other covariates, except Latino population growth, held at their means. Because
of how Latino population growth is calculated (percentage change, not percentage point
change), growth rates are going to be larger in states with small baseline Latino popula-
tions and lower in states with large baseline Latino populations. Running counterfactual
simulations while holding this variable at its mean would create unrealistic scenarios. To
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compensate for this, the Latino population growth variable decreases in equal increments in
my model matrix from the mean growth rate for states with the smallest Latino population
(100%) to the mean growth rate for states with the largest Latino populations (28%) across
the full range of Latino voting populations.
Figure 5.3: Effect of competition and Latino voters on probability of Republican anti-
immigrant web appeals
Solid lines indicate the predicted probabilities of mobilizing anti-immigrant attitudes for hypothetical Re-
publican candidates in states with adjusted Latino growth across the full hypothetical range of observed
Latino voting populations. Rug is jittered.
First, I find that Republican candidates in competitive elections are slightly more likely
than Republican candidates in non-competitive elections to utilize anti-immigrant appeals.
Candidates who are winning or losing are less likely to use anti-immigrant appeals, though
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the difference is small.
Second, I find that Latino voters moderate this relationship as expected. In states with
large Latino voting populations, I find that candidates are less likely to utilize anti-immigrant
appeals across all levels of competition. I hypothesized that candidates in competitive races
would be quicker to moderate their appeals given the increased importance of Latino voters
in these races, but find little evidence of this. It appears that the presence of Latino voters
decreases the likelihood that Republicans use anti-Latino appeals regardless of the level of
competition in the race. We see, therefore, that there may be a tipping point of Latino voter
influence where candidate strategy begins to shift away from xenophobic anti-immigrant
appeals. We see this transition already in states like New Jersey (10.1%), New York (12%),
Nevada (13.7%), and Florida (16.7%).
While these results are suggestive, one of this study’s largest liabilities is the lack of
states with large Latino populations as illustrated by the rug on my x-axis, suggesting that
the non-monotonic relationship between Latino registered voters and anti-immigrant appeals
is reliant, partly, on model specification. The trouble with forecasting electoral appeals in
states where Latino voters serve as counter-mobilization threats is that there are so few. As
the rug indicates, the vast majority states have between zero and 10 percent Latino registered
voters. The upper half of the plot is informed by data from just a few states (California
and New Mexico). These concerns are partially assuaged by examining the non-parametric
relationship between these two variables (see Figure A1 in the supplemental materials).
Future work should test this hypothesized relationship in House districts where we observe
much greater variation in the size of the Latino voting population.
In sum, my data suggests that Republican U.S. Senate candidates use anti-immigrant
appeals, particularly in competitive elections and in states with rapid Latino population
growth, but do fear potential backlash from Latino voters who might counter-mobilize in
response and in opposition. Similarly, Democrats refrain from pro-immigrant appeals unless
a state contains enough Latino voters to overcome the risk of losing white voters. Further, as
predicted, campaign competition ultimately moderates the perceived importance of Latino
voters, at least as measured by immigration appeals.
165
5.4 Conclusion
Despite rapid and drastic demographic changes in the United States over the last several
decades, and despite a brief attempt by Republican political operatives to mobilize Lati-
nos during President George W. Bush’s 2000 and 2004 Presidential bids, the largely white
GOP has coalesced around an anti-immigrant position, particularly with the candidacy of
Donald J. Trump. Despite a 2012 Republican National Committee report calling for greater
racial inclusiveness within the Republican Party, President Donald J. Trump ran a campaign
focused on building a border wall with Mexico, deporting undocumented immigrants, and
banning Muslims from the United States. Trump’s anti-immigrant appeals likely were a
strong mobilizing factor for his largely White base of voters, helping him soar past his 16
opponents in the primary and win a general election with strong support from working class
white voters in the Rust Belt.
The Democratic Party, in contrast, has increasingly become the home of Asian Amer-
icans and Latinos, who together with African Americans and progressive whites, compose a
racially diverse party and support liberal immigration policy. Democratic presidential can-
didate Hillary Clinton often appealed to minority voters in speeches on the campaign trail
and in television advertisements. Indeed, many pundits have singled out Clinton’s focus on
identity appeals to racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and her lack of outreach to working
class whites as two of the reasons for her loss.
Thus, Republican candidates up and down the ballot have strong short term electoral
incentives to mobilize racial conservatives. Republican candidates can, and do, turn to
anti-immigrant appeals as long as they don’t risk counter-mobilizing the Latino community.
Democrats, as Clinton illustrated, must walk a finer line between maintaining white support
and mobilizing minority voters.
Yet racial party cleavages do not alone explain why Senate candidates like Scott Brown
in New Hampshire ran a campaign almost exclusively focused on anti-immigrant appeals
while Cory Gardner in Colorado focused his attention primarily on energy and health care.
My theory of contemporary immigration appeals helps explain campaign cost-benefit deci-
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sions regarding campaign issue appeals. It is ultimately the interplay of politics and de-
mographics, specifically Latino population growth, Latino voters, and competition, that are
increasingly driving the use of immigration appeals in U.S. electoral campaigns, particularly
at the state and local level.
As states continue to rapidly diversify, then, Republican candidates face incentives
to racialize and politicize these demographic changes for electoral gain. As the minority
population expands within a state, however, racial, ethnic, and religious minority voters can
organize and countermobilize, threatening the electoral prospects of candidates running on
xenophobic platforms and increasing the likelihood of electoral or policy concessions from
Democrats. This is the pattern we have already seen in California and New York, and are
starting to see in rapidly changing states like Nevada, Colorado, and Virginia. Each election
cycle, Arizona and Texas become slightly more Democratic.
The increasing use of immigration appeals illustrates that the United States is far from
post-racial, particularly in electoral politics. The use of anti-immigrant appeals, which are
less risky than anti-black appeals, is becoming commonplace around the country. More
attention should be paid to the racialized content of these immigration appeals and their
impact on racial attitudes in the United States. Further, this research suggests that Repub-
lican candidates are using immigration appeals as wedge issues to persuade cross-pressured
Democrats, further deepening racial cleavages between the two parties. As this cleavage
widens, the policy implications of this racial divide is potentially drastic. Finally, this re-
search highlights the increasingly important role that Latino voters are playing in electoral
politics, influence that may result in better substantive representation in the future.
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5.5 Supplemental Appendix
5.5.1 Coding Immigration Appeals
In order to build a dictionary of immigration appeals and understand how pro-immigrant ap-
peals differ from anti-immigrant appeals, I acquired a list of the most pro- and anti-immigrant
U.S. Senators from NumbersUSA’s website. NumbersUSA, a fervent anti-immigrant group,
issues report cards grading sitting Congressmen on past votes, public statements, and actions
regarding immigration. Those who receive an “A” are the most voraciously anti-immigrant
and those who receive an “F” are the most pro-immigrant, given their lifetime political
records.
I scraped all of the HTLM from their official ‘.gov’ websites and extracted text from each
section on “immigration.” If the page had no issues page or immigration-specific language,
I removed it from my sample. I removed stop words and pooled the language into a single
vector for pro-immigrant senators and another for anti-immigrant senators. Each of these
were then parsed into bi-grams. I then sorted the bi-grams by frequency to look for patterns
in the language that each group used when talking about immigration.
The bi-grams from the senators’ webpages were highly predictable. For instance, anti-
immigrant senators, those who scored A+ with NumbersUSA, most frequently frame im-
migration as an issue of law and order and national security. Some of the most common
bigrams from these Senators include: ”illegal immigrants,” ”border security,” ”immigration
laws,” ”illegal amnesty,” ”executive amnesty,” and ”national security.” A lot of the language
appears to be in response to President Obama’s executive action on immigration in 2014.
Pro-immigrant candidates spoke more to reforming the immigration system and providing a
pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. Some of their most common phrases
included: ”[comprehensive] immigration reform,” ”undocumented immigrants,” ”broken im-
migration,” ”path citizenship,” and ”economic opportunity” (all summarized in Table 5.3).
I used these frames to guide my coding decisions. Some further examples of website text
and codes can be found in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.3: Common Bi-Grams
Pro-Immigrant Anti-Immigrant
immigration reform illegal immigrants
undocumented immigrants border security
broken immigration immigration laws
path citizenship illegal amnesty
economic opportunity executive amnesty
5.5.2 Additional Robustness Checks
Ballot Initatives
Using Ballotpedia’s database of state ballot initiatives I found that only two states in
the three years of my study, Oregon and Montana, had ballot initiatives on immigration,
and therefore this could not be an important part of the story, at least in the years I am
analyzing. It could be the case that candidates simply react to their opponents and variation
in appeals is driven, in part, by simply responding to a few policy entrepreneurs. I find little
evidence of this effect. In only 4 of 99 general election campaigns did both candidates go
negative or positive. In only 5 primary campaigns did all candidates go negative or positive.
I suspect that part of this lack of back-and-forth is driven in part by my selection of website
text as my dependent variable. As noted, website campaigns tend to be crafted early in a
campaign and tend to be quite stable, potentially masking at least rhetorical exchanges on
issues that become salient during the heat of a senate race.
Latino Turnout
Finally, it could also be the case that Latinos in some states are more predisposed to
turnout and vote than in other states, a fact that would be well known to campaign operatives
in those states. I run a robustness check controlling for Latino propensity to mobilize in
previous elections. To do this, I downloaded the CPS for 2008, 2010, and 2012, calculating
a self-reported Latino turnout score for each state. Because the CPS doesn’t oversample
Latino respondents, some of the samples were too small to calculate turnout scores. For
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these states, and for each year, I imputed a turnout score by as the average Latino turnout
across all states in that census region (South, West, Northeast, North Central) for that year.
I find that the turnout score has no independent effect in my models as shown in Table 5.6,
below.
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Table 5.4: Sample Web Text
Pro-Immigrant Anti-Immigrant
“America is better and stronger be-
cause of immigrants. That’s why Mark
believes comprehensive immigration re-
form should be a top priority—it will
strengthen families, boost the econ-
omy, shrink the deficit, and create jobs.
He also supports the DREAM Act be-
cause young people who know no other
home than America should have the
opportunity to fully contribute to our
communities, economy, and national
security and eventually be eligible for
citizenship.”
“Our borders have been unsecured for
so long our country will need to get
ready for what’s going to happen next.
Our enemies brag about their infiltra-
tion and I believe at some point they
will attempt to harm American citi-
zens. First the borders must be se-
cured. Then those undocumented per-
sons will have to either become citizens
and pay taxes or prepare to leave our
country after their work visa run out.
Our military will need to train state
and local law enforcement on how to
protect our homeland.”
“He’ll fight in the Senate to pass com-
prehensive immigration reform that en-
courages individuals who were edu-
cated here to innovate here, cracks
down on employers who hire undocu-
mented workers, lays out a path to cit-
izenship for the eleven million undoc-
umented immigrants who are already
here and allows the DREAM Act’s
“DREAMers”—those individuals who
were brought here at a young age—to
earn citizenship by serving in the U.S.
military or pursuing higher education.”
“If we cannot learn from our mis-
takes, we are doomed to repeat the
past. Amnesty is one of those mistakes.
We have been promised time and time
again that our officials secure our bor-
ders, only to find those laws lost in the
political red tape. As a nation, we can-
not continue to simply welcome people
with open wallets when they refuse to
follow our citizenship laws. We were
founded as a nation welcoming all peo-
ple, and we should continue in that tra-
dition. However, that does not mean
continuous handouts to illegals when
they sneak across our borders.”
“The current political debate has set a
side one very important aspect of im-
migration, the human cost. Many fam-
ilies have been torn apart and the im-
pact on children has been severe. De-
portation of undocumented parents has
left U.S. citizen children to be raised by
neighbors or marginally older siblings,
while others have been placed in the
foster system. The thought of any close
friend or neighbor having to face such
a circumstance should invoke compas-
sion and empathy, regardless of party
affiliation.”
“I am not for amnesty. I believe that
we must reform our Broken Immigra-
tion system. It is not modern, prohibits
our economic opportunities, and allows
many to receive benefits while undocu-
mented. If we intend to deal with over-
stays and illegal entries, then we must
have a logical plan to do so.”
Note: Cells indicate full immigration sample web appeal taken from pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant
senator websites.
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Table 5.5: Independent Variables
2010 2012 2014
Competitive 0.222 0.213 0.142
(0.417) (0.411) (0.349)
Ahead 0.424 0.388 0.284
(0.495) (0.489) (0.452)
Behind 0.354 0.382 0.564
(0.479) (0.487) (0.497)
Latino Voters 0.061 0.074 0.051
(0.061) (0.092) (0.072)
Latino Pop Growth 0.590 0.774 0.974
(0.229) (0.290) (0.353)
Romney Vote 0.015 -0.007 0.071
(0.209) (0.217) (0.187)
Unemployment 7.501 7.295 7.186
(1.639) (1.777) (1.631)
GOP Nativism 1.418 2.017 2.009
(0.086) (0.246) (0.118)
Incumbent 0.268 0.202 0.127
(0.444) (0.403) (0.334)
Note: Means and standard deviations (parentheses) of each independent variable by year.
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Table 5.6: Regression Results with Latino Turnout
Anti-Imm (R) Anti-Imm (R) Pro-Imm (D) Pro-Imm (D)
Intercept −10.292∗∗∗ −10.094∗∗∗ −3.372∗ −3.004
(2.721) (2.789) (1.635) (2.231)
Latino Voters Sq 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Behind 0.844 0.833 −0.577 −0.583
(0.545) (0.545) (0.639) (0.640)
Competitive 1.180 1.177 −0.710 −0.730
(0.822) (0.821) (0.887) (0.892)
Latino Pop Growth 0.016∗ 0.016∗ −0.000 −0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Latino Voters −0.224 −0.231 0.074∗ 0.074∗
(0.198) (0.199) (0.032) (0.032)
Romney Vote 1.263 1.192 −2.053 −2.077
(0.800) (0.828) (1.277) (1.279)
Unemployment 0.178 0.177 0.228 0.226
(0.093) (0.093) (0.127) (0.127)
Rep Nativism 5.314∗∗∗ 5.375∗∗∗
(1.606) (1.623)
General Election −0.374 −0.376 0.284 0.283
(0.300) (0.300) (0.387) (0.387)
Incumbent 0.215 0.210 −0.572 −0.565
(0.431) (0.431) (0.475) (0.477)
Year 2012 −5.180∗∗∗ −5.206∗∗∗ −0.162 −0.120
(1.140) (1.147) (0.723) (0.746)
Year 2014 −5.683∗∗∗ −5.747∗∗∗ −0.105 −0.128
(1.111) (1.131) (0.747) (0.757)
Latino Voters Sq*Behind 0.005 0.005 0.020 0.020
(0.005) (0.005) (0.044) (0.044)
Latino Voters Sq*Competitive 0.012 0.012
(0.019) (0.019)
Latino Voters Sq*Latino Pop Growth −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Latino Voters*Behind −0.139 −0.137
(0.143) (0.142)
Latino Voters*Competitive −0.137 −0.135 0.151 0.153
(0.294) (0.293) (0.087) (0.087)
Latino Voters*Latino Pop Growth 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Turnout −0.005 −0.006
(0.014) (0.027)
Dem Nativism −0.765 −0.779
(1.194) (1.201)
White Dems −0.132 −0.152
(1.241) (1.239)
AIC 411.099 412.990 229.356 231.298
BIC 484.072 489.803 283.443 288.990
Log Likelihood -186.550 -186.495 -99.678 -99.649
Deviance 373.099 372.990 199.356 199.298
Num. obs. 344 344 272 272
Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses.∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p <
0.01, ∗p < 0.05
173
Figure 5.4: Non-Parametric Relationship Latino Voters and Anti-Immigrant Appeals
Note: Jittered scatter of Republican anti-immigrant appeals with smoother.
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